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New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Call for Articles
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship (NEJE), published twice a year by Sacred Heart University’s John F. Welch College
of Business, is an invaluable forum for exchange of scholarly ideas, practices, pedagogy, and policies in the field of entrepreneurship and small business management.
The Journal is currently seeking original contributions that have not been published or are under consideration elsewhere.
The scope of the articles published in NEJE range from theoretical/conceptual to empirical research, with maximum relevance
to practicing entrepreneurs.The Journal will consider practitioner interviews, book reviews, experiential exercises, cases, and
articles dealing with entrepreneurial education.The Journal appeals to a broad audience, so articles submitted should be written in such a manner that those outside of academics would be able to comprehend and appreciate the content of the material.

Format
Manuscripts submitted to NEJE should be written in Microsoft Word or saved in RTF (rich text format). All papers should be
submitted electronically, via e-mail attachment, to hsherman@southampton.liu.edu.
Accompanying each manuscript, as a separate file, should be (a) an abstract of the article (100 words maximum), (b) a biographical sketch of the author(s), and (c) a page with manuscript title and the order of authors as well as the primary author’s
name, mailing address, preferred e-mail, phone and fax numbers.
Authors’ names should not appear anywhere in the manuscript including Word document properties.
Papers are to be double-spaced with one-inch margins. References should be included on separate pages at the end of the
paper. Manuscripts should he no longer than 20 pages of text and 25 pages total, including abstract, text, tables or illustrations,
notes, and works cited. Please consult APA style guidelines for all formatting details.

Copyright
The copyright of published articles will belong to the publishers of NEJE. Authors will be granted permission to reprint or
otherwise use portions of their articles published in the Journal upon written request.

Review Process
All articles will be double-blind refereed.Authors will normally receive reviewers’ comments and the editors’ publishing decision in approximately 90 days of submission.

Submission
All snail-mail correspondence should be addressed to:
Herbert Sherman, Ph.D.
Editor, New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Southampton College—Long Island University
239 Montauk Highway
Southampton, NY 11968
Phone: (631) 287-8285
Fax: (631) 287-8441
e-mail: hsherman@southampton.liu.edu
Visit our web page at http://business.sacredheart.edu/neje.html

Sample Copies
Sample copies of previous issues are available from Joshua Shuart,Associate Editor, on a first-come, first-served basis.
Please contact him via e-mail at shuartj@sacredheart.edu.
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New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
From the Editors:
In the Spring 2005 issue we announced that Dr. Lorry Weinstein, co-founder and editor of the Journal, was retiring
as editor and that an interim editor would shortly be named.We would like to thank Dr.Weinstein for his arduous
and ardent efforts on behalf of the Journal and note that he will continue to remain on the editorial board. We
would also like to thank Dr. Herbert Sherman of Southampton College, Long Island University, for taking on the onerous task of interim editor. Dr. Sherman has served as the editor of the Journal of Behavioral and Applied
Management and has just retired as the founding editor of the CASE Journal. Both are online journals and he looks
forward to working on a hardcopy one.
You may have noticed when you perused the front and inside cover of this issue that we have instituted some new
and, we hope, creative and stimulating changes. It is our intention and fervent wish to position the journal as a
bridge between academics and practitioners and, within the academic community, a bridge between researchers
and instructors.To carry out this mission, we have segmented the journal into several topical areas including book
reviews, minority and women entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial education, practitioner’s corner, practitioner’s interviews, and international entrepreneurship and appointed an associate editor in charge of each area.We hope to have
at least one manuscript published in each area per issue, therein creating a balanced arrangement.
The associate editors have been charged with the task of soliciting manuscripts for their area and managing the
review process. The editor will forward manuscripts received through the normal solicitation process to them as
per their subject area. Manuscripts that fall outside of their jurisdiction will be processed, as before, by the editor.
Manuscripts that are accepted by the associate editors will be featured in their own section of the Journal, with
an accompanying note from the associate editor.
This issue features five articles and one case.The first article written by Rolland LeBrasseur, Huguette Blanco, and
John Dodge of Laurentian University, entitled “Growth Intentions of Owner-Managers of Young Microfirms,” is an
empirical piece, which examines the intended growth of young microfirms and postulated that these firms could
be categorized as either Lifestylers, Entrepreneurs, Managers, or Movers.Their research indicated that this typology
was accurate and furthermore that government and nonprofit agencies supporting business growth should take
these characteristics into account when providing assistance.
Maria Minniti of Babson College also examined government support for entrepreneurial activities in the second article, entitled “A Cross-Country Assessment of Government Intervention and Entrepreneurial Activity.” This empirical
study, employing original data from a representative sample of 10,000 individuals and from more than 300 semiopen interviews in 10 countries, provides some suggestive evidence that government intervention aimed at enhancing the underlying environment of entrepreneurial decisions may be more effective than intervention designed to
provide safety nets.
We go from macro empirical research to a micro two-part field-based disguise case when Herbert Sherman,
Southampton College–Long Island University, and Daniel J. Rowley, University of Northern Colorado, present a
rather intriguing real-life situation:What do you do if you run a family firm, hired your only progeny to run the business, and then had that offspring quit a few days later? There are some challenging twists and turns in this case as
Part B provides the reader with additional information that turns the case (and the situation) on its head!
The next two articles—“Capital Accessibility, Gender and Ethnicity: The Case of Minority Women-Owned Firms” by
Leyland M. Lucas, Morgan State University and “The Embedded Entrepreneur: Recognizing the Strength of Ethnic
Social Ties” by Ed Chung and Kim Whalen, Elizabethtown College—deal with gender and ethnicity issues and are
described by our associate editor, Miles K. Davis. Last, but never least, Joseph E. Levangie has again graced us with
another practitioner article as he has teamed up with Deaver Brown of Simply Magazine to tell us all about sales
through the imagery of the purchase order in the article entitled “The Often-Neglected Term in the Entrepreneurial
Equation—the Purchase Order.” Joe has also provided us some chance pearls of wisdom in the introduction to the
article.
We look forward to hearing from you, our readership, concerning these changes and would appreciate your feedback and suggestions.

Herbert Sherman
Editor

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2006

Joshua Shuart
Associate Editor and Web Master

Lorry Weinstein
Editor Emeritus
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New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
From the Associate Editors:
Joseph E. Levangie—The Practitioner’s Corner
The Practitioner’s Corner has been edited for the last two years by Joseph E. Levangie who has nearly three
decades of entrepreneurial experience. Joe has been involved in more than five dozen start-ups, has helped raise
over $600 million for these emerging ventures, including a dozen public capital raise-ups. He has observed the
“good, the bad and the ugly” of entrepreneurship. He has personally contributed six articles to NEJE.
The Practitioner’s Corner encompasses subject areas that reflect the actual touch and feel of the entrepreneurial
experience. Candidate manuscripts should address a practical concern for the entrepreneur or those interested
in real-world aspects of the venturing challenge, including functional concerns (finance, sales, planning, outsourcing, etc.); psychological issues (motivational factors, risk assessment, decision making, etc.); and insights into a
changing entrepreneurial environment (new laws and regulations, the rise of China, etc.). Manuscripts should be
12–30 pages in length, include citations for references to quotes and factual data and be written in a style appealing to the practicing entrepreneur or followers of the genre.
In this issue, I collaborated with a long-time colleague, Deaver Brown, to address how businesses should “make
sales happen” in our article entitled “The Often-Neglected Term in the Entrepreneurial Equation—the Purchase
Order.” I warn you that Brown’s elitist education (Choate, Harvard College, Harvard Business School) should not
be interpreted as a lack of “street smarts”; Brown’s more entrepreneurially friendly credentials include winning
Golden Gloves boxing medals and selling Fuller Brush products door-to-door! To ascertain how the entrepreneur
can wrest an order from a prospective customer, read on!

Miles K. Davis—Minority and Women Entrepreneurs
As a new associate editor at NEJE, I would like to briefly introduce myself. I am an associate professor of management at Shenandoah University and the director of the Institute for Entrepreneurship. In my academic and
professional life, I strive to bridge the gap that sometimes exists between theory and practice.The articles in this
section are examples of the kind of scholarship that does just that.
While it is assumed that minority women-owned business are undercapitalized as a result of bias and discriminatory practices in capital markets, Leyland M. Lucas of Morgan State University in the article entitled “Capital
Accessibility, Gender and Ethnicity: The Case of Minority Women-Owned Firms” makes a compelling argument
that in practice the issues are much more complex. He argues that while discrimination may exist, most financing institutions are behaving as they should and the lack of capital access is more explained by inexperience,
information inaccessibility, and liabilities of newness and size. Whether you agree or disagree with the hypotheses offered by Dr. Lucas, this article will certainly add to the debate regarding financing of minority womenowned businesses.
Ed Chung and Kim Whalen of Elizabethtown College in their article,“The Embedded Entrepreneur: Recognizing
the Strength of Ethnic Social Ties,” premised on the idea that social networks represent an important, but often
overlooked, unit of analysis in management and entrepreneurship studies.The concept of embeddedness, emphasizing the significance of social relationships, is of particular relevance as more and more frequently minorities
and immigrants engage in small business ownership.This article borrows from the ethnicity and social network
traditions, and offers that an analysis of the ethnic homogeneity of an entrepreneur’s strong and weak social ties
would be fruitful in gauging entrepreneurial success.
I hope if you have a thought-provoking, challenging issue regarding women and minority entrepreneurs, you will
submit your scholarly work to NEJE. If you wish to contact me directly regarding whether an article is suitable,
I can most easily be reached by email at mdavi3@su.edu and every once in awhile I am actually in my office (540)
545-7314.
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Barry R. Armandi—Book Reviews
Welcome to the book reviews section of the NEJE. Our purpose in this section is to present reviews of not only
current books in the field, but also other materials such as case books, simulations, and exercises.We would also
encourage reviews of classic books and materials.
Two problems, however, have been identified to get the book reviews section off the proverbial ground. First, we
need reviewers. Reviewing is not the laborious process many of us have felt in the past. We have created guidelines not only to aid in reviewing, but also to standardize our reviews.The guidelines are posted on our website
for easy downloading. If you wish to review, please send an email to the address at the bottom of this introduction.
The second problem is coverage of the field. We would like you to recommend works that should be reviewed.
We have a number in the pipeline already, and if there is duplication, we’ll let you know. Likewise, if there are
some older “classic” materials you use or wish to see reviewed, then again please contact us. Once you make a
recommendation, hopefully you will want to do the review.
I look forward to hearing from you (armandi@attglobal.net or armandib@oldwestbury.edu) .

Pamela Hopkins—Entrepreneurial Education
Are you interested in finding new ways to make learning environments exciting yet still challenging and stimulating to the students and to you? Would you like to discuss new techniques with your colleagues? Would it be
exciting to hear about students’ experiences in these dynamic classrooms from the students themselves? Or what
about sharing entrepreneurial education experiences using online instruction?
As associate editor of entrepreneurship education, my goal is to report these learning techniques and experiences
so that we all may grow as teachers. I see this as a forum whereby we are discussing cutting-edge entrepreneurship education—maybe it is an idea, an application, an experiment, or a critique.
Entrepreneurs tell us many times that their successful ventures came about after a failure. I believe it is the same
with entrepreneurial professors, who are always venturing to try new teaching methods and techniques. So, even
if you think your attempt was unsuccessful, I think it is worthy to read about why. Maybe a tweak here and there
through our discussion or even a change of venue can bring about success.
I am Pamela J. Hopkins and have been a professor for the past 26 years, currently teaching management at
Southern Connecticut State University.As the associate editor of entrepreneurship education, I invite you to join
me in creating a forum whereby we can share and discuss classroom experiences.With the acceleration of technology combined with diverse ways of student learning, a variety of exciting venues exist for us to explore.
This is a call for papers that explore creative and innovative approaches to entrepreneurial education. This is a
call to all those teachers who are experimenting with accomplishing learning outcomes. If you enjoy this education experiment, please take the time to write up your experience so we can share and learn.

Daniel J. Rowley—Practitioner Interviews
Daniel J. Rowley is a professor of management and chair of the Management Department at the Monfort College
of Business at the University of Northern Colorado. He is the lead author of four scholarly books on strategic planning in colleges and universities; a workbook in the same series; a book on academic supervision; and a forthcoming textbook on business strategic management with Dr. Sherman. He is the author of articles and presentations
on these subjects nationally and internationally. He has served as editor and as associate editor of the Journal of
Behavioral and Applied Management, and has published book reviews and article reviews in several different
journals. He received his B.A. from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1969; his MPA from the University of
Denver in 1978; and his Ph.D. from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1987.

FROM THE ASSOCIATE EDITORS 5
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Practitioner interviews need to be objective and less personal in approach. Accolades for experience, position,
and power should be placed either in the introduction or in the final biographical piece. They should not be
placed within the body of the discussion. The interview must focus on what the entrepreneur has deduced
about entrepreneurialism and how he or she has used it specifically in his or her career. To me, being able to
show how entrepreneurialism has been a significant player is of extreme interest to the readers of an academic journal. See prior issues and our website for examples.

Gerry W. Scheffelmaier—International Entrepreneurship
Gerry W. Scheffelmaier is an assistant professor of entrepreneurship with a Ph.D. in business information systems
from Utah State University, an M.Ed. in business and marketing and a B.S. in accounting from Central Washington
University. His interests include buyer behavior and e-commerce. Dr. Scheffelmaier has employed the “Baseball
Model” to describe a business start-up or failing e-commerce businesses. In the model, each base on the baseball
diamond is occupied by one of three components necessary to establish, create, and implement a successful ecommerce business.
NEJE is quite interested in receiving any articles that deal with international entrepreneurship—that is, any article dealing with U.S. entrepreneurs working outside of the states as well as any articles pertaining to non-U.S.
entrepreneurial ventures. Both conceptual and empirical articles are encouraged as well as international case
studies.
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Join the Institute of Behavioral
and Applied Management
at the 14th annual conference at the downtown Memphis Marriott
and share your ideas, research, and experiences
in a friendly and supportive environment.
Session discussions are lively, informative and broad-based.
You will be warmly welcomed and we predict
you will enjoy interacting professionally and personally
in an atmosphere where you are a valued individual and colleague.

Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management Conference
Memphis Marriott Downtown, October 5 – 7, 2006
http://www.ibam.com

Past participants report: “IBAM ’ s culture is friendly, collegial . . . great

atmosphere for faculty, practitioners, and students where teaching, research,
and professional development are equally important. Lively discussions to
receive helpful , constructive feedback.”
Workshops, panels, symposium, research papers, and works-in-progress.
Six divisions addressing management practices and research in:
·
Human Resource Management
·
Management Education
·
Organizational Behavior
·
Global Management and Strategy
·
Student Papers
·
And focus on two special topics this year:
Entrepreneurship and Spirituality
See IBAM’s web-site http://www.ibam.com
or David Schmidt, PhD and IBAM 14 Program Chair/VP
at schmidtd@cedarville.edu for additional information.
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Growth Intentions of Owner-Managers of Young Microfirms
Rolland LeBrasseur
Huguette Blanco
John Dodge
survey of young microfirms was conducted to investigate their growth intentions. The findings confirm
the distinct profiles of four types of firms categorized on the basis of current and future employment:
Lifestyler, Entrepreneur, Manager, and Mover. They differ in
terms of the owner’s perceptions of the desirability and
practicality of growing their firm, and with respect to the
moderating variables of industry affiliation, business location, and investment level. Research issues and service
implications for business support agencies are identified.

A

Over the past few years, private and public resources have
been expended to help entrepreneurs move from the idea
stage to the start-up stage and survive their initial years of
operation. In contrast, research and practices to help young
firms in the initial growth stage has lagged (Chaganti et al.
2002; White 2002). Given the current state of knowledge, a
descriptive study of initial growth would be a positive contribution to our understanding of the issues.
The purpose of the study is to identify the characteristics
of young firms that are likely to experience growth.The study
is guided by a typology of young firms that differentiates
them on the basis of current and future levels of employment. Growth intentions are investigated using the ShaperoKrueger Model (Krueger et al. 2000) that focuses on the perceptions of the businessowners in terms of the desirability
and practicality of growing their young enterprises, and the
impact of moderating variables.The end result is a profile of
four types of young firms and a discussion of service implications for the small business support agencies.

Diversity within the Small Business Sector
In Canada, as well as in other industrialized countries, small
businesses have replaced large firms as the motor of economic development, hence the interest in improving the survival
rate of business start-ups (OECD 2000; Industry Canada
1996). By their very nature, small businesses are well suited
to meeting the challenges of a changing economy because
they can sustain an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit
while remaining agile and adaptive to change (Industry
Canada 2002).
Based on surveys executed by Statistics Canada,
Industry Canada (2003) reported that microenterprises
(0–4 employees) accounted for 19 percent of all businesses.

Microenterprises are distributed broadly across both the
goods-producing and service-producing sectors of the economy, but are predominant in construction, retail trade, business services, and consumer services.
The number of self-employed persons has grown substantially in the 1980s and 1990s (Industry Canada 2003,
Table 10; Stanworth and Stanworth 1995). Of the selfemployed people in Canada, 34 percent made use of paid
help as either employees or contract staff.This statistic suggests that some of these one-person enterprises are evolving into employee-based enterprises. Self-employed persons
are not likely to become paid employees of another firm
(Dennis and Solomon 2001), as they have chosen this vocation. However, they are not a homogeneous group, and are
driven by motives such as autonomy and independence,
creativity, and security and stability (Feldman and Bolino
2000).
Working with small firms with fewer than 500 employees,
Rutherford, McMullen, and Oswald (2001) have confirmed
that discriminators based on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and of the firm (i.e., firm age) can be used to identify two groups of small businesses.They suggested additional
investigation to identify subgroups of small firms.This suggestion, derived from their study of established firms, may be
pertinent to the young and developing firms, which may
form a distinct group with its own subgroups (e.g., small v.
micro, industry). The academic literature typically explains
the behavior of the young firms in terms of stage of development [see Ardichvili et al. (1998) for a review of a variety of
models]. In contrast, Chrisman et al. (1998) presented a
model for new firms anchored in the strategic literature.
Chrisman’s model is appealing because it covers both internal and external factors that may influence the competitive
success of the young enterprise. Also, Chrisman et al. define
“new” as less than 10 years in operation, arguing that there
are unique circumstances in the first decade of a firm’s existence (e.g., establishing core competencies). The cut-off of
the first decade is validated by the survival statistics noted in
the Industry Canada study (2003), which showed that it takes
about 10 years for the microfirms to improve their survival
rate to the survival rate of larger firms with 5 to 99 employees.The Industry Canada study also showed that microfirms
have a relatively low survival rate in their first year of operations, thus justifying the focus of this study to microfirms 2 to
10 years old.

GROWTH INTENTIONS
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Growth of Small Businesses
Growth in a firm may be defined alternatively as the rate of
increase in sales volume or the rate of increase in the number of employees experienced by the firm. Both measures of
growth are considered important, but the addition of
employees, especially the initial employees, may be a greater
challenge for the young firm. Since small businesses are usually defined in term of employment (see discussion above),
growth in this article refers to increasing the employment
level of the firm.
The attention of interested observers, such as lending
institutions and economic development agencies, has recently been captured by hypergrowth and the “gazelle” (Birch et
al. 1999; Rumball 2001). In a recent study of the Canadian
economy, Halabisky, Dreessen, and Parsley (2004) confirmed
that the “gazelles” are the star contributors to employment
growth. However, the authors also stressed that the Canadian
economy has reaped substantial benefits from small businesses that experience strong, but not hyper, growth. It can be
argued that pacing the growth of the young firm may be a
wise decision for owners who need more time to assess the
growth opportunities and build the business to exploit these
opportunities. However, economic developers view the
young firm that limits itself to a one-person operation as a
poor investment target. Morrison, Breen, and Ali (2003)
argued that, because of limited supply, public resources
should be directed to young firms that are likely to create
employment. How can we best identify which young
microfirms are likely to create employment?
The diverse approaches to explaining firm growth recognize the interdependence of the businessowner and the
enterprise created. Cope and Watts (2000, p. 108) argued
“that there exists a complex, interactive and mutual relationship between the individual and the organization,
where entrepreneurs actively share their learning with
their business, both shaping its growth and direction and
passively adapting to the changing demands of the enterprise.” It follows that in order to study growth of the small
firm, personal, business, and industry variables must be
addressed simultaneously.

Growth Intentions in Small Business Start-ups
Researchers generally agree that growth in the firm is deliberate, and depends on the owner’s mindset composed of his
or her business vision, personal motivations, attitudes, and
perceptions. The mind becomes focused through entrepreneurial intentions that guide the owner’s decisions and
actions. Bird (1988, 1992) described this concept as a cognitive tension between the business vision and current conditions. She proposed that the owner’s intentions could be a
key determinant of organizational success and growth.

Wiklund et al. (1997) concluded that growth intentions
were moderately strong predictors of goal-directed behavior
(Doll and Ajzen 1992; Kim and Hunter 1993). Kim and
Hunter (1993) and Armitage and Conner (2001) have
demonstrated through meta-analysis that intentions can successfully predict a wide variety of individual behaviors.With
respect to firm performance, Orser et al. (1998) found a significant relationship between the owner’s growth willingness (an indication of intention) and actual firm growth over
a four-year period. Other researchers have confirmed that
growth intentions prove to be better predictors of actual
business growth for a distant horizon than for growth in the
immediate future (Autio et al. 1997; Krueger et al. 2000;
Reitan 1996).
Two similar but competing cognitive theories of intentions are present in the literature. First to appear was the
cognitive theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1980, 1988;
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1981), which theorized that actions
can be predicted by intentions. Later, Krueger et al. (2000)
proposed the competing Shapero-Krueger Model, which
links the intentions to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity to the perceived desirability and perceived feasibility
or practicality of the business outcome.1 On reviewing the
empirical evidence of numerous studies, Krueger concluded that both models were validated, but that their model
was more robust. For our purposes, the Shapero-Krueger
Model has the advantage of focusing on the business decision-maker.
Krueger et al. (2000) have specified the key determinants
of perceived desirability and feasibility. First, owner-managers view growth as desirable when the expected outcomes of growth help them meet their personal and business objectives. Thus, expected outcomes are anchored in
their motivation for expanding their firm. Second, ownermanagers perceive the feasibility of business growth in relation to their self-efficacy; that is, in terms of the business
skills they believe they need and have to manage growth.
This approach is consistent with the expectancy theory that
links work effort and performance to perceptions (Vroom
1964).
The Shapero-Krueger Model describes the cognitive
process that leads to growth intentions, but ignores a number of moderating variables that are likely to influence
growth intentions, such as resources and opportunities
(Wiklund 2001; McKelvie and Chandler 2002), industry
structure and business strategy (Chrisman et al. 1998;
Minniti 2001). With limited resources in a capital-intensive
industry, such as manufacturing, growth intentions are likely
to be suppressed.With more resources in an industry requiring a low level of investment, such as consumer services,
growth intentions are likely to be enhanced.
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Classification of Young Microfirms
Based on his survey findings, Fillis (2002) proposed a classification of owner-managers of craft microenterprises to help
explain their likelihood of growth by becoming international
in scope.This classification scheme is specific to craft enterprises where the technical/artistic skills of the operators are
critical to the success of the enterprise. However, it can be
argued that the classification has wide application in that all
microenterprises at the early stages of development share this
dependence on the skills of the owner-manager.We therefore
propose the following adapted categories of owners:
Lifestyler, Entrepreneur, Manager, and Mover (see Figure 1).
This classification scheme (Figure 2) includes a firm characteristic (actual employment: no employees v. some employees) and an owner characteristic (intentions to add employ-

ees: no v. yes). At this early stage of firm development, the
owner-operator and the firm are closely aligned and intertwined. The Lifestyler is the one-person enterprise, the typical consultant who operates alone and sells his or her expertise. The Lifestyler works alone and has no intention of
employing others. In contrast, the Entrepreneur currently
works alone out of necessity, but plans to have employees in
the near future as the young enterprise becomes more established. On the other hand, the Manager has succeeded in having employees, but has no intention of adding any more,
being content with the current size of the enterprise. The
market Mover also has succeeded in creating employment,
and wants to increase the growth momentum by adding
more employees.The Mover has a growth-oriented vision of
the enterprise.

Current Employment

Employment
Intentions

No Employees

Some Employees

No growth in employment

Lifestyler

Manager

Growth in employment

Entrepreneur

Mover

Figure 1. Classification of Young Microenterprises

Lifestyler
• No employees and no intentions of
having any
• Concentrates on business services
• Low level of sales and investment
• Home-based
• Desires little growth and sees it as
less doable

Manager
• Employees but no intentions of adding
any
• Present in all industries
• High level of sales and investment
• Some leased space
• Desires some growth and sees it as
moderately doable

Entrepreneur
• No employees but intends on having
some
• Present in all industries
• Low level of sales and investment
• Some leased space
• Desires growth and sees it as doable

Mover
•
•
•
•
•

Employees and intends on adding more
Concentrates on consumer services
Highest level of sales and investment
Considerable leased or owned space
Desires growth and sees it as very
doable

Figure 2. Profile of Four Types of Young Microenterprises
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Only the Entrepreneur and Mover are expected to exhibit high growth intentions. However, their situations differ:The
Entrepreneur must acquire and manage employees for the
first time, whereas the Mover acquires additional employees
and begins to operate at a higher level of complexity. Movers
are likely to have more resources, and can obtain leverage
from their current employees.Adding employees to an existing human resource base requires less adjustment than hiring, developing, and managing employees as a first-time
event. This transition from the owner-operated firm to the
owner-managed firm challenges the entrepreneur to acquire
and exercise a broader range of managerial and operational
skills (Mount et al. 1993). In addition, the Shapero-Krueger
Model predicts that these higher levels of growth intentions
should be accompanied by higher levels of perceived desirability and feasibility of growth.

Research Propositions
The literature review and classification scheme described
above lead to four propositions for testing purposes.
Proposition 1 (P1): The four types of young microenterprises (Lifestyler, Entrepreneur, Manager, and
Mover) can be differentiated on the basis of personal,
business, and industry characteristics.

Proposition 3 (P3): The four types of young microenterprises differ in that the Entrepreneur and Mover
have the highest levels for perceived desirability of
growth.
Proposition 4 (P4): The four types of young microenterprises differ in that the Mover has the highest level
of perceived feasibility of growth.
In the next section, we introduce a business survey that
helps to test these propositions, and assess the validity of the
classification scheme for young microenterprises.

Methodology
Sample
A telephone survey took place in the summer of 2003 and
was executed by two research assistants who followed a set
protocol. A list of 549 young firms was obtained from the economic development agencies of two Canadian cities, Ottawa
and Sudbury. The combined sample of these two communities (populations of 750,000 and 150,000, respectively) represents a diverse economic base, including resource-based,
retail, government and business services, and high technology industries.

Questionnaire
Proposition 2 (P2): The four types of young microenterprises differ in terms of growth intentions, where
the Mover aims for higher employment growth than
the Entrepreneur.

The questionnaire was divided into two sections: growth
intentions and firm characteristics. The key variables were
measured on a 0 to 100 scale (Krueger et al. 2000, p. 421–422)
as specified in Figure 3.

Perceived desirability: “How desirable is it for you to grow your business?”
(0 Not desirable to 100 Completely desirable)
Perceived feasibility: “How practical is it for you to grow your business?”
(0 Not practical to 100 Completely practical)
Growth intentions in terms of number of employees was tapped by two questions:
• How many employees do you currently have? _____Full-time _____Part-time
• How many employees do you intend to have in three years time, by 2006:
_____Full-time _____Part-time
Growth intentions in terms of sales was tapped with one question:
• What is the annual growth in sales that you intend to have:
In 2004 ___%
In 2005: ___%
In 2006: ___%
Moderating variables of growth intentions: We have included three moderating variables:
1. Facility: From where do you operate your business: home v. owned office/retail space v. leased
office/retail space
2. Investment: How much money have you invested in your business so far, including all personal
and external sources?
3. Industry Type: What is the main product or service of the business?

Figure 3. Key Variables
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Facility and investment were considered indicators of
resources dedicated to the business, whereas industry was
viewed as the context that determines the specific success
factors.

Results
A total of 119 questionnaires were completed.The response
rate was 22 percent (119/549). Fifteen of the completed
questionnaires were rejected because the firm was either too
young (less than 2 years in operation) or too old (11 or more
years).Thus, the final count was 104 usable questionnaires of
firms 2–10 years of age.All of the respondents were owners
or partners and were actively involved in the enterprise.
Given the number of respondents (104) and the total sample size (549), the results have a confidence interval of +/8.66 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. Confidence
intervals were calculated using The Survey System version
6.01.
The number of employees and the growth intentions in
terms of number of employees were calculated on a Full
Time Equivalent (FTE) basis. A part-time employee was
equivalent to 50 percent of a full-time employee.
Average intended growth in sales was calculated as the
average of the intended growth in sales for 2004, 2005, and
2006.
The firms were divided into four industry groupings based
on the NAICS two-digit codes: manufacturing, retail, customer
services, and business services. Eight firms composed the
manufacturing industry grouping (construction and manufacturing), and were omitted only from the industry analysis
because there were insufficient cases to allocate across four
cells of the firm classification being tested.

Characteristics of Firms
A profile of the sample and the four types of firms is presented in Table 1. These young firms (mean of 4.3 years of age)
operated primarily in business and consumer services, and
achieved modest annual sales (less than $500,000).
Approximately 70 percent of the respondents indicated an
investment of less than $50,000 in their home-based business. For firms with employees, the average number of FTEs
was 2.7 ranging from 0.5 (one part-time employee) to 14.
When comparing the four types of firms, several significant differences emerged, as measured by the Chi-Square
test. The profile of each type of firm highlights these differences. Given the small respondent sample size and the confidence interval of +/- 8.66 percent at the 95 percent level, the
differences between the Lifestylers and Movers are reliable,
whereas the other comparisons are less so.
Lifestyler. Most of these firms (70%) offered business
services, had attained a low level of annual sales (87% reported less than $100,000), and had invested little in the firm

(91% indicated less than $50,000). Not surprisingly, 84 percent were home-based businesses.
Manager. While the majority of these firms (57%) offered
business services,a large number (43%) operated in consumer
services and retail.These firms had a higher level of sales (44%
between $100,000 and $499,999), and a higher level of investment (33% indicated $50,000 to $99,999). While most were
home-based businesses, 22 percent had leased space.
Entrepreneur. These firms were distributed across industries, but the majority (56%) were in business services. They
had achieved a low level of sales (76% had less than
$100,000), and most had invested little in the firm (80% indicated less than $50,000). However, 20 percent had leased
space.
Mover. Nearly the majority (49%) were in consumer services, had achieved the highest level of sales (71% reported
$100,000 or better), and 32 percent had invested over
$100,000 in the venture. Thirty-seven percent had leased
space, and another 13 percent owned their office or retail
space.

Intentions of Growth in Number of FTE2
Employees by 2006
The Lifestyler firm had no employees, and did not intend on
having any in the next three years. In contrast, the Manager
firm had a few employees (Mean =1.44 FTE, S.D. = 0.81), but
did not intend on expanding its human resources.
The Entrepreneurial firm had no employees, but intended
on adding a few over the next three years (Mean = 1.96 FTE,
S.D. = 1.46). In the case of the Mover firm, it had employees
(Mean = 2.95, S.D. = 2.85), and proposed to add more (Mean
= 3.08, S.D. = 2.84).
A T-test indicated that there was no significant evidence
that Mover firms were currently larger than Manager firms
(n.s.). Similarly, there was no significant support that Mover
firms intended more growth in FTEs than Entrepreneurial
firms, though the results were in the expected direction (sig.
= .074). Thus, P2 is not supported. These results are understandable given the large standard deviations present in the
data subsets.

Perceived Desirability and Feasibility of
Growth
Table 2 summarizes the ANOVA tests on the growth-related
variables. The types of firms were compared on average
intended annual sales growth (%) over the next three years.
On average, the respondents indicated an intended growth of
25.5 percent.Though the F statistic was not significant (p =
0.145), the mean percentages were in the expected order,
with Mover and Entrepreneur firms reporting the higher
growth goals (33.1% and 29.8%), and the Lifestyler and
Manager the lower sales goals (16.8% and 13.0%).
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Table 1. Profile of Four Types of New Microenterprises
(0 = no,1=yes)
1 = yes)
FTEs (o=no,
Intended Growth in FTE
0 = no growth, 1 = growth
Number of cases
Average age of business, yrs
Average number of FTEs
Average intended growth in
FTEs
Industry groupinga
retail
business services
consumer services

Sample

104
4.32

Lifestyler

Manager

Entrepreneur

Mover

0

1

0

1

0
31%
4.66

0
9%
3.56
1.44

1
24%
4.48

1
37%
4.11
2.95

1.96

3.08

Chi-square
Value

p
(2 sided)

14%
51%
35%

3%
70%
27%

14%
57%
29%

16%
56%
28%

23%
29%
49%

12.99

0.043

61%
37%
3%

87%
13%
0%

56%
44%
0%

76%
20%
4%

29%
66%
5%

33.7

0.000

less than $10,000
$10,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $99,999
$100,000 +

28%
42%
16%
13%

44%
47%
6%
3%

44%
22%
33%
0%

32%
48%
16%
4%

8%
39%
21%
32%

29.4

0.001

home
owned office/retail space
leased office/retail space
other

67%
6%
22%
5%

84%
0%
6%
9%

78%
0%
22%
0%

76%
4%
20%
0%

45%
13%
37%
5%

21.2

0.012

Sales for past year
less than $100,000
$100,000 to $499,999
$500,000 +
Investment

Facility

a

N= 96. Eight firms composed the manufacturing industry grouping (construction and manufacturing),
and were omitted from the industry analysis.

As for desirability of growing the business (scale of 0 to
100), there were significant differences among the types of
firms (p = 0.000):The Mover and the Entrepreneur indicated
higher levels of desirability (87.3 and 72.2) than the Manager
and Lifestyler (64.4 and 54.2).Thus, P3 is supported. Similarly,
there were significant differences in terms of the practicality
of growing the business (p = 0.000):The Mover reported the
highest level of readiness to grow (82.5), followed by the
Entrepreneur and the Manager (69.6 and 68.9), and finally by
the Lifestyler (52.5).Thus, P4 is supported.

Limitations of the Study
This study is based on a convenience sample.As such, it suffers from a number of design weaknesses.The sample is tied
to a client mailing list prepared by two economic development corporations and not to a census of the businesses in
the two communities. The mailing list contained only the
name of the company and the contact person; no information was available that would allow for a comparison
between the mailing list and the responding sample.
Furthermore, the response rate was relatively low, which
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Table 2. ANOVA on Desirability and Practicality of Growing the Business

Average intended annual sales
growth next 3 yrs, %
Desirability of growing
business
mean
standard deviation
Practicality of growing
business
mean
standard deviation

ANOVA
F
p

Sample

Lifestyler

Manager

Entrepreneur

Mover

n=104

n=32

n=9

n=25

n=38

25.54

16.77

12.96

29.84

33.09

1.839

0.145

71.53
28.78

54.22
30.35

64.44
28.77

72.2
26.54

87.34
19.22

9.914

0.000

68.99
27.62

52.5
29.13

68.89
26.14

69.6
30.45

82.5
15.49

8.289

0.000

scale
to 100,
100 (completely
desirable/practical)
scale of
of 00,(not
not desirable/practical)
desirable/practical to
completely desirable/practical
impacts the reliability of the findings as indicated by the large
confidence intervals. Given these inherent weaknesses, the
reader is advised to consider cautiously the findings for
reflection instead of prediction. Despite these limitations, the
study is considered valuable because it focuses on small
young enterprises that often elude robust business studies.
As stated above, it was impossible to compare the characteristics of the responding sample (n = 104) to those of the
survey sample (n = 549). However, as expected, the responding sample was composed of young firms from a variety of
industries, with a range of both sales and investment levels
and a variety of business facilities. Though our findings are
limited to the responding sample, they remain a valuable
guide for agencies that serve a diversified economic base.
Our sample of young firms included only those that
approached an economic development agency for services.
Therefore, the sample excluded young firms that chose not
to contact such an agency. Our findings are useful for these
agencies as they attempt to improve the support services
they offer to their traditional clients, but less so to their nontraditional clients. Our sample may also have excluded
microfirms operating along new business models.
Future research is required to confirm our findings
because this study suffers from weaknesses in reliability and
validity due to the small convenience sample used and the
resulting confidence interval of +/- 8.66 percent at the 95
percent level for the statistics generated. In other words, our
findings can be challenged and considered unrepresentative
and inaccurate. It is recommended that the research design

be expanded to include before–after measures to capture the
impact of intentions over time and the entrepreneurial activities that make growth possible.We expect that the entrepreneurial behaviors are varied (Carter et al. 1996) and focused
on building the business and dealing with the business environment. The questionnaire would be administered twice,
once to measure the initial condition of the firm and the
growth intentions, and the second time to record the entrepreneurial behaviors that have taken place and measure the
actual growth that has occurred. The study would span one
year of business activity—sufficient time for change to happen but not so long that the researcher loses contact with
the respondents. Within this time series design, subjects act
as their own controls. However, to reduce the risk of extraneous factors influencing the outcomes, the researcher should
keep a historical record of significant local events that may
have some impact on economic climate and business activity. Finally, a large stratified random sample including all industries would be appropriate and reflect a business census of
the city or region targeted.

Discussion
The survey findings support the proposition (P1) that the
four types of young microenterprises (Lifestyler,
Entrepreneur, Manager, and Mover) can be differentiated on
the basis of personal, business, and industry characteristics.
From the economic development goal of creating jobs, it
would be appropriate to tailor an approach for each type of
firm.
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The Lifestyler needs no or little assistance because the
objective of the Lifestyler is self-employment and nothing
more. The Entrepreneur shows desire of growing the business but so far has been unable to create employment. The
entrepreneur is committed, but may need assistance to make
growth feasible. In contrast, the Manager shows promise only
on the basis of business characteristics: the firm has achieved
some level of success and has employees. In this case, the
main impediment to employment growth is the lack of a
business vision including growth. Agency staff could help,
but would need to persuade these Managers that their current view of their firm is unduly limiting, and perhaps disadvantageous in a changing business environment.
The Mover is the star in that these firms have successfully
grown, and the businessowners intend to expand the workforce.The likelihood of creating more jobs is high. In so far as
they concentrate on consumer services, agency staff could
advise them on the success factors of this industry sector, and
explore exporting possibilities.
Interestingly, although Movers had higher intended average annual sales growth compared to the others, all the firms
intended to increase their annual sales by a substantial
amount, whether they had employees or not. Obviously, they
viewed growth in sales as much easier to accomplish, even
with limited resources.The decision to hire an initial employee, or add employees, commits the owner to financial obligations and forces new ways of running the business to ensure
a productive workforce, and many were not willing or ready
to do that.
Agency staff must rely on their training and experience to
guide the businessowners in creating, implementing, and sustaining a growth strategy. However, engaging these small
businessowners in a meaningful manner involves practical
solutions for the ongoing operation of their business. In other
words, a growth vision and strategy must be concrete, and
any agency intervention should be based on experiential
learning (Deakins and Freel 1998) and user-friendly learning
strategies such as those outlined by Dyer and Ross (2004):
1. Encourage more awareness, self-reflection, and selfexamination.
2. Involve others in a dialogue and thus act as mentors and
coaches.
3. Formalize the process of business planning with learning-oriented computer programs.
Cope and Watts (2000) also recommended the use of mentors who would have a detailed knowledge of both the owners and the businesses, and could create the constructive
context for both reflection and action.
For firms with employees, or with intentions of adding
employees, the issues of training and delegation of duties
become very important. We can assume that the businessowner assesses whether each employee has the requisite

skills, and whether the skill gaps require some kind of remedial action (training to upskill or job simplification to downskill). However, only skillful employees create the foundation
for delegation and teamwork—hallmarks of the growing
firm. The business advisor or mentor can help to raise the
level of awareness among businessowners on these issues
through an ongoing dialogue.
In a survey of young firms,Ardichvili et al. (1998) reported that accounting was the first function to be delegated and
the only area in which outside experts played a significant
operational role. Growth in employee numbers was accompanied by increased delegation of a number of functional
activities. The greater the number of full-time employees
added (1 or less versus 2–8), the higher the level of delegated activities in production and service delivery, including
purchasing and computer systems.They recommended structured training for employees in all of these areas at the same
time. In the case of rapid growth (9+ employees), sales and
marketing-related activities were likely to be delegated to
either employees or new managers.While employees would
benefit from structured training, new managers can be hired
from the outside who come with strong competencies in
marketing and sales. This advice appears relevant to the
Movers who resemble the sample of young firms in Ardichvili
et al. and less relevant to the Entrepreneurs who are having
employees for the first time and are likely to retain close
involvement in all of the firm’s activities. Persuading the
Movers that their employees need training on a wide front
will meet with resistance on the basis of costs and preference for on-the-job training.
As for business planning, Ardichvili et al. (1998) reported
that, irrespective of growth in number of employees, the
original management team continued to be closely involved
in this “strategic” activity. They recommended executive
development focused on strategic decision making and on
understanding the competitive and wider environment.This
advice appears to hold for the Entrepreneurs, Movers, and
Managers; however the latter are likely to have low awareness of such a need and to question the benefits. In any case,
delivery of this executive development would have to be
low cost and flexible.
Ardichvili et al. (1998) reported that functional delegation
appeared to be similar for manufacturing and service firms
when annual sales were less than $10 million. In their opinion, their training and development recommendations did
not require tailoring to industry-specific contexts.That being
said, the owner-managers will want a tailored-service that
reflects the young firm’s “unique” situation.
Delegation is a multistep process that includes job
design, selecting the right person, and implementing the
new working relationship. A mentor would be in a position
to guide the owner through this complex process that is sit-
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uated within the particular context of that owner and that
business.

Conclusions
In the pursuit of employment growth, business support agencies are well advised to distinguish among the four types of
young microfirms so that their assistance and interventions
be as effective as possible. To focus resources on the young
firms that are likely to experience strong employment
growth, the agencies should prioritize as follows:

1. Movers deserve the most attention because both the
personal and business characteristics are favorable for
employment growth.
2. Entrepreneurs and Managers deserve some attention
because either the personal or business characteristics
(but not both) are favorable for employment growth
3. Lifestylers do not merit any special effort beyond the
standard services because all of the key characteristics
oppose employment growth.
Solicitation and assistance would have to be tailored to
match the particular context of each type of firm.
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Endnotes
1. The model includes a third variable: propensity to act.The variable is excluded here because Krueger et al. (2000) found that
it added little explanatory power.
2. FTE was calculated as number of full-time employees plus 50 percent of the number of part-time employees.
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A Cross-Country Assessment of
Government Intervention and Entrepreneurial Activity
Maria Minniti
ecent studies have shown that the contribution of
small firms to employment and GDP is increasing.
A large amount of work has also established the significance of social and economic variables for entrepreneurial decisions.Very little is known, however, about how
government policies and programs influence entrepreneurial activity, and whether these effects are consistent across
countries. Using original data from a representative sample of 10,000 individuals and from more than 300 openended interviews in 10 countries, this article provides
some suggestive evidence that government intervention
aimed at enhancing the underlying environment of entrepreneurial decisions may be more effective than intervention designed to provide safety nets.

R

In recent years, several studies have provided significant evidence on the ability of smaller and entrepreneurial firms to
create employment and contribute to economic development and growth (Acs et al. 1999; Baumol 2002; Birch 1987).
New and small firms constitute more than 99 percent of all
firms in almost all advanced countries, and their share of
employment and contribution to the Gross Domestic
Product is increasing (OECD 1996; Carree and Thurik 2003).
Acs et al. (1999) and Wennekers and Thurik (1999), among
others, have shown that, in recent years, the role played by
entrepreneurship in productivity and GDP growth has
expanded significantly. In fact, entrepreneurship is now
acknowledged as a major source of economic growth and
many governments and international organizations have
launched initiatives for the support and development of the
entrepreneurial sector.1
Within this context, a sizable amount of empirical work
has established the significance of both social and economic
variables in determining entrepreneurial decisions. Among
others, Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton
(1989), and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) have discussed the
importance of financial resources and constraints on entrepreneurial decisions. Iyigun and Owen (1998), Murphy et al.
(1991), and Otani (1996) have discussed issues related to the
allocation of human capital. Bogenhold and Staber (1991),
Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), and Hamilton (2000) have
studied the importance of employment status and labor markets on entrepreneurial decisions. Finally, Amit et al. (1995)
have focused on individuals’ opportunity costs when choosing between alternative income-producing activities. The

complementarities between many of these works have
drawn attention to the fact that entrepreneurial decisions are
the outcome of a multilayered and complex process and that
understanding the sequence of actions required to start a
new firm is, to a large extent, contingent upon the context in
which they are taken (Jacks and Anderson 2002).
Very few studies, however, have tried to establish how, if
at all, government policies and programs influence the level
of entrepreneurial activity. Some significant exceptions are
Brenner (1987), Holcombe (2003), Maggioni et al. (1999),
Porter (1990), Spencer et al. (2005), and Wren and Storey
(2002). In 1990, Porter argued that a nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and
upgrade. By focusing on innovation, he indirectly brought
attention to the importance of the entrepreneurial sector on
economic growth and to the possible role of the government in fostering entrepreneurship. Brenner (1987) posed
more precisely the broad issue of the role of the statesman
with respect to entrepreneurship policy. In his view, entrepreneurial ventures are often the outcome of a desire to
overcome adverse social or economic handicaps. Thus, he
argued, policy-makers need to encourage free trade while, at
the same time, recognize the concerns of those in danger of
being left behind. Along complementary lines, and building
on Kirzner (1973), Holcombe (2003) provided a taxonomy
of the origins of entrepreneurial opportunities, including
factors that disequilibrate the market and factors that
enhance production possibilities. His line of reasoning led
directly to policy implications regarding the economic environment more conducive to entrepreneurial discovery and
to the role of government in research and development.
Spencer et al. (2005), instead, suggested the existence of a
relationship between a government’s interest in the maximization of power and its willingness to support the creation of new industries. At a more applied level of analysis,
using the case of Italy, Maggioni et al. (1999) evaluated the
impact of public entrepreneurial policies on the postentry
performance of new businesses and showed the existence
of mixed effects. In fact, government aid was shown to allow
firms to have higher levels of technology. However, the same
government aid was also found to support inefficient firms.
Finally, using the UK example, Wren and Storey (2002)
assessed the impact of publicly provided soft subsidies on
the performance of small and medium enterprises. They
found no effect on smaller firms but a positive and signifi-
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cant effect on survival rates and growth rates for mid-range
SMEs.
Overall, although some studies exist on the effects of government policy on entrepreneurship, very little has been
done to determine whether these effects are consistent
across countries.The relative lack of comparative studies on
the implications of policy action for entrepreneurs is due, at
least in part, to the paucity of reliable information and, in particular, to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the elimination of this
gap by providing some initial answers on this important
question. Specifically, the article discusses the extent to
which government policies, such as those concerning taxes,
regulations, and procurements, are either size-neutral or
encourage new and growing firms. In addition, the article
tries to assess the effectiveness of government programs and
initiatives aimed at directly assisting new and growing firms.
The article's overall goal is to generate discussion and further
research on the role played by government on entrepreneurial activity by showing that, although, entrepreneurial policies need to be fitted to their local context, it appears that
cross-cultural (universal) phenomena are also at play and
should be taken into account by policy-makers.
Government policies and programs mold institutional
structures for entrepreneurial action, encouraging some
activities and discouraging others (Dobbin and Dowd 1997).
Public policy shapes the rules of competition and creates
niches where investment and entrepreneurial activities are
perceived as being more or less attractive (Boettke 1993;
Boettke and Coyne 2003). Finally, the nature of political interventions influences alertness (Harper 1998). Thus, policies
and programs that improve transparency and entitlement
tend to increase the subjective perception of the link
between actions and outcome. Harper, for example, argued
that “an environment of freedom is more likely than other
environments to generate internal locus of control beliefs
and acute entrepreneurial alertness” (1998, p. 253).
Furthermore, government policy and programs also influence the fate of organizations by disrupting established ties
between firms and resources (Carroll et al. 1988;
Stinchcombe 1965). Baumol (1990) argued that institutional arrangements affect the quantity and type of entrepreneurial efforts and that “. . . the exercise of entrepreneurship
can sometimes be unproductive or even destructive, and
that whether it takes one of these directions or one that is
more benign depends heavily on the structure of payoffs in
the economy—the rules of the game” (Baumol 1990, p.
899). In general, government policies and programs may be
crucial in determining the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial behavior as they define the incentives for individuals to transform perceived opportunities into actions and
contribute to determining the extent to which the environ-

ment is supportive of and conducive to entrepreneurial
behavior.
The overriding goal of this article is to provide some initial cross-country evidence of the role played by government
in shaping entrepreneurial behavior and, hopefully, to initiate
a much needed debate on best and worst practices and on
the general ability of governments to influence entrepreneurial behavior.

Variables and Data
Data used in this study are from the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEM) project. Started in 1999, the GEM project is an
ongoing, large-scale international study designed to understand the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic activity.2 All data used in this article are original and
were collected simultaneously with standardized procedures
during winter 1999 in Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Israel, Japan, United Kingdom, and United
States.The 10 countries in the sample share several relevant
social and economic characteristics.3 Differences across their
entrepreneurship rates may be attributed, to some extent, to
factors other than socioeconomic circumstances. As a result,
the selected countries provide a good sample for studying
the influence that variables, such as government policy and
programs, have on entrepreneurial activity.
The timing of the data collection is not relevant for the
argument in the article.The point of this research is neither
to evaluate any particular policy nor to propose benchmarking or best practices. Also, the evidence emerging from the
10 countries considered here is suggestive, and the article
contains no attempt to generalize these results to other countries or to compare the relative performances of different
groups of countries.This article presents a discussion, and its
goal is to initiate a debate about the ability of governments to
influence (positively or negatively) entrepreneurial behavior.
The GEM project includes the collection of three types of
data. First, a survey is administered simultaneously in each
country to a representative stratified random sample of the
population. In 1999, surveys were stratified geographically
and household sample selection was based on random direct
dialing or using listed numbers. All surveys were conducted
by phone, except in Japan were they were conducted face to
face.Also, in 1999, the sample size was of at least 1,000 people per country for a total of 10,422 individuals.4 In the survey, entrepreneurship is defined as:“Any attempt at new business or new venture creation, such as self-employment, a
new business organization, or the expansion of an existing
business, by an individual, a team of individuals, or an established business (Reynolds et al. 1999, p.3).”5 Although this definition does not allow for a clear distinction between entrepreneurial behavior motivated by growth strategies and
entrepreneurial behavior motivated by self-sufficiency, still it
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has a wide range of applicability and is consistent with wellestablished literature on the subject (e.g., Gartner 1985,
1990). An interesting feature of the GEM dataset is that it
does not focus, as most studies do, on the existing number of
small firms or on firm birth and death rates. Rather, GEM data
capture the entrepreneurial mindset of individuals in different countries. In this sense, the data are very suitable for the
study of how policies and programs influence individuals’
decisions since they are not affected by hindsight or survival
biases.
Items in the survey focused primarily on providing an estimate of the percentage of the adult population (18–64 years
of age) actively involved in starting a business. In each of the
10 countries, adults participating in the survey were asked a
series of questions about their involvement in entrepreneurial activities, including whether they were currently starting
a firm on their own or on behalf of their employer as part of
their job. Those who responded yes to either or both questions were considered nascent entrepreneurs if, in addition,
they were also expecting to own part of the new firm and if
the initiative was not an operating business at the time of the
interview. Figure 1 provides a detailed description of questions and procedures used by GEM to classify respondents as
being involved in entrepreneurial activity.6
In addition to the survey, in each country, GEM researchers
conducted face-to-face interviews to gain information about
nine preselected factors. The list of nine factors was compiled on the basis of existing literature that had shown their
relative importance for entrepreneurial decisions.The list of
constructs included:
1. Government policies: The extent to which government
policies reflected in taxes, regulations, procurements, or
the application of any are either size-neutral or encourage new and growing firms.
2. Government programs: The presence of programs and
initiatives to assist directly new and growing firms at all
levels of government (national, regional, municipal).
3. Financial support: The availability of financial
resources, equity, and debt, for new and growing firms
including grants, collateral, and subsidies.
4. Education and training: The extent to which training
in creating or managing small, new, or growing business
is incorporated within the educational and training systems at all levels.
5. Research and development transfers: The extent to
which national research and development will lead to
new commercial opportunities and whether these are
available for new, small, and growing firms.
6. Commercial and professional infrastructure: The presence of commercial, accounting, and other legal services and institutions that encourage and support the
emergence of new, small, or growing businesses.

7. Internal market openness: The extent to which commercial arrangements undergo constant change and
redeployment as new and growing firms compete and
replace existing suppliers, subcontractors, and consultants.
8. Access to physical infrastructure: Ease of access to
available physical resources (communication, utilities,
transportation, land, or space) at a price that does not
discriminate against new, small, or growing firms.
9. Cultural and social norms: The extent to which existing social and cultural norms encourage, or do not discourage, individual actions that may lead to new ways of
conducting business or economic activities and may, in
turn, lead to greater dispersion in personal wealth and
income.
Relevant literature addressing the role played by government policy and programs has been discussed in the introduction to this article. Within this context, however, it is
worth recalling that although most scholars now agree that
governments have the ability to influence the entrepreneurial sector, no general agreement exists yet on exactly what
this role ought to be and whether a proactive and specific
approach to entrepreneurial policy ought to be preferred.
Investigating this issue is the goal of this article.With respect
to financial support, Audretsch and Elston (2002), Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Hamilton (2000), and Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979) are just a few examples of works that have discussed the importance of financial resources and constraints
on entrepreneurial decisions. Overall, they have shown that
entrepreneurs are constrained by lack of resources and that
a positive correlation exists between an individual’s wealth
and income and his probability of getting involved in starting
a business. The importance of education and training for
entrepreneurial decision has been the object of much debate
in light of the increasing number of programs focusing on
entrepreneurship education. In general, the relationship
between education and new firm formation is uncertain,
except for richer countries where post graduate training has
been shown to have some positive effects on high-tech startup rates (Blanchflower 2004).
Because of the increasing importance of high-tech startups, research and development transfers have been the
subject of several studies (Degroof and Roberts 2004;
Markman et al. 2005; Peters et al. 2004). Overall, this literature has established the importance of incubators, university patenting, and spin-off activities, as well as investigated
the role played by alternative arrangements with respect to
property rights and their effect on entrepreneurial incentives. Less work has been devoted, instead, to studying the
importance of commercial and professional infrastructure
and of access to physical infrastructure. Van de ven (1993)
and Venkataraman (2004) emphasized the importance of
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All respondents were asked three basic questions:
1a.Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any type of self-employment? (yes, no, don’t
know, refuse)
1b.Are you, alone or with others, trying to start a new business or a new venture with your employer—an effort that is part
of your normal work? (yes, no, don’t know, refuse)
1c.Are you, alone or with others, the owner of a company you help manage? (yes, no, don’t know, refuse)
Nascent Entrepreneurs
Respondents who answered “yes” to items 1a or 1b, were then asked:
2a.You mentioned that you are trying to start a new business. Over the past 12 months have you done anything to help start
this new business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up team, working on a business plan,
beginning to save money, or any other activity that would help launch a business? (yes, no, don’t know, refuse)
2b.Will you personally own all, part, or none of this business? (all, part, none, don’t know, refuse)
2c. Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind, including your own, for more than three months? (yes,
no, don’t know, refused)
Respondents were coded as “nascent entrepreneur” if, in addition to 1a and 1b, they answered “yes” to 2a and 2b, and “no” to
2c.
New Businessowners
To make the distinction between individuals involved in starting a new business (nascent entrepreneurs) and those
involved in managing a very young business (baby businessowners), respondents who answered “yes” to question 1c were
asked:
3a.You said you were the owner or manager of a company. Do you personally own all, part, or none of this business? (all, part,
none, don’t know, refuse)
3b.What was the first year the owners received wages, profits, or payments in kind? (4-digit year, or no profits yet, don’t know,
refuse)
Respondents who classify as full or part owners of the business and had received wages or salaries paid up to 42 months
were coded as “baby business owners.”

Figure 1. Questions and Procedures Used to Classify Respondents
sound legal systems, transparent capital markets, advanced
transportation and telecommunications, etc. Venkataraman
(2004) also emphasized the importance of internal market
openness as one of the conditions necessary for government
intervention to produce tangible results. Due to the high
level of development of all countries included in the sample,
market openness and quality of infrastructure turned out to
be less important than the other constructs. Most likely, the
results with respect to those variables would have been significantly different with a group of developing countries.
Finally, a growing body of literature has established the
importance of cultural and social norms for entrepreneurial behavior. In addition to the embedded nature of much
entrepreneurship (Jacks and Anderson 2002), and building
on Hofstede’s conceptualization of national culture, these
works have shown that the level of economic development,
culture, and institutions all influence the demand for entrepreneurship by creating opportunities available for start-ups.

In addition, these works suggested that cultural and institutional conditions have an impact on the supply of entrepreneurship because of their ability to influence the skills,
resources, and preferences of individuals within the population (Hayton et al. 2002; Frederking 2004).
Between 35 and 50 open-ended, standardized face-to-face
interviews were conducted in each country (at least three
individuals per country for each of the nine constructs listed
above) for a total of 338 interviews across the 10 countries
in the sample. Interviewed individuals, called key informants, were entrepreneurship experts selected among academics, government officials, venture capitalists, and other
well-known individuals with significant expertise in one of
the nine areas listed above. In each country, a special effort
was also made to select key informants so as to represent
geographical, ethnical, and gender differences adequately.7
During the interviews, each informant was asked to identify
and discuss the factor he or she considered to be most rele-
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vant for the future of entrepreneurship in that country. The
selected factor, called the main issue, identified the dominant issue influencing entrepreneurial decisions in that
country at the time of the interview according to the person
interviewed. In addition to the main issue, each key informant was asked to select at least three discussion issues; that
is three factors he or she considered to be particularly relevant, though not dominant, for the future of entrepreneurship in that country from the list of nine pre-selected factors.8 Responses from the key informants allowed an initial
assessment of the relative importance, in each country and
across countries, of each of the nine selected factors.
Finally, at the end of the interview, each key informant was
given a 10-page questionnaire from which the third type of
data was obtained. In addition to demographic information,
questionnaires contained a minimum of five questions for
each of the nine preselected factors. Each question was presented as a standardized fixed-response item. Responses
were then combined and used to calculate multiitem indices
for each of the nine selected factors.9 Results presented in
this article rely primarily on questionnaires and interview
data, while survey data were used only to report entrepreneurial propensity rates in each of the 10 countries. All data
used in this article are GEM data and were collected in all
countries during the spring and summer of 1999.

varied between countries from 1.4 percent in Finland to 8.4
percent in the United States (Reynolds et al. 1999).10 The
spread in entrepreneurial prevalence rates is quite large,
ranging from more than 1 in every 12 individuals in the
United States (e.g., 8.4% of the adult population), to less than
1 in every 67 individuals in Finland.
The results above suggest that even across countries
with relatively similar socioeconomic environments, such
as the 10 countries in the sample, the rates of entrepreneurial propensity differ significantly. But what causes these differences? Data from the key informants’ questionnaires
were used to construct multiitem indices for each of the
nine factors identified as being relevant for entrepreneurial
decisions.
For each of the nine factors, and for each country, the values across the relevant five answers on the questionnaires of
all key informants were averaged to compute that country's
index. The weighted average value of each set of indices
across countries was then computed to obtain the crosscountry index for that issue. Table 2 shows the correlation
between entrepreneurial propensity and the indices representing the nine entrepreneurial factors as well the
Chronback Alphas for each index.11 Favorable cultural and
social norms, availability of financial support, and ease of
R&D transfers are shown to be positively and significantly
correlated with the rates of business start-ups.Access to comSome Cross-country Evidence on
mercial and professional infrastructure and the existence of
Government Policy and Programs
relevant education and training are shown to be also someData collected through the adult population surveys were
what relevant. Correlation is weak or absent, instead,
used to estimate what percentage of individuals were
between start-up rates and internal market openness. As meninvolved in starting a business in 1999. Raw data were
tioned earlier, this result is not surprising since all 10 counweighted to be representative of the entire population.Table
tries in the sample are relatively well developed and have
1 shows that rates of entrepreneurial propensity for each
democratic and stable institutions. In such environments,
country and the corresponding confidence levels. Such rates
market openness is often taken for granted and its value
underestimated. More surprising, instead, is the
very weak correlation between start-up rates and
Table 1. Percentage Rates of Entrepreneurial
government policies and programs. While Table 2
Propensity by Country (95% Confidence Level)
suggests a low positive correlation between govLow
High
Mean
SE
ernment policy and entrepreneurial propensity,
government programs are shown to be virtually
Finland
0.62
2.18
1.40
0.40
uncorrelated to it.
Japan
0.85
2.35
1.60
0.40
In addition to filling out the questionnaire used
France
1.02
2.58
1.80
0.40
to construct Table 2, key informants were also
interviewed and data from the interviews were
Denmark
1.22
2.78
2.00
0.40
coded to analyze the experts’ evaluations of the
United Kingdom
2.12
4.48
3.30
0.60
nine relevant factors. Tables 3 and 4 were conItaly
2.22
4.58
3.40
0.60
structed using data from the interviews.The simiGermany
2.92
5.28
4.10
0.60
larities in the answers across Tables 2, 3, and 4
provide some suggestive support for the reliabiliIsrael
4.03
6.77
5.40
0.70
ty of the data.Tables 3 and 4 show the relative freCanada
5.23
8.37
6.80
0.80
quency of each of the nine factors for entrepreUnited States
6.64
10.16
8.40
0.90
neurial decisions according to the key informants’
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tified physical infrastructure, market
openness, and commercial and legal
infrastructure as the main issue facCross-country Index
Correlation Chronbach
ing entrepreneurship in their counwith
Alpha
try. The results for government poliEntrepr.
cy and programs are similar to those
Propensity
reported in Table 2, though the relative importance attributed to the
Government Policies Helpfulness Index
0.35
0.42
two factors diverges significantly.
Government Program Helpfulness Index
-0.10
0.67
The first two columns of Table 3
show, for each country, the percentImportance of Financial Support Index
0.76*
0.60
age of key informants who identified
Importance of Education and Training Index
0.67
0.77
government policy and programs,
respectively, as the main issue for
Ease of R&D Transfer Index
0.71*
0.54
entrepreneurship in their country. In
Importance of Commercial Infrastructure Index
0.60
0.69
general, it appears that key informants believe that an entrepreneur’s
Importance of Internal Market Openness Index
-0.05
0.87
decision to start a new venture is not
Importance of Physical Infrastructure Index
0.50
0.71
affected by government programs.
This conclusion is consistent across
Favorable Cultural and Social Norms Index
0.83*
0.68
the 10 countries in the sample with
*Statistical significance 0.01
the exception, perhaps, of Denmark.
Government policies, on the other
interviews. The relative importance shown in Tables 3 and
hand, are identified as the main issue for entrepreneurial
Table 4 does not necessarily imply a negative evaluation of
decisions by 10 percent of all key informants. Unlike prothe influence of each specific issue on entrepreneurial
grams, which are insignificant almost everywhere, governpropensity but simply indicates that, according to the key
ment policies are clearly much more important in some
informants, those issues are somewhat important. Table 3
countries (e.g., Canada, France, Germany, and Israel) than in
shows the relative frequency with which each of the nine
others.
factors was identified as the main issue by a key informant.
Each key informant was also asked to select at least three
That is, it shows what factor among the nine considered is
discussion issues among the nine listed factors. If we take the
viewed as having the strongest impact on entrepreneurial
number of times that government policies and programs
propensity. For example, the first cell in Table 3 indicates that
were discussed during all interviews as an indicator of their
19 percent of the Canadian key informants identified governsignificance, their relative importance increases. Table 4
ment policies as being the main issue for entrepreneurial
shows the relative frequency with which the nine entrepredecisions in their country at the time of the interview. The
neurial factors were identified by the key informants as disfirst cell of the bottom row of Table 3, instead, indicates that,
cussion issues. That is, it shows what entrepreneurial factors
across the 10 countries in the sample, 10 percent of all key
among the nine considered are viewed as having a strong
informants identified government policies as being the main
impact without being the dominant concern for entrepreissue for entrepreneurial decisions as opposed, for example,
neurial decisions.Across the 10 countries, government policy
to cultural and social norms that, instead, were identified as
and programs represented 14 and 11 percent, respectively, of
the main issue by 25 percent of key informants across the 10
all issues discussed.With policy issues representing as much
countries. Of course, as the last two columns before the total
as 18 percent of all issues in Italy and Finland, and programs
one in Table 3 show, several key informants chose as the main
accounting for as much as 19 percent of discussion topics in
issue a factor not listed among the selected nine, while a few
Denmark.
others chose not to identify any main issue.
A qualitative examination of the specific aspects of govSimilarly to the results shown in Table 2, across all 10
ernment policy and programs discussed during the intercountries, several key informants identified cultural and
views revealed that key informants believed that governsocial norms, the availability of equity funding, and the availments can indeed influence the likelihood of success of new
ability of appropriate education and training, as the main
ventures but only indirectly by creating appropriate underissues for entrepreneurial decisions. Fewer key informants
lying conditions. Table 5a lists the aspects of government
identified R&D as the main issue, while virtually no one idenpolicy that were identified by key informants as being the

Table 2. Correlation Between Start-up Rate and
Factors Relevant for Entrepreneurial Decisions

26 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol9/iss1/1

28

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2006

0.10

Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
UK
US
All Countries

Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
UK
US
All
All
Countries
Countries

Governm.
Policy
0.19
0.00
0.05
0.17
0.14
0.21
0.07
0.03
0.00
0.08
0.19

0.15

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.25

0.09

0.08

No Main
Issue
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.05
0.18
0.13
0.00
0.13
0.11

Governm.
Policy
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.13
0.11
0.08
0.18
0.12
0.15
0.14
0.14

Governm.
Programs
0.12
0.19
0.12
0.13
0.12
0.06
0.06
0.02
0.14
0.08
0.11

Financial
Support
0.26
0.15
0.26
0.15
0.18
0.32
0.23
0.30
0.15
0.16
0.22

Educ. &
Training
0.10
0.16
0.08
0.19
0.14
0.17
0.12
0.17
0.15
0.09
0.13

Research
& Devel.
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.12
0.06
0.18
0.08
0.10
0.13
0.09

Commer.
Infrastru.
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.10
0.09
0.02
0.13
0.04
0.05
0.12
0.06

Market
Openess
0.06
0.00
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.05

Physical
Infrastruc.
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.04

1.00

Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Social &
Cul. Norms
0.15
0.24
0.21
0.13
0.14
0.16
0.06
0.19
0.18
0.17
0.17

Table 4. Relative Frequency of Factors Influencing Entrepreneurial Decisions Identified as Discussion Issues

0.03

Table 3. Relative Frequency of Factors Influencing Entrepreneurial Decisions Identified as Main Issues
Social &
Unlisted
Governm. Financial
Educ. &
Research.
Commer.
Market
Physical
Cultural
Main
Programs
Support
Training
& Dev.
Infrastruc.
Openess
Infrastruc.
Norms
Issue
0.08
0.25
0.11
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.00
0.19
0.03
0.11
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.44
0.00
0.14
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.43
0.14
0.00
0.06
0.19
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.42
0.08
0.02
0.16
0.23
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.28
0.09
0.05
0.08
0.13
0.21
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.27
0.00
0.20
0.10
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.13
0.06
0.58
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.29
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.45
0.05
0.05
0.24
0.19
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.16
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Countries*
CA, IL, IT, JP, US
CA, FR, IT, US
FI, GE, IT, US
CA, FR, IT
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Countries*
CA, FR, GE, IL, IT, JP, US
CA, GE, US

6b. Most Important Aspects of Government Programs Identified by Key Informants as Discussion Issues
RI(1)**
RI(2)***
1. Too many programs exist. No effectiveness evaluation process exists. As a result, ineffective or redundant
28%
3%
programs are perpetuated and scarce resources wasted
2. Government officials do not know the needs of entrepreneurs. As a result, they are often unable to design
12%
1%
meaningful programs and provide useful services and advice. In addition, vehicles for delivering programs often lack
sufficient competence
3. Decentralization of program delivery works well but there is not enough of it
7%
1%
4. Programs are too often based on political interests. As a result, they tend to be unstable and lacking
5%
1%
transparency
5. Other issues
48%
5%
* Country List: CA=Canada, DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, IL=Israel, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States.
** The RI(1) column shows the relative importance across countries of that particular topic among all government policy and programs issues respectively.
*** The RI(2) column shows the relative importance of that particular topic across countries and all nine selected factors.

6a. Most Important Aspects of Government Programs Identified by Key Informants as Main Issues
1. Need for coordination, stability, and transparency of government programs
2. Need to train government officials to better understand the needs of entrepreneurs so they can design more
meaningful programs and provide more useful services and advice

Table 6. Influence of Government Programs

5b. Most Important Aspects of Government Policy Identified by Key Informants as Discussion Issues
RI(1)**
RI(2)***
1. Tax burden is too heavy and is often skewed against smaller firms
15%
2%
2. Burden of compliance with taxes and regulation is high and hinders new firm formation
15%
2%
3. Need for cross-training and sharing of information between government and growing businesses. In general,
14%
2%
governments are sympathetic to entrepreneurs but operate with a very different mindset
4. Employment regulation is rigid and has a negative impact on new firms growth
8%
1%
5. Other issues
48%
7%
*Country List: CA=Canada, DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, IL=Israel, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States.
** The RI(1) column shows the relative importance across countries of that particular topic among all government policy and programs issues, respectively.
*** The RI(2) column shows the relative importance of that particular topic across countries and all nine selected factors.

5a. Most Important Aspects of Government Policy Identified by Key Informants as Main Issues
1. Need for cross-training and sharing of information between government and growing businesses
2. Tax burden is too heavy and is often skewed against smaller firms
3. Burden of compliance with taxes and regulation is high and hinders new firm formation
4. There exist no incentives for developing partnerships between established and new firms, and foreign investors
and new firms

Table 5. Influence of Government Policy
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main issue for entrepreneurship in a given country and the
countries where the issue was raised. Surprisingly, the primary policy concerns among key informants with respect to
policy is the lack of interaction between government and
growing businesses. In addition, taxes and the compliance
with various regulations and tax laws were considered main
issues in four countries. Specifically, Italian and Canadian
informants commented not only on the height of the tax
rates but also on their distribution across firms of different
sizes. Size-related complaints were also raised with respect
to regulation compliance being too labor intensive and costly.12 Finally, the lack of adequate laws on incorporation, initial
private offerings and stock options were blamed in three
countries for reducing growth incentives for smaller and
newer firms.
In addition to the ones listed in Table 5a, other main policy issues were identified but only in one or two countries.
In Italy and France, for example, key informants identified
the main policy issue for the entrepreneurial sector with the
fact that institutions that could assist in fostering entrepreneurship suffered from equal representation in their committees of parties that stand on opposite positions regarding
new and growing firms. While, in Israel, several key informants identified the broadening of supportive policies, from
high-tech start-ups to all new firms, as a necessary condition
for the long-term growth of entrepreneurial activity in the
country.
The list of aspects of government policy that were identified by key informants as discussion issues for entrepreneurship in a given country mirrors that of main issues. Table 5b
shows that, at about 15 percent each, the top three policy
topics listed as main issues are also the three topics more discussed in general across countries. However, when all discussion issues are considered, the rigidity of employment laws
becomes relatively more important.The countries where this
issue was raised more often were Canada, Finland, Germany,
Italy, and the United States. In particular, the cost of labor was
the main complaint in Finland and Italy, the rigidity of hiring
and firing decisions was the main complaint in Canada and
the United States, and restrictive policies in the hiring of foreign workers was the main complaint in Germany.
In this article, government programs refer to the existence, at all levels of government, of initiatives designed to
assist new and growing firms. Table 6a shows that, among
main issues, the primary concerns regarding governmental
programs revolve around information about and implementation of programs. In other words, most key informants agreed
that although plenty of programs exist, information about
them is lacking. Most entrepreneurs are unaware of existing
programs and of how to find out about them. Also, a lot of
redundancy exists across programs and it is difficult to know
when one qualifies. Finally, being delegated to officials who

have no adequate background, the implementation of the
programs is often unsatisfactory.13
Table 6b shows the list of aspects of government programs identified by key informants as discussion issues. As
in the case of government policy, this list follows closely that
of the main issues. At 28 percent, the proliferation of programs is identified, by far, as an important problem and a significant source of inefficiency.14 Also, many of the key
informants felt that a more rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of government programs would be a useful step in
eliminating such redundancy.Without an appropriate evaluation process, programs are funded indefinitely, even as new
programs with similar services are initiated. Key informants
in Germany, Italy, and the United States commented that not
enough decentralization of program delivery exists. In addition key informants in Italy and France commented on the
lack of transparency and on the connection between politics and programs that makes the latter unstable especially
at the local level. In general, the evidence suggests that
potential entrepreneurs who are successful in making contact with such programs are more likely to implement a new
business, and that those new businesses that make contact
for assistance have a higher survival rate and tend to report
more growth.15
To summarize, government policy and programs seem to
be only weakly connected to individuals’ entrepreneurial
propensity. According to detailed interviews with key
informants, they represent only 10 and 3 percent, respectively, of the issues identified as most important (main
issues) for entrepreneurship by the 338 key informants.
Government policy and programs, however, received more
attention as secondary (discussion) issues, where they represent 14 and 11 percent, respectively, of all issues discussed. Among different aspects of government policy, key
informants identified the burden of taxation and the high
cost of compliance with regulation to be two very important factors.With respect to government programs, instead,
key informants indicated redundancy and lack of transparency as being very important. Finally, with respect to
both government policy and programs, key informants identified the lack of interaction between governments and
growing businesses as a major concern for entrepreneurial
activity. That is, differences in information and mindsets
between entrepreneurs and public employees were identified as being the main problem hindering the useful deployment of public resources in the entrepreneurial sector. No
expert, in any country, suggested or advised the creation of
new programs or increased public involvement. Thus, the
tendency seems to be that of seeing governments as creators and guarantors of underlying conditions conducive to
an entrepreneurial environment rather than as active promoters of entrepreneurial activities.
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Discussion
Entrepreneurs are concerned with the exploitation of profit
opportunities. Such opportunities exist in the form of market niches, new ways of producing existing goods, or the
introduction of new goods. According to economic literature, entrepreneurship is possible because information is
asymmetrically distributed across individuals (Knight 1921)
and the entrepreneur is an individual exhibiting above-average alertness (Kirzner 1973, 1979).Thus, by definition, entrepreneurs are individuals who deviate from the mean. They
possess a competitive advantage with respect to new methods or products and are, in a sense, ahead of the curve.As a
result, the actions of governments with respect to entrepreneurial intervention appear particularly difficult since the
number and types of variables that enter the entrepreneurial environment are always changing.These observations are
consistent with the results presented in Table 5 and, in particular,Table 6.
A more radical critique on the feasibility of effective government intervention on entrepreneurship would state that
it is impossible for governments to gather all the necessary
data to begin with, because the necessary information exists
in know-how of potential entrepreneurs and is not available
to others. In fact, if information were known, superior alertness would not be necessary to exploit profit opportunities.
Profit opportunities would be known to everyone and would
be immediately eliminated.This is why government intervention and entrepreneurial policy and programs are so difficult
to identify. As mentioned by the key informants, entrepreneurs and public officials have different mindsets.The entrepreneurial process underlying entrepreneurial behavior is
complex in nature and unpredictable.To a large extent, government policy and programs are variables exogenous to the
entrepreneurial process and, given what entrepreneurs do,
governments suffer by definition of an informational and
mindset disadvantage.
Recent findings on national systems of innovation are consistent with the argument that government intervention with
respect to entrepreneurship is extremely hard to plan. A
national system of innovation is defined as the web of institutions and economic structures affecting the rate and direction of innovative activities in the economy (Edquist and
Lundvall 1993). Much of the research on this subject has
shown the bulk of the innovative effort to be endogenous to
the economy and sustained by the firms themselves (Nelson
1993). If this argument is accepted, then, with respect to the
entrepreneurial sector, governments should promote selforganized and endogenous innovation rather then engage in
extensive planning or even selective nurturing. Along these
lines, Clark (1988) adopted an evolutionary perspective to
discuss forms of public policy that may be appropriate for
and conducive to more innovation. Clark’s evolutionary argu-

ment relied on the observation that the market system is
complex and constantly changing and that governments lack
information beyond that possessed by entrepreneurs and
that, as a result, government policies may not deliver a net
positive effect.
Yet, governments do play a crucial role in enhancing the
ability of individuals to act entrepreneurially. Although suggestive, results presented in this article support and complement arguments according to which governments need to
implement policies that increase market openness and legal
transparency (e.g., see Boettke 1993; Brenner 1987; Harper
1996; and Holcombe 1998, 2003). In fact, even if such features of the economic system are important for all businesses, regardless of newness and size, they are particularly
important for smaller and newer firms that have lower lobbying power and may not be capable of creating monopolistic
rents. Results also suggest that government policy and programs are more effective when capable of enhancing the
underlying pool of resources from which potential entrepreneurs draw their inputs than when providing selective safety
nets. In fact, the rules and practices that favor innovation and
the creation of new markets cannot be imposed by external
agencies, but are created, refined, and transmitted effectively
over time only if the appropriate institutions and values are
transferred across generations. In general, government interventions may be distinguished between proactive government actions specific to entrepreneurship and incentive
boosting interventions not necessarily specific to entrepreneurship. Proactive interventions aim at helping those
engaged in starting a business and at removing obstacles for
their endeavors. Implicitly, proactive interventions assume
that perceived or actual barriers discourage prospective
entrepreneurs, and that more people would start a business
if the process were made easier. Thus, the aim of proactive
government intervention is to ease the start-up process and
minimize the risk of failure. Incentive type interventions, on
the other hand, operate on the principle that entrepreneurs
are deterred from entrepreneurship because the expected
rewards are not commensurate with the risks, both financial
and social.
Although purely suggestive, the results presented in this
article indicate that government policy and programs have
limited influence on entrepreneurial decisions. Specifically,
policy and programs represent only 10 and 3 percent,
respectively, of the issues identified as most important (main
issues) for entrepreneurship by the 338 key informants.
They received, however, more attention as secondary (discussion) issues, where they represented 14 and 11 percent,
respectively, of all issues discussed.Among different aspects
of government policy, key informants identified the burden
of taxation and the high cost of compliance with regulation
to be two very important factors. With respect to govern-
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ment programs, instead, key informants indicated redundancy and lack of transparency as being very important. With
respect to both government policy and programs, key
informants identified the lack of interaction between governments and growing businesses; that is, differences in
information and mindsets, as being the main problem hindering the useful deployment of public resources in the
entrepreneurial sector. No expert, in any country, suggested
or advised new programs or increased public involvement.
Thus, the tendency seems to be that of seeing governments
as creators and guarantors of underlying conditions conducive to an entrepreneurial environment rather than as
active promoters of entrepreneurial activities.
Also, it should be noted that the data refers specifically to
1999.The fact that the data are from a specific year and that
if interviewed again the experts might express different opinions is not relevant from a substantive point of view.This is a
discussion aimed at generating a debate on structural issues
of the economy at the global level.The point of the article is
neither country specific nor to evaluate any particular policy
or to propose best practices. Rather, the article attempts an
evaluation of the ability of governments to influence (positively or negatively) entrepreneurial behavior in general.
Within this context, the article does not pretend to offer specific policy prescriptions for any of the countries in the study
but, rather, provides further evidence that market processes,
as opposed to social constructionism, are more conducive to
entrepreneurial behavior.This is consistent with recent stud-

ies showing that, when it comes to entrepreneurship, one
size does not fit all (Acs et al. 2005) and that much more
work is needed at the local and regional level. A very desirable extension of this article, for example, would include longitudinal country-specific studies focusing on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of specific policy interventions or programs.
The descriptive evidence presented here, however, does
support the neoclassical economic view according to which
entrepreneurship may be better served by an environment
where nascent entrepreneurs may hope in high rewards than
by one offering a stronger safety net, and government policy
toward entrepreneurship should place greater emphasis on
underlying incentive measures rather than specific proactive
measures. After all, by definition, entrepreneurship is concerned with the creation of new ventures for the purpose of
profit, where the occasion for profit is generated by the
entrepreneur’s ability to innovate. In several countries, for
example, a widespread entrepreneurial sector, capable of
adjusting to changes in market conditions, had been one of
the main strengths during the stagnation of the early 1990s.
When significant changes in relative prices, technologies, and
industrial relations exist, entrepreneurial firms demonstrate a
remarkable capacity to adjust and innovate and are, therefore, particularly important in smoothing out the effects of
the business cycle. It is hoped that governments at all levels
will work to provide an environment in which the entrepreneurial spirit may flourish.
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Endnotes
1. For example, in 1998 the OECD published the report Fostering Entrepreneurship: A Thematic Review.This report aims at
understanding the state of entrepreneurship in all OECD countries and at identifying which policies might be most successful in fostering it. In 1998, the European Commission presented the report Fostering Entrepreneurship: Priorities for the
Future to the Council of Ministers.The aim of this report was to simplify the start-up process and improve access to financing throughout the European Union. In addition, many programs including technological incubators, industrial parks, and
networks of services have been established in France, Israel, Italy, the United Kingdom, and many other countries.
2. Details about the GEM project and dataset are available at www.gemconsortium.org.
3. Cross-country comparability is, of course, a complex and multilayered phenomenon. How and if countries may be considered comparable depends on the question asked. In this article, comparability refers to aggregate socioeconomic conditions.
Thus, examples of relevant indicators include per capita GDP; literacy; mortality rate; life expectancy; educational attainments; legal, commercial, and physical infrastructures; technological levels; and market openness. Data from official international sources, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, show that the 10 countries in the sample have
identical or comparable values for all standard indicators of development. Among others, relevant statistics may be easily
obtained from Euromonitor (2005), OECD (2000), and World Bank (2004).
4. Survey respondents were distributed as follows: Canada 1,003; Denmark 1,002; Finland 1,001; France 1,000; Germany 1,008;
Israel 992; Italy 1,000; Japan 1,384; United Kingdom 1,014; United States 1,018.
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5.The collection of data in the GEM project has undergone significant changes and refinements over the years.The definitions
and classifications presented in this article refer exclusively to the methods used in 1999 and should not be used to appraise
later data and developments in the GEM project.
6. Reynolds et al. (2005) contains details on the methodology used for the construction and harmonization of the dataset.
7. Details about the selection process used to identify key informants in each country, as well as a list of questions posed to
each interviewed individual and other details about the interview process and the data coding can be found in the 1999
GEM Operation Manual. The manual is available at www.gemconsortium.com under the heading “1999 documents.”
8.An example may clarify the procedure:An academic known for her work on entrepreneurial education could be selected to
be a key informant with special knowledge regarding construct #4 (education and training). She would be asked to identify what factor, in her opinion, was the most relevant for the future of entrepreneurship in her country.The selected factor,
called the main issue, could be education and training or any of the remaining eight constructs. She would then be asked to
identify at least three discussion issues (i.e., three factors she considered to be particularly relevant, though not dominant,
for the future of entrepreneurship in her country). She would then select, say, financial support, culture and social norms,
and internal market openness. Thus, for each key informant, it was possible to identify the factor each of them believed to
be the main issues for entrepreneurship plus three additional factors each thought important for entrepreneurship.
9.The complete 1999 GEM questionnaire administered to key informants can be found in the 1999 GEM Operation Manual,
available at www.gemconsortium.com under the heading “1999 documents.”
10.The complete 1999 GEM Report can be downloaded from www.gemconsortium.org.
11. Noticeably, some of the reported Chronbach Alpha’s coefficients are low.This is likely due to the fact that they were calculated from the subjective answers of a small number of respondents.
12. In the United States in 1992, for example, it was estimated that regulatory compliance cost small firms approximately $5,000
per employee, versus $500 to $3,400 for larger firms (Zacharakis et al. 1999, p.28).
13. In the United Kingdom, for example, several key informants expressed significant dissatisfaction with the quality of services provided by the system of local agencies specializing in the support of smaller and newer firms.
14. For example, in the United States, in 1999, the state of Wisconsin alone had at least 400 programs providing more than 700
different services for small business, but the overall awareness of their assistance and their use was very low.
15. In Denmark, for example, some key informants identified government programs as a main issue and as having a huge positive effect on entrepreneurship in the last decade.
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Case Study
Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow:
DHR Patio Homes, LLC1 and Family Firm Management
Herbert Sherman
Daniel J. Rowley
quit.” Those two little words were dropped like an
atomic bomb and seemed to explode across the dinner table at the Davis residence.The meal had not yet
been served though everyone was at the table engaged in a
lively discussion, which of course included their business,
DHR Patio Homes, LLC. Immediately, a hush descended
upon the Davis family and their guest, close friend, and
business associate, Stephen Hodgetts, as an imaginary
mushroom cloud filled the room. No one could move or say
a word although numerous glances of varying nature were
being exchanged in rapid succession.The somberness of the
situation was quickly broken, however, by another barrage
of discontent.“I’ve had it, I quit. Find someone else to act as
the contractor for the company.”With those words, RJ Davis
quickly vacated the dining room and zoomed upstairs into
the Davises’ spare garage apartment.

I

Company History and Background-—Part A
D&H Management, LLC—A Real Estate
Management Firm
It all started back in August 2002 when the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dipped under 8000. Richard Davis and
Stephen Hodgetts, academics, friends, and coauthors, were
lamenting their ever-shrinking retirement funds. Neither was
getting any richer on a faculty member’s salary nor expected
any windfalls from relatives, their book sales, or lottery tickets. As Hodgetts was fond of saying,“America believes in education: The average professor earns more money in a year
than a professional athlete earns in a whole week.”2
After a long discussion, they decided to become masters
of their own economic fate and jump into an entrepreneurial venture. Davis had done enough preliminary research on
the real estate market in their area to convince Hodgetts that
becoming a landlord was a good idea.
Davis and Hodgetts, with the assistance of the Davis’s real
estate agent, found six families in three months and worked
with these families to find them homes3 in the $175,000
price range that the families would be happy to lease from
Davis and Hodgetts and eventually purchase. The deal was so
attractive that they even had a waiting list for new tenants.
The six homes, though, had gobbled up their initial investment of $100,000 and required an additional $80,000 (which
Hodgetts loaned the company) while their monthly cash

flow yielded a net profit of $ 1,500/month. Adrienne, Davis’s
wife, managed the day-to-day operations of the firm.

DHR Construction, LLC—A Home Residential
Construction Company
The construction company started off as just another small
entrepreneurial undertaking to raise venture capital.
Hodgetts and Davis would finish off the basements of their
rental homes, get the homes reappraised, and then remortgage the properties pulling out an additional $10,000–
$20,000 per home. These funds could then be used as down
payments for future rental homes.
Davis and Hodgetts were approached by one of their
renters to perform all of the nonlicensed work (i.e., framing
out the basement, wall boarding, taping, plastering, trimming,
painting) to finish off all of the other basements of their tenants. Davis explained to the renters (Alan and Wilma) that
they would have to form their own LLC and act as any other
subcontractor. Based on the additional funds raised by finishing off the basements, Davis and Hodgetts went on to purchase six more homes, five of which had their basements
completed by Alan and Wilma (as A&W Construction, LLC).
Alan and Wilma enjoyed working on these basements
since it yielded them additional income of $2,000/month.
They approached Davis and Hodgetts about figuring out a
way that they could keep occupied year round, however,
there was nothing that Davis and Hodgetts could do for Alan
and Wilma at that time. Yet a few days later, the situation
changed dramatically.
One of Davis’s students who was designing their basements said Davis and Hodgetts could cut out the middleman
in terms of their rental business if they built their own
homes. Davis thought his student was crazy at the time but
they talked after class and the student said that he would be
happy to act as the general contractor and that he knew all
of the subcontractors who were needed to construct new
homes. Alan and Wilma would do all of the interior work, and
Alan could hire part-time workers to help. In any event, Davis
and Hodgetts could build the rest of the homes they wanted
to rent under a different company name, sell it to themselves
for a profit, and then make a profit renting the homes. On a
$150,000 home Davis and Hodgetts would net about a 20
percent profit, that’s around $30,000 over a two- to three-
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month time period (the time it took to build a 1200 square
foot three bedroom, two bath home).
The profit derived from this entrepreneurial venture led
Davis and Hodgetts to backward integrate their operation;
they were now going to build homes not only to be purchased by D&H Management as possible rental units but also
for public consumption. In May 2003, DHR Construction
broke ground on their first construction site in the St.
Andrews development.
In November 2003 Davis and Hodgetts bought out the student’s interest in DHR Construction due to differences in
management and business philosophy. By January 2004 they
had completed three homes at St. Andrews. They then shifted their building site to another location, Florence
Development, which they felt had a more upscale look and
would allow them to build nicer and more expensive homes.
By April 2004 they had built three homes in Florence, had
plans to build five more in that area, and were looking at
other developments for future growth and expansion. On
April 12, 2004, the Florence Development Corporation developed cash flow problems and decided not to pay their landscapers. Each of the properties that were owned by Davis
and Hodgetts in the development had a mechanic’s lien
placed on it by the landscapers for $450,000 per property.

DHR Patio Homes, LLC—A Second Home
Construction Company
While a deal was being brokered to clear Davis and
Hodgetts’ liens, Davis, acting in his usual entrepreneurial manner, located a
brand new development in
June 2004, about 10 miles
east of where they currently were building. The new
development, called Snowy
Mountains, was a unique
project since the developers had built lakes, a golf
course, and clubhouse
(including a three-star
restaurant) and had very
specific designs for community development. The
housing currently in the
development (phase one)
ran the gamut of homes,
from two-bedroom condominiums (that started
around $140,000) to multimillion-dollar estate homes

on the lake. Every member of the community was given
access to the clubhouse (which included a pool and a playground) and the several lakes dotting the development, as
well as given a discount at the restaurant and golf course.The
developers also sponsored fishing, golfing, boating, and concert events and even had an island that could be rented for
weddings and other parties. The island had fully equipped
restrooms with showers, electricity, and a kitchen service
cabana.
DHR Patio Homes, LLC was established in August 2004 by
Davis and Hodgetts to legally separate their construction
projects in Florence (run under the corporate name of DHR
Construction, LLC) from their latest project, Mountain Trails,
a section of the Snowy Mountain development. Davis and
Hodgetts kept the “DHR”designation in the firm’s name since
they thought that the DHR name had some brand recognition and wanted to show a linkage of ownership between
their two construction firms. DHR developed a simple business model. Homes would be priced at 20 percent above cost
with Davis acting as the architect and head of construction
operations. His job was to work with the subcontractors to
ensure that their work met schedule and building code
requirements and to make sure that subcontractors’ bills
coincided with the work provided. Alan would work with
Davis as the acting foreman on the job by helping to coordinate the subcontractors as well as continue his own subcontracting work dealing with wall hanging, lining, spackling,

Interlocking Board of Directors
Richard Davis
Stephen Hodgetts

Adrienne Davis, Chief Operating Officer

Richard Davis, Contractor & CFO

Alan (A&W Construction, LLC),
Foreman

Subcontractors
(Skilled and Nonskilled)

Figure 1. D&H Management, DHR Construction, DHR Patio Homes (June 2004)
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molding, and painting.Wilma worked along side Alan (though
Wilma was paid by Davis and Hodgetts directly) while Alan
also hired his younger brother Marvin to help out as there
was plenty of work to do and Alan wanted people he could
trust. Alan’s LLC received $6,000 a month in which to pay
himself and his brother and pay federal income tax.
Everything seemed to be going smoothly. Alan was working out quite well,taking over as the foreman and after a while
Davis gave Alan carte blanche as to how to run the operational aspects of the construction business (see Figure 1).

The Latest Debacle
In early January 2005, Davis and Hodgetts changed from
using a part-time book bookkeeper to an accountant who
worked with numerous home construction businesses. A
two-year audit conducted by the accountant on all three businesses revealed that about $25,000 of expenses connected to
Alan’s corporate credit card account were either for nonbusiness items (i.e., Christmas trees), multiple questionable
charges (i.e., filling up the company truck six times in one
day), and, at times, was signed by someone other than Alan
(signatures on receipts did not match Alan’s signature).
After a discussion with their lawyer, Hodgetts and the
Davises agreed to confront Alan with their accountants’ findings. Evidence was presented as to the inappropriate credit
card charges, multiple purchases of gas and tools, and felonious signature on certain credit card charges. Further evidence was presented to Alan that matched his wife’s signature to those on the credit card receipts.Alan neither agreed
to nor denied the charges.That being the case, Richard took
the keys to the company truck and tool shed from Alan and
then described to Alan what their continued working relationship would be. Rather than being fired, Alan would be
working under his brother (who would form his own company) and his brother’s company’s monthly check would be
docked approximately $4,000 a month until all of the losses
had been recovered. Alan still made no comments and left
the meeting.

When In Doubt, Hire Family
Alan’s demotion and separation from the business left a wide
managerial gap. So who was going to take over as foreman for
the month it would probably take to hire a new one? Richard
Davis’s plans to retire that year and work the business full
time had been stymied by the poor cash flow of the business;
there was just not enough positive cash flow to pay Davis a
salary that was not even half of what he was earning at the
university. Davis would continue to act as the firm’s CEO but
could not devote the time necessary to act as the chief operating officer (foreman). Hodgetts had pursued several academic undertakings (books, articles, and research) in the last
year or two with the understanding that he was going to

have to be the lead author of this “dynamic duo.” He had neither the knowledge of the operational aspects of the construction business necessary to serve in a managerial capacity nor the time needed to supervise home building. None of
the owners could then serve as foreman.
Davis and Hodgetts agreed that they would need to recruit
a foreman but needed someone immediately (i.e., tomorrow)
to fill the position while their search moved ahead. There
were two likely candidates who immediately came to mind,
both family members. Adrienne Davis, Richard Davis’s wife,
had an MBA and was managing many of the back office functions for Davis and Hodgetts’ three firms. She was quite good
at dealing with renters, potential buyers, and suppliers, and
served as the information hub for the three firms. RJ, Richard
and Adrienne’s only child, had already graduated from college
and served as an administrative assistant to both a local
lawyer and the president of their local hospital. RJ was currently working as the assistant to the president of a personal
services firm that happened to be one of Davis and Hodgetts’
suppliers and was also providing advertising services
through a separate business.
The family, including Hodgetts, had a get-together to discuss this matter and decided that RJ would be the most likely candidate to fill the bill. RJ had the free time, had worked
in a very tough and stressful environment (a legal office and
a hospital) and excelled, and seemed to have both the interest and tenacity to learn the contracting portion of the business. From Davis and Hodgetts’ perspective, this would provide an opportunity to determine whether RJ would want to
be the one to eventually take over the family business.
Richard Davis then spent a few days at the work site with
RJ to introduce RJ to the numerous subcontractors
(plumbers, HVAC, electricians, framers, insulators, carpenters, masons, etc.) and their employees and to spread the
word that RJ was going to take over the job of foreman
while the business was searching for an experienced person. RJ was pleased to discover that many of the subcontractors had worked together on previous jobs for Davis and
Hodgetts as well as for other small local contractors and
therefore had developed good working relationships with
one another.
No specific managerial training was provided since neither Richard Davis nor Hodgetts had undergone their own
managerial training prior to any of their entrepreneurial ventures. Richard did give RJ a copy of all of the building blueprints, work charts (showing which subcontractor had to be
working at what time point in each home and what work the
subcontractor would perform), and had RJ surf the net to
read up on the basics of subcontracting. RJ was a very quick
learner and after having several question-and-answer sessions
with both Richard and Adrienne, they decided that RJ was
ready to go solo on the job site.
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Like March, Coming in Like a Lion
The next day RJ was at the construction site checking in
with all of the subcontractors (who were all in the midst of
doing their jobs) to make sure that everyone knew what
needed to be done by whom and in what order. RJ specifically reminded the electrician that an electrical inspection
was to be done in two days on the house he currently was
working on and he assured RJ that the he’d be done on time.
The electrician was having real problems tracking down
some problems he and his coworker were having, both in
the basement (the light switches turned on the wrong
lights) and in the first floor dining room (electrical outlets
were not working and he could not trace the trouble). RJ
asked if the inspection should be cancelled or put off for
another few days and the electrician again assured RJ that
he’d be done on time. (Richard Davis had told RJ that inspectors seemed to get quite mad if they inspected a house that
did not seem to be ready. More importantly, the second
inspection would be far more thorough and inevitably the
inspector would find something on which to fail the electrical inspection.) RJ then called the town hall to ensure that
the inspection was properly scheduled and to see what the
inspector would need (i.e., blueprints) for his visit.
RJ came home from the first day of the job exhausted and
a bit disgruntled. At the dinner table with Richard and
Adrienne, RJ described how the electrical problems still had
not been solved and how the electrician guaranteed that
he’d get the job done even if he had to work through the
night to do it. Other problems kept cropping up (i.e., there
was a scratch in one of the kitchen cabinets that was delivered and the lighting company shorted them one fixture)
and RJ had to be “the problem solver.” Many of these problems would throw the building schedule off and RJ was having to constantly shuffle around the subcontractors to
accommodate the numerous mishaps found in each home.
Richard and Adrienne were empathetic and offered some
kindly advice. Richard kept emphasizing how RJ needed to
keep the subcontractors up-to-date on the work schedule,
while Adrienne asked about the work climate and how the
subs were adjusting to their new boss. RJ complained that
the temporary nature of the job and RJ’s lack of practical
construction work experience probably made it more difficult to deal with the subcontractors. How could they
respect someone who had never worked in construction
before? Like every other challenge, however, RJ would rise
to the task.
Richard, in the interim, had found, through a friend of the
family, a retired gentleman who had worked in the construction industry for many years. He really only wanted to work
part-time, three to four days per week, and felt that he could
serve as a foreman if someone else would pitch in to assist

on his days off. Richard was really looking for a full-time foreman but kept this gentleman in the back on his mind, just in
case.

A Failed Inspection and Tempers Flare
After a day or two on the job, RJ felt like the work was getting out of control.The lighting fixture supplier still had not
delivered one fixture and the electrician seemed absolutely
baffled as to what the problem was with the wiring in the
dining room, yet did not inform RJ of this until the inspector
was at the work site. The inspector subsequently failed the
electrical work on the house and left in a huff.
In the interim, problems were starting to arise with a second home since the insulation subcontractor accidentally
insulated the house before it could be inspected for framing;
the inspector was absolutely livid when he examined the
home and refused to inspect it unless all of the insulation was
removed. Meanwhile, he noted that there were problems
with the framing of the ceiling (warped wood) and that the
metal supports for the joists were poorly installed.
RJ’s reaction to all of this was very simple.After “playing
nice” with the subcontractors who were giving RJ problems, RJ decided to turn hard-hitting and give the subcontractors a tough talking to.The electrician took the brunt of
RJ’s anger since he did not call RJ in time to cancel the electrical inspection—two houses failing in two days was not a
track record that RJ could deal with.The electrician, though
apologetic, did not take lightly to RJ’s heavy-handed
remarks, and returned RJ’s comments with some harsh
words of his own.
That afternoon RJ confided to Hodgetts, “I feel overwhelmed on the job. How can I handle all of these responsibilities on top of the work I still had to complete for my own
small business of writing promotional advertisements?”
Hodgetts listened intently to RJ’s comments and suggested
that RJ either cut back on one of the jobs or speak with
Richard and Adrienne about the situation.

The Calm Before the Storm
The night of the failed electrical inspection, Hodgetts was
invited over to the Davis home for dinner so they could discuss the business and see how RJ’s first few days on the job
were working out. Hodgetts had not revealed his conversation with RJ to the Davises, but the Davises were astute
enough parents to know that something was wrong at the
work site since RJ seemed more agitated than usual. The
dinner conversation started out in its usual jovial manner
and then slowly shifted to the progress being made on the
construction site.
RJ gave a summary of the past few days, including the
failed inspections and the tough time RJ was having managing
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the contractors. RJ pointed out who all the “good” and “bad”
contractors were, and therefore who ended up on RJ’s like
and dislike list. The Davises and Hodgetts were absolutely
silent through RJ’s description of the situation (a very difficult task, indeed, for both Richard Davis and Hodgetts) and
everyone tried to keep their body language as controlled as
possible. RJ finally came to an abrupt finish.This left a long
pause for everyone else at the dinner table to fill with table
talk or comments about the business. Before anyone could
ask RJ a question about the building projects, RJ quit the job
and left the room.

Part B
Adrienne left the table and followed RJ to the spare garage
apartment to find out exactly what the problem was. In the
interim, Richard Davis and Hodgetts were sitting stunned at
the dinner table.The silence was broken when Richard said,
“So I guess I’m left holding the bag again! How I’m going to
manage to act as contractor again is beyond me, but I’ve done
it before for a short time when we dumped David Russ and I
can do it again.”4
“Slow down,” Hodgetts requested,“let’s move into the family room and then discuss this matter in a more conducive
setting.”
While Davis and Hodgetts each resumed their conversation, Adrienne joined them to discuss the matter further.“RJ
needs some time to herself,”Adrienne began,“and she really
is not in a mood to talk right now. Let’s give her time to compose herself and perhaps she’ll come down to chat with us.”
“That’s fine by me,” quipped Hodgetts,“I lost my appetite
on the first ‘I quit.’Adrienne, perhaps you can tell us what this
is all about?”
“What this is about,” started Richard, “is the fact that I’m
going to have to clean up this mess and get back into the dayto-day operations of the business. I’m going to need to get to
the bottom of the problems with the subcontractors and
clear up this chaos.”
“Yes, yes, yes,” jumped in Hodgetts. “That’s all well and
good, Richard, but we have to get at the root of the matter
with RJ—what could have made her quit in only a few days?
She has been in jobs with far more pressure than this and yet
here she collapses like an accordion on the first sign of trouble? What’s going on here?”
“She wouldn’t tell me,”Adrienne declared,“and I certainly
was not going to pressure her. That’s all she would need right
now, an overbearing mother!” With that last sentence
Adrienne’s gaze quickly affixed on her husband, Richard,
who clearly got the hands-off message.

The “Truth” Wills Out
About a half an hour later, RJ came down and joined the

threesome to discuss the work situation. Rather than pepper
RJ with a series of questions, the group allowed her the
opportunity to let her story unfold.
I knew that I was a young woman walking into a
man’s world, even for a short time, and I thought I was
prepared for what I would encounter—discrimination
and sexual harassment. I treated everyone fairly but
tough and wanted to come across as the boss, especially with those subcontractors who were not getting the
job done. I wanted them to be afraid of me, that I would
fire them on the spot if the work didn’t get done well
and on time, that I was a person to be reckoned with; a
bitch. The subs saw me replace our former foreman
Alan and knew that if he could be replaced, they all
could. I thought that is what I needed to do to earn the
respect of the subcontractors—in a tough world, be
tough.
Though they were polite enough when talking with
me directly, I overheard several subs talking with their
coworkers about me, and, trust me, it was not complimentary. What really got me upset was that they kept
referring to me as “that woman” and that I was less than
competent because of my gender.
Worse, the presence of a woman on the job site
seemed to be a distraction to some of the subs’ employees, especially the younger, unmarried workers.5 One of
them kept asking me out on a date, which, of course, I
continued to say “no” to; and I explained that it was a
conflict of interest for us to become socially involved. I
further asked him to stop asking me out and that I felt
uncomfortable with his advances. This clearly did not
deter his advances, which I kept putting off. When I
eventually threatened to have him fired if he didn’t
back off, he finally got my point.
It was immediately clear to me that it did not matter
what I said; the subs were going to do their thing and
deal with Dad if there were any real problems; like failing an inspection is not a problem! I felt out of place
and in the way. I quit because it was apparent that in
that environment there was no way, no how, that I
could work with the subs and get the work completed
in a productive, timely manner.
Richard Davis’s face said it all.Anger for how his daughter
was treated, regret that he had put her into an untenable situation, and guilt on his part for thinking that she had dumped
this problem on him for no real reason. Adrienne also wondered how she might have prepared RJ for this situation
though Adrienne had never experienced anything close to
what RJ had described.
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While Adrienne comforted her daughter, both Richard
Davis and Hodgetts discussed the matter further, knowing
that they would still have to deal with these issues as well as
the need to find an immediate replacement for RJ.

Editors’ Note: Anyone wishing to obtain the instructor’s manual for the case study should contact Dr. Herbert Sherman at
Herbert.Sherman@liu.edu.

Endnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.

This is a disguised case.The names of the firms and characters have been changed by request of the owners.
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3,August 27, 2003.
The location has been purposely left out to support the disguised nature of the case.
For an earlier case study on DHR Construction, see Sherman, Herbert, and Daniel James Rowley. 2004. Case study: DHR
Construction, LLC: Parts A and B. New England Journal of Entrepreneurship 6, 2: 33–44.
5. These workers were a mixture of immigrants and locals and included men of Hispanic origin.
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Capital Accessibility, Gender, and Ethnicity:
The Case of Minority Women-owned Firms
Leyland M. Lucas
inority women continue to make significant
gains in economic activity, particularly as entrepreneurs through the creation of small businesses. Despite this increased role in small business activity and
an admirable rate of success, minority women-owned businesses continue to experience problems in acquiring capital. This difficulty, which some have attributed to discriminatory practices, forces a large number of these businesses
to rely on governmental support programs for assistance in
meeting their capital needs. Building on the idea that
things are not as simple as commonly presented, a case is
made that access to capital for women-owned businesses is
affected by a number of other factors tied to the inability
to join important networks.

M

Small businesses are an essential tenet of the U.S. economy
and continue to be created in increasing numbers.According
to recent census estimates, small businesses account for
more than 35 percent of economic activity and will continue
to increase despite changes in the qualifying criteria. Within
this broad sector of the economy, even more rapid growth is
occurring in the creation and successful operation of small
businesses owned and operated by minority women. The
number of these firms has been increasing at a faster rate
than that of minority males (U.S. Census Bureau 2002), suggesting that minority women-owned businesses are taking on
an increasingly important role in the U.S. economy.
Despite continued growth in minority women-owned
businesses, attempts by government, private banking, and
boutique lenders appear unable to fulfill the need for capital
generated by these businesses. As a consequence, many
minority women-owned businesses are unable to secure capital for reasons such as unacceptable rates of return, concentration in low-profit industries, and incompatible risk exposure (Greene et al. 2001; Mason and Harrison 1999; Timmons
and Bygrave 1997). As a result, stories persist of the challenges that minority women-owned businesses face in
accessing capital. Further complicating the issue is the fact
that set-aside programs and stereotypical attitudes that view
these owners as “too soft” and incapable of making the tough
decisions persist are seen as hampering the development of
these businesses.
Although these stories persist, there are other valid reasons why minority women-owned businesses have difficulty
in accessing capital. The intent of this article is to suggest

that, while these attitudes persist, there is a more rational
explanation why minority women-owned businesses find
access to capital so difficult. We suggest that lending decisions are driven by issues of profitability, return on investment, and the perception that investments are “relatively
safe.” Such determinations can be made by examining the
experience of entrepreneurs, information accessibility, liabilities of newness and size, and management styles.These factors rather than the persistence of prejudice and stereotypical attitudes explain why many minority women-owned businesses find access to capital so difficult.
The next section reviews some of the critical aspects of
women and minority-owned businesses.It is followed by arguments and the development of propositions that explain the
challenges to capital accessibility among minority womenowned businesses.The article concludes with a discussion of
possible implications for these businesses and policy-makers
in assessing strategies to increase capital accessibility.

Critical Aspects of Minority Womenowned Businesses
The essence of entrepreneurial activity is opportunity recognition, timing, and exploitation. Entrepreneurship cannot
flourish unless all three of these factors converge. Failure in
any one of these areas leads to unfulfilled entrepreneurial
goals and objectives. It is the convergence of these three factors that has led to the substantive increase in small business
activity.
Having access to capital markets requires knowledge about
who has capital available and for what purposes. In reality,
however, this knowledge is not perfectly available and minority women entrepreneurs often find themselves at a disadvantage in this respect,because they are not part of the important
networks that play a role in the capital markets. To further
complicate the issue, minority women entrepreneurs, in their
quest for capital, are entering a male-dominated setting and
lack the necessary social contacts and skills (Cliff 1998;
Greene et al. 2001; Uzzi 1999).The dominance of males in this
setting leads to the adoption of specific values and beliefs that
appear at odds with those of women.As a consequence, lending to minority women entrepreneurs is seen as a high-risk
venture that is unlikely to provide adequate returns.

Conceptual Development
Success in business often depends more on who knows you
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and what they know about your work than on either what or
whom you know. If these entrepreneurs are known to individuals who are part of important networks, then it is easier
for information about these entrepreneurs to be shared than
in instances where they are not part of these informal networks. Additionally, informal networks often provide significant and valuable information that can either enhance or
counter what is already known about an entrepreneur’s
character.

Experience
Small businesses are often established by individuals who
recognize an opportunity closely related to their current
employment. This is particularly the case where these businesses are designed to offer services previously performed
by the company but now targeted for outsourcing. To best
exploit these opportunities, entrepreneurs must not only recognize that they exist but also have experience that is viewed
as critical to the success of their operations (Fiet et al. 2002;
Haynes and Haynes 1999; Lerner and Almor 2002). The substance of the argument is that capital exists and lenders are
willing to accommodate the needs of entrepreneurs so long
as they have the relevant experience and are not pursuing
“pies in the skies” dreams (Humphreys and McClung 1981;
Schwartz 1976).
Two types of experience are critical to business success
and, by extension, access to capital: general and specific
(Sigrist 1999). General experience, or business experience, is
acquired through the opportunity to work in a large or small
corporate body and participate in the making of significant
decisions (Humphreys and McClung 1981; Schwartz 1976).
Such general experience may be acquired through one’s corporate career that may involve opportunities at a single or
several corporate entities. Specific experience, or industry
experience, is much narrower in scope and deeper in quality
because it typically covers exposure to significant decision
making within the same industry. Specific experience is idiosyncratic to the particular circumstances surrounding an
industry. Through specific experience, an individual gains
greater insight into the intricacies of the business cycle as it
pertains to a particular industry (Brophy 1989; Coleman
2000; Loscocco and Robinson 1991).These different types of
experience are addressed more fully below.

Business Experience
A critical aspect of business experience is that it provides
individuals with access to human capital, which is the stored
knowledge and abilities possessed by individuals (Birley et al.
1987).This is achieved through access to occupational experiences that allow individuals to develop skills on several
aspects of business that prove to be essential for the creation
and operation of successful businesses. Without this human

capital, individuals are likely to make critical errors in decisions and these can prove fatal for the business. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is already a problem among small
businesses and contributes to their high failure rates.
Recent studies have found that women now occupy more
than 15 percent of senior corporate positions and the number of female chief executives has tripled within the past
seven years (Downey 2002). However, these gains among
women are not matched by gains among minority women.
Though their numbers in undergraduate and graduate fields
of study are increasing, minority women in business are highly concentrated in support roles and fields that afford little
opportunity for significant senior management experience.
The concentration of minority women in these support roles
provides them with limited access to the requisite business
experience helpful to establishing successful businesses.
Although their undergraduate training provided insight into
financing, accounting, marketing, and other skills necessary
to perform critical business functions, some of the more intricate skills that can only be acquired through exposure to critical decision-making in a “real-world” scenario are not
acquired. Minority-women entrepreneurs tend to be well
educated. However, they often lack training in critical areas
of business that can provide access to important networks
(Brush 1992; Lituchy et al. 2004).
The limited business experience has major implications
for minority women entrepreneurs to access capital. These
difficulties arise because minority women are not part of the
critical networks that can provide them with the information
needed to gain the business experience (Fabowale 1995;
Loscocco and Robinson 1991). For several reasons, minority
women find that they are more often involved in tightly knit
networks that have few linkages to major players outside of
the network. It is access to the players who are outside of the
network that are positioned to provide these women with
the opportunities to acquire significant business experience
and access to capital. In effect, the strong ties established by
minority women prevent them from establishing weak ties
that create access to funding opportunities. Strong ties provide minority women entrepreneurs with, at best, very narrow business experiences that are often confined to a few
areas.Weak ties provide minority women entrepreneurs with
broad business experiences that significantly increase their
breadth of learning and widen their access to major players
who can expose them to multiple funding options
(Humphreys and McClung 1981; Schwartz 1976).
Therefore, we suggest that business experience has major
consequences for the minority women entrepreneur’s efforts
to access capital. Because most minorities are concentrated
in support roles in businesses, their skill base is limited. A
limited skills base means that the human capital developed
by these entrepreneurs lacks many of the important skills
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and exposure necessary to operate successful businesses. If
these entrepreneurs do not have the requisite knowledge
important in making sound business decisions, then lenders
are unlikely to provide capital. Lenders want to ensure that
individuals entrusted with the task of investing assets have
the skills to make good business decisions. Furthermore, concentration in support roles results in minorities developing
strong ties that further limit their exposure to critical individuals who might help to develop their skills base. By maintaining strong ties, minorities are unable to create multiple weak
ties with individuals who can provide them with access to
other skills and who can provide access to capital. From
these arguments we draw the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
Minority women entrepreneurs lacking significant
business experience will find it increasingly difficult
to access capital.

Industry Experience
Even when minority women entrepreneurs have significant
business experience, the relevance of that experience to
their entrepreneurial ventures may create additional problems. Minority women entrepreneurs may be required to
have specific industry experience. Significant industry experience suggests that entrepreneurs understand what is
important in the industry, know who are the key players, and
can better assess trends and opportunities for entrepreneurial activities (Brophy 1989; Coleman 2000; Loscocco and
Robinson 1991). Studies have shown that previous experience plays a critical role in the success of small businesses,
especially when that experience is within the same industry
where these small businesses operate (Brush and Hisrich
1988; Srinivasan,Woo, and Cooper 1994)
Research in this area shows that women owners with
access to human capital, particularly in the form of significant senior management experience, and higher levels of
education are more likely to access capital than their counterparts without these qualities (Haynes and Haynes 1999;
Lerner and Almor 2002). Minority women entrepreneurs
with knowledge of the industries in which they operate
know what is important to the industry, its trends, and key
players.These women, who successfully rose to senior management positions, can use the knowledge and information
they acquired to make crucial decisions on which the relative success/failure of their businesses might depend. Their
industry experience helps them to better craft their ideas
and to provide a well-developed plan of action. With a welldeveloped plan of action, they can determine what sources
of capital can be pursued, which prior relationships can facilitate access to capital, and how prior relationships with capital sources can secure better financing terms.

Moreover, minority women entrepreneurs with industry
experience not only know the industry but also know
some of the “key players.”This knowledge helps to reduce
information obstacles that limit other entrepreneurs from
accessing certain sources of capital. This gives them some
legitimacy in the industry among potential financiers who
may have dealt with them in the past. If these women have
established a good reputation among these potential financiers through their previous contacts, then they will find it
much easier to access financing. For instance, access to
venture capital is more a function of whom one knows
than it is of the viability of the business idea (Brush 1992).
From these arguments, we develop the following proposition:
Proposition 2:
Minority women entrepreneurs with significant prior
industry experience will likely find it easier to access
capital than those without significant industry
experience.

Information Accessibility
Successful entrepreneurs must have access to financial
resources.Access to these resources requires that some trusting relationship be developed between the entrepreneur
(agent) and the lender (principal). This trusting relationship
is particularly important from the perspective of the principal who must be sure that the agent will (1) adhere to the
conditions under which the funding has been provided, and
(2) has the ability to repay the loan.Trust is essential between
the principal and agent because of information asymmetries
due to liabilities of newness and smallness (Lant and Mezias
1992). Small businesses, particularly those that are private, do
not provide a high quality and quantity of information from
which informed decisions by lenders can be made (Berger
and Udell 1995; Ennew and Binks 1997). Information essential to the loan decision-making process is unavailable, and
faced with this paucity of information, lenders make decisions to deny funding.
In addition to the issues raised previously, an important
factor that affects access to capital is information. Prior
research has suggested that capital inaccessibility is a result
of high search costs both for lenders and entrepreneurs
(Wetzel 1987).The gist of the argument is that capital exists,
but lenders are frustrated in their efforts to provide capital
because entrepreneurs are not hooked into the networks
that provide information on capital availability. This lack of
information persists despite efforts by governmental and
other agencies to provide entrepreneurs with information
on capital availability. Consequently, failure to find capital
has a discouraging effect whereby entrepreneurs, given the
scarcity of resources and the high costs of search, cease to
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pursue potential lending opportunities (Mason and Harrison
2002).
Although absence of information may affect access to capital, of even greater importance is the type of information
that can facilitate a successful search. Information acquired
must not only provide the entrepreneur with the idea of
where capital exists, but also what type of capital exists. In
essence, information acquired to facilitate the “meeting”
between entrepreneur and capital source must be both general and specific, as they both affect the credit decision-making process (Jensen and Meckling 1992). General information
refers to what is widely known not only about the business,
but also about the environmental conditions affecting this
business (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). Specific information is
idiosyncratic to the particular circumstances surrounding a
business.
Although both general and specific information are important to the loan decision-making process, lenders must often
deal with incomplete information. Incomplete information
results because women-owned businesses, like other small
businesses, are often privately held and not subject to the
reporting requirements of publicly held institutions (Brush
1992; Hisrich, 1989).
Incomplete information increases ambiguity and the risks
associated with a borrower. Prospective lenders find it more
difficult to (1) assess the borrower’s ability to comply with
loan agreements, (2) determine whether the borrower has
certain relevant capabilities, and (3) meets lender’s requirements (Ennew and Binks 1993). Incomplete information limits the ability of lenders to make an “informed” assessment of
the potential borrower.
Lenders can counter these risks in one of three ways.
One option is to increase the collateral requirement for
borrowers. Increase in collateral requirements, particularly
when it involves personal assets, is seen as an intrinsic
motivator to success. The borrower knows that failure to
meet expectations will result in a loss of the collateral,
which may include very prized personal assets. Several
studies have found that pledging collateral often facilitates
borrowing among small businesses (Ang et al. 1995;
Broome 1990). A second option is to increase the rate of
interest. Charging higher rates of interest not only reflects
risk levels, but also helps to compensate for information
asymmetry and exposure of lenders to greater risk
(Petersen and Rajan 1994). A third option available to
lenders is to pursue lending relationships primarily with
long-term customers. With long-term relationships, lenders
have the opportunity to observe performance, financial
and otherwise, and develop additional information that
would not necessarily be available. Long-term relationships
provide additional information, improve the quality of the
relationship between the lender and borrower, and

increase the likelihood that the borrower will adhere to
the conditions stipulated in the loan agreement.
However, there are problems with all three of these
options.With respect to pledging increased collateral, financial institutions are in the business of lending money and
not in the business of managing and liquidating assets.
Performing these functions places additional burdens on
lenders that can be eliminated through more selective lending.Although lenders can also compensate for risk by charging higher interest rates, there is a point beyond which managing such loans is not feasible. Beyond a specific threshold,
the benefits from maintaining high rate/high risk loans are
far outweighed by their costs. Building long-term relationships is not an option for many women-owned businesses
because most are relatively new. In addition, recent decisions within the banking industry to centralize the loan decision-making process reduce the value of building long-term
relationships, especially when many of those relationships
would have been built with branch personnel no longer
involved in the loan decision-making process (Uzzi and
Lancaster 2003). The challenges associated with each of
these options not only increase the risk potential of lending
to these businesses, but also the cost of lending for both parties. Minority women businessowners are forced to borrow
at higher interest rates and lenders incur additional monitoring costs. From these arguments, one can draw the following
proposition:
Proposition 3:
Information accessibility will have a significant
influence on access to capital for minority women
entrepreneurs.

Liability of Newness
The age of a business affects its performance, and its ability
to survive. New businesses lack the broad bases of influence,
endorsement, and stable relationships with important constituents. New businesses suffer from a liability of newness
and this translates into a greater likelihood of failure (Baum
and Oliver 1991; Carroll 1983; Stinchcombe 1965). Newer
businesses are more vulnerable to environmental shocks
because they are still in the process of developing an understanding of how the industry works (Lant and Mezias 1992).
In addition, these new businesses have not yet established
the important linkages that may affect their awareness of
environmental forces, industry trends, and emerging opportunities. Older small businesses have survived the liability of
newness, while younger ones are yet to show that they have
survived this liability (Lant and Mezias 1992). By surviving
the liability of newness, women-owned small businesses have
demonstrated that they have the ability to be competitive,
rather than remain stagnant and die.
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Older minority women-owned small businesses that have
survived the liability of newness may be better positioned to
access capital. With older businesses, more information is
available about their performance. By surviving, these businesses have demonstrated the ability to “do things right.”
Moreover, as these businesses age, management is better able
to delegate responsibility and concentrate on strategic
issues. Roles are more clearly defined and higher levels of
trust exist.As small businesses grow older more information
about them becomes available.Although there is a tendency
to keep information private, some information does seep into
the public domain permitting lenders to make more
informed decisions regarding loan applications than would
be the case for new small businesses. From these arguments,
one can draw the following proposition:
Proposition 4:
Older minority women-owned small businesses will
find it easier to access capital than their younger
counterparts.

Liability of Smallness
The decision to either grow or remain small is a strategic one
that every entrepreneur must consider. Opportunities to
grow may exist, but decisions against growth may be made
because the businessowners are risk-averse and this may continue even as wealth increases (Brown and Segal 1989;
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Olsen and Currie 1992). By
maintaining a relatively small operation, minority women
maintain their risk-aversion and limit their need for capital.
Small firms require less need for external capital particularly
if they do not operate in capital-intensive industries. By maintaining relatively small businesses, minority women entrepreneurs can rely on their personal savings and retained earnings for funding of expansion. Decisions regarding growth
have implications for resource endowment, capital requirements, and capital structure (Greene and Brown 1997). It also
raises issues regarding control, a subject that may be critical
to minority women entrepreneurs.As minority women entrepreneurs increase their debt-equity ratio, the degree of control over their operations decreases.The actions they undertake are increasingly subject to the oversight of external parties more concerned with ensuring loan repayment than in
the long-term survival of the business. By opting to remain
small, these businesses are constrained in achieving their full
potential. Constraints on growth may subsequently harm
these minority women-owned businesses because their
client base is less diversified than would otherwise be the
case.This lack of diversification further exposes these small
businesses to fluctuations of the business cycle.
The emphasis on maintaining small businesses translates
into what had been termed “the liability of smallness.”

Small businesses have a greater likelihood of either dying
or failing to access much needed capital because they can
be effectively screened out of the population without significantly affecting the level of competition.This is referred
to as “the impact of niche width” (Freeman et al. 1983;
Levins 1968; Loscocco and Robinson 1991). Niche width is
defined as a population’s tolerance for factors that inhibit
growth.The greater the tolerance for growth inhibitors, the
broader is the perceived niche width.
One important characteristic of niche width is spatial
distribution, which is the extent of variety. When patterns
are difficult to identify, spatial distribution is said to be
high, otherwise it is low. The existence of significant numbers of small businesses in the service sector suggests that
there are large groups of homogeneous businesses and a
lack of spatial distribution.The existence of large groups of
homogeneous small businesses increases the possibility for
low profit margins and allows lenders to be more selective.
The more marginally profitable small businesses have a
higher propensity for failure because they operate close to
the margin and find it more difficult to attract resources,
including capital. As a result, lenders are more selective in
their loan decisions. Given the abundance of small businesses, lenders can then pay less attention to the marginally profitable businesses and focus on lending to the more
profitable ones.
Thus, issues of control and spatial distribution may result
in minority women entrepreneurs operating small businesses that lenders may be less willing to fund. Several of these
businesses operate at or close to the margins and this translates into a greater likelihood of failure. The closer a small
business is to the margins, the lower is the capital available
to absorb cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. From a
lender’s perspective, low profit margins also decrease the
potential for debt repayment. With an overabundance of
small businesses, lenders can be more selective in their loan
decision-making choosing to focus on more profitable businesses rather than expose themselves to greater risk of loan
default. From these arguments, one can draw the following
proposition:
Proposition 5:
A preference for maintaining small businesses by
minority women entrepreneurs will limit their ability to access capital.

Conclusions
Small businesses continue to act as an important source of
economic growth and play a critical role in the U.S. economy. Coupled with this role has been a significant growth in
the number of minority women-owned small businesses.To
support this growth, several programs have been designed to
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further promote their chances for success. Despite these
efforts, problems still persist for minority women businessowners. One problem many of these businessowners face is
accessing capital.Though some have suggested that inaccessibility to capital is a result of discriminatory policies, this
article makes the argument that inaccessibility occurs
because minority women entrepreneurs are often absent
from important networks.These important networks help in
skill development, provide entrepreneurs with access to critical information, and help to facilitate the views formed
about their abilities to operate small businesses successfully.
While issues of discrimination may prevail, there are other
reasons why women entrepreneurs find it difficult to access
capital. Lack of access to capital can be explained by inexperience, information inaccessibility, and liabilities of newness
and size—all of which are in some way related to the need to
become part of the important networks. Capital will be provided to businesses that have demonstrated the ability to be
highly profitable and successful.The objective of lending is to
secure an adequate return on investment. If businessowners
show that their businesses are viable, then funds will be
made available. Failure to demonstrate viability of a business
is not a function of discrimination but due to certain idiosyn-

cratic conditions operating within small businesses and
among small businessowners.
Minority women businessowners must take a different
approach to accessing capital rather than the ones currently
used. Faced with these idiosyncratic conditions in the small
business segment, these businessowners must find ways to
counter the perceived gaps in their abilities. For instance,
focusing on relationship banking may help in the long run
but is of little value in the short term. Therefore, minority
women businessowners might consider finding ways to
increase information availability.
Finally, although minority women businessowners need to
adopt new approaches in accessing capital, generating
behavioral change is not easily achieved. It is a process that
can only be pursued over time and the results of such change
may be difficult to discern. Small businesses operate in
changing environments and, as these businessowners enact
change, old challenges will disappear and new ones will
emerge. Therefore, minority women businessowners must
find ways to either anticipate new challenges or counter
them. The fact that women businesses continue to grow
despite these challenges to capital access may show some
hope for the future.
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The Embedded Entrepreneur:
Recognizing the Strength of Ethnic Social Ties
Ed Chung
Kim Whalen
his article is premised on the idea that social networks represent an important, but often overlooked, unit of analysis in management and entrepreneurship studies. The concept of embeddedness, emphasizing the significance of social relationships, is of particular relevance as more and more frequently minorities and
immigrants engage in small businessownership. This article borrows from the ethnicity and social network traditions, and offers that an analysis of the ethnic homogeneity of an entrepreneur’s strong and weak social ties would
be fruitful in gauging entrepreneurial success.

T

Introduction
In much of the management and marketing literatures, the
unit of analysis is often the individual.The entrepreneurship
literature has more or less followed this path, and a large
body of insightful work has flourished under this agency perspective. McKay and Chung’s (2005) discussion of benchmarking for entrepreneurial survival (and success) highlights
the emphasis that has been placed on the individual—the
entrepreneur—in question. In their study of factors that lead
to small business success, Rutherford and Oswald (2000)
specifically focused on attributes of the owner/manager, placing the individual squarely at the core of entrepreneurial performance. In a similar vein, Becherer, Halstead, and Haynes
(2003) studied the level of marketing orientation in entrepreneurial firms, based primarily on data gathered on key individuals—the CEOs of small firms.
These and other similar studies have enriched our understanding of entrepreneurial effectiveness. Certainly, the entrepreneur plays a vital role in the success of a small business.
However, because entrepreneurial pursuits are but a subset
of the human condition and because the human condition
cannot be fully studied without also examining social forces,
the embeddedness perspective offers an opportunity to
develop a more complete understanding of entrepreneurial
success (Alexander and Smith 1993; Emirbayer and Goodwin
1994; Chung and Fischer 1999a).
In recent years, small businessownership by minority
groups and immigrants has grown at a much faster clip than
the national average. While in 1997 minority firms made up
only 14.6 percent of all U.S. firms, the percentage share of
minority firms in total U.S. business is growing. Between
1992 and 1997, the growth rate in number of minorityowned businesses was significantly larger than that of nonmi-

nority businesses (The State of Minority Business 2001). In
fact, the growth over the past two decades has been significant. In 1982, minority-owned firms represented only 6.8 percent of all U.S. firms, but this figure grew to 9.3 percent in
1987, 12.5 percent in 1992, and as mentioned above, 14.6
percent in 1997 (Minority Business Statistics 2005). In terms
of specific minority groups in the United States,Asian-owned
businesses grew by 24 percent between 1997 and 2002,
black-owned businesses grew in number of firms by 45 percent, and Hispanic-owned businesses grew by 31 percent
(Survey of Business Owners 2002).The apparent propensity
for minorities and immigrants to enter small businessownership has triggered many studies comparing entrepreneurial
startup and success across various cultures (e.g.,Tienda and
Raijman 2004). Cultural and ethnicity considerations compound the challenges of studying the minority entrepreneur,
and here the inadequacy of an individualistic approach is particularly glaring.
In this article, we suggest that entrepreneurship studies
should pay special attention to businesses owned and started
by minorities and migrants, and that such a focus would benefit greatly from a socially embedded approach. To simplify
our discussions, we limit our attention to minority entrepreneurs, though by no means do we suggest that all minorities
are immigrants, or that all immigrants are minorities.

Social Processes and Migration
Cultural values are shaped in part by social and individual
processes (Chung 2000). Indeed, interpersonal relationships
can even play a role in the emergence of certain ethnic
groups. Glazer (1954/c.1964) recounts how a number of ethnic groups came into existence after the people migrated to
America.Along this line of an emerging ethnicity, Tilly (1990)
also notes that (p.84)
By and large, the effective units of migration were
(and are) neither individuals nor households but sets of
people linked by acquaintance, kinship, and work experience. . . .Where kinsmen, friends, neighbors, and work
associates already have good contacts. . .[migrants] rely
on these networks for assistance both in moving and in
settling at the destination.
According to Tilly, these networks often create new categories (ethnic groups), and in so doing, provide the basis for
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ethnic identity.And if, as previous research seems to suggest,
ethnic identity affects consumer behavior, it would then be
beneficial to learn more about the social relationships of
migrants.
How an immigrant adjusts to his or her new environs is
largely determined by the immigrant’s social relationships,
and whether social networks represent a help or hindrance
to the immigrant’s acculturation is the subject of ongoing
study (Kwong 1984; Pohjola 1991; Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993).

A Socially Embedded Approach
Many researchers reject the notion that social behavior is
caused by attitudes and norms alone. In the study of interpersonal relationships, a strong research tradition has been
established in the realms of network analysis (e.g., Brown
and Reingen 1987; Granovetter 1982; Ward and Reingen
1990). One implicit assumption of network analysis, called
the “anticategorical imperative,” stresses the significance of
structural and social relationships in shaping social behavior
(Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The idea that social networking is important to entrepreneurial firms is not new. For
example, Peng’s (2001) study of Chinese entrepreneurs suggests that networking is one of the major entrepreneurial
strategies used by practitioners. The importance of social
influences and relationships on behavior has long been recognized by consumer researchers (e.g., Rogers 1976). In this
line of thinking, analysts question the usefulness of approaches that stress only the nonrelational attributes and/or purposive actions of individuals. Out of this recognition stems various attempts to incorporate social relations in the study of
human behavior.
Central to this social perspective is the idea that people
are “embedded” in social relationships. In offering his argument of embeddedness, Granovetter (1985, p.482) notes,
“. . . the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as
independent is a grievous misunderstanding.”
Because most people do not live alone in caves, but
instead interact with one another in a society where relationships are formed, the embeddedness perspective proposes
that social structure “constrains, supports, or derails individual goal-seeking behaviors” (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993,
p.1321). In simple English, embeddedness means that the
company one keeps has an impact on one’s behaviors.
Granovetter’s (1985) concept of embeddedness contrasts
sharply with the “undersocialized concept” of human action,
which is characteristic of the economic perspective.
According to Granovetter (p.490), the fact that people generally prefer to deal with individuals with known reputations
“implies that few are actually content to rely on either generalized morality or institutional arrangements [governance

structures] to guard against trouble [deceit].” But even when
economists take into account the role of reputation, they do
so in an “undersocialized”fashion by generalizing it as a mathematical ratio. Embeddedness, as in a network of interpersonal relationships, is critical in “generating trust, in establishing
expectations, and in creating and enforcing norms” (Coleman
1988, p.S97). Moreover, our relationships with others also
play a role in developing and maintaining our own identities
and self-concepts, particularly in terms of the relative
salience of our various discrete identities (Stryker 1968).
The embeddedness argument was presented by
Granovetter (1985) in the context that economic action is
embedded in social relations. Specifically, he referred to the
role of social networks in generating trust and discouraging
malfeasance, and the behavior of interest was economic
behavior. While economic action took center stage in
Granovetter’s discussion, economic behavior was only used
as an illustration. Indeed, as Granovetter noted (1985, p.504),
“most behavior is closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations and that such an [embeddedness] argument
avoids the extremes of under- and oversocialized views of
human action. . . . I believe this to be so for all behavior.”

The Importance of Interpersonal
Relationships
It is well established in sociology that feelings of identity are
distinct from social relationships and exert varying influences on behavior (Oliver 1984; Tilly 1978). Social relationships, for instance, are seen by many social-movement
researchers as a key determinant of activism (Gould 1991;
McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Rosenthal et al. 1985). In the
social movement literature, many studies have shown that
psychological and attitudinal factors provide only limited
explanation for individual participation (McAdam and
Paulsen 1993). For example, in a study of a peace demonstration in the Netherlands, Klandermans and Oegema (1987)
have found that 96 percent of those who were attitudinally
or psychologically disposed to participate did not do so. This
emphasizes that psychological and attitudinal factors are not
always enough of a motivation to lead to activism.
Adoption and diffusion researchers have also incorporated social relations in their analysis of how innovations are
communicated over time. Indeed, interpersonal influences
represent one of two integral components of how information is transmitted and opinions formed (Burt 1987; Gatignon
and Robertson 1985; Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990; Rogers
1976). Another research area that has benefited from a social
relationships perspective is the study of job-seeking behavior, and related to that, the diffusion of information
(Granovetter 1982; Liu and Duff 1972; Weimann 1983).
Consequently, under the embeddedness approach, a detailed
analysis of social structure is central to an understanding of
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social action, of which “economic action is seen only as a special, if important, category” (Granovetter 1985, p.507).
The importance of social relationships is not lost on consumer researchers either. Belk (1988), for example, suggests
a broader sense of self that includes not only the individual
level, but also a collective level such as family, group, and cultural levels. He proposes that the concept of an extended
self is “a central construct that can explain a variety of consumer and human behaviors” (p.160) more completely than
the narrower individual sense of self. Frenzen and Davis
(1990), building on the idea of embedded markets, note that
market behavior is explained not by economic utilities alone
but also by preexisting social relationships between buyers
and sellers.
In view of the criticism leveled at the atomization perspective, in which focus is placed on the individual as the
unit of analysis, many researchers have incorporated the concept of groups in their work, or even as the focal point of
their studies. Childers and Rao (1992), for example, study the
influence that reference groups have on the consumption of
luxuries and necessities in the United States and Thailand. Ho
(2005) employed a dyadic perspective to study social influence on psychological contract fulfillment. Interpersonal
influence is recognized as an important set of influences in
diffusion research (Mahajan et al. 1990; Midgley and Dowling
1993). Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel (1989) undertake the
task of developing a scale to measure consumer susceptibility to interpersonal influence. Brown and Reingen (1987) perform a network analysis of word-of-mouth referral behavior.
Ward and Reingen (1990) study group decision-making and
reason that strong social ties lead to greater belief sharing
among group members.And as we noted earlier, Frenzen and
Davis’s (1990) study concerns consumer behavior in embedded markets.These and other important studies have sparked
growing interest in the social aspects of human endeavors, by
alerting researchers to the contributions that investigations
into social relationships may bring. While much of past
research was mainly centered on individual action, this
stream of analysis acknowledges that humans are social
beings and as such are influenced by the company they
keep. As Venkatesh (1995) has remarked, “. . . all consumer
behaviors (are) primarily sociocultural phenomena that
must, therefore, be discussed in sociocultural terms” (p.29).
The important point is that we are seeing more research sensitive to the importance of social relationships, which helps
to alleviate some of the problems associated with the “undersocialization” criticism.
Embeddedness is not an entirely new concept in the study
of firm behavior. Indeed, as Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001)
point out, structural embeddedness, or the analysis of interfirm network influences on competitive behavior, has been
given some attention in the literature. Our article continues

on this path by incorporating entrepreneurship inquiry into
this stream of research.

Social Networks and the Minority
Entrepreneur
According to data from the 2000 Census, immigrants have
higher self-employment rates than do natives (ToussaintComeau 2005). Oftentimes, social networks influence the
type of business a minority entrepreneur will open. In fact,
businesses owned by minority entrepreneurs are often concentrated in small niches (Masurel, Nijkamp, and Vindigni
2004). For instance, USA Today (2002) reported that Koreans
own 29 percent of Asian food stores.Vietnamese own 37 percent of Asian nail-care salons. Asian-Indians own more than
half of all economy lodging properties in the United States.
During the tech boom in Silicon Valley, more than 25 percent
were owned by Asian-Indian or Chinese entrepreneurs. Data
from the 2000 Census on the most common businesses for
entrepreneurs from several different minority groups is consistent with the above minority group and business pairings
(Toussaint-Comeau 2005). Clearly, social networks are important for minority entrepreneurs.
Funding issues are particularly challenging for minority
entrepreneurs. Many of them, lacking significant personal
financial sources, rely primarily on governmental assistance
(Entrepreneur Magazine 2003). However, as various governmental entities begin to look for ways to reduce spending,
increasingly so minority entrepreneurs look to social networks as a way to secure financing, be it through venture
capital or social circles. As Erkki Liikanen of the EU remarked
in a conference on ethnic entrepreneurship in Brussels in
2003 (Europa 2003), most ethnic minority entrepreneurs rely
heavily on coethnic social networks to help them get started
with their businesses. These networks, however, are often
closed to those who are not part of the social network, and
even when available, tend to be limited in their resources or
expertise. A study by the Canadian government indicated
that 30 percent of visible-minority entrepreneurs cited
financing as a key obstacle in starting their small businesses
(Industry Canada 2005). Even so, as reported in USA Today
(2002), the success and proliferation of Asian entrepreneurs
in the United States owes much to the availability of what is
called “informal loan associations” that are essentially based
on coethnic social networks.
The concept of social capital facilitates an understanding
of embedded social relations to which Granovetter alluded.
Coleman’s (1988) discussion of the various forms of social
capital provides a starting point for investigating how social
relations influence human action. Instead of merely criticizing economists for their undersocialized views and sociologists for their oversocialized conception of human behavior,
Coleman proposes a tool that “involves use of the paradigm
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of rational action but without the assumption of atomistic
elements stripped of social relationships” (Coleman 1988,
p.S118). Inkpen and Tsang (2005) applied the concept of
social capital to the study of knowledge transfer among network members. Indeed, new energy is beginning to infuse
the relatively old concept of social capital, as more
researchers start to “rediscover” its efficacy (Adler and Kwon
2002).
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) modify the idea of social
capital for application in a migration context. Their study
focuses on minority immigrant groups, and offers an interesting recasting of social capital in a more “ethnic” light. Of particular interest is their idea of “bounded solidarity” as a kind
of social capital that minority immigrant groups have to offer,
as well as the changing nature of bounded solidarity itself.
According to Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993), bounded
solidarity is a collective consciousness that compels people
to behave in a certain way. Bounded solidarity does not
come from some underlying moral order, but emerges as a
collective sentiment, a defensive strategy (of the group) arising out of feelings of oppression, etc., what Portes and
Sensenbrenner (1993, p.1325) called a “defensive banding
together of the losers in the market struggle.” This kind of
social capital is situational, and is a group reaction made necessary by a common adversary. It is bounded because it is
restricted to members of a particular group who are similarly and contemporarily affected by common events. In developing this concept, Portes and Sensenbrenner borrow from
Marx’s notion of class struggles, referring to migrant ethnic
solidary communities as born out of a confrontation with the
host society.
Portes and Sensenbrenner note that a group needs to be
able to “activate a cultural repertoire” in addition to using
group defense to sustain bounded solidarity.Thus, confrontation helps to build bounded solidarity, and activating a cultural repertoire helps to sustain it. But not all immigrant groups
develop this sense of solidarity. Some do not have to, and
some do not want to. On this latter point,Wang’s (1991) concept of sojourner’s mentality is illustrative. Those migrants
who do not plan to stay, but are contemplating exit, may not
see a need for solidarity at all, since they would perceive
fewer “clashes” with the host society (Portes and
Sensenbrenner 1993). Contrast the solidarity of earlier ethnic
Chinese immigrants to Canada with the lack of it among
more recent Chinese immigrants (Johnson 1992; Kwong
1984). Sojourner’s mentality alone of course does not fully
explain why recent immigrants may exhibit less solidarity.As
Johnson (1992) has noted, higher education levels (and thus
occupational mobility) and a multicultural policy by the
Canadian government have contributed to a less problematic adaptation. But many of these recent immigrants consider
their stay temporary and look forward to “going home”

(Wang 1991). In this respect, they have less need to form solidary communities united by common interest or to belong
to them. Instead, as Johnson (1992) has reported, ethnic
organizations are no longer defense strategies against the
host society’s overt prejudice and discrimination, but are voluntary associations that offer other appeals.
While some minority migrants closely identify with their
ethnic groups, and socialize frequently in those circles, there
are also minority migrants who do not do so. Such intracultural differences have been identified in the consumer culture literature (e.g., Chung 2000) and in studies on ethnic
enclaves (e.g., Light et al. 1994).We propose that such intracultural differences exist among minority entrepreneurs.
Various factors lead to such differences, and these differences
have varying consequences on entrepreneurial behavior.
A lot of work has been done on how “ethnic” one feels.
More precisely, much has been done on how closely a person
identifies with her or his ethnic group. Much of this takes an
individualistic approach, as we have alluded to earlier. From
a more sociological perspective, following Chung and
Fischer (1999a), we propose that the ethnic homogeneity of
a person’s social ties, and their relative strength, have a lot to
do with how “ethnic” the person is. This borrows heavily
from Granovetter’s (1985) work on social ties.

The Strength of the Tie
How do “interactions in small groups aggregate to form largescale patterns,” Granovetter asks (1973, p.1360).The answer,
according to Granovetter, lies in the use of weak ties as
bridges over which new ideas are transmitted from group to
group. Social relationships vary in their tie strength, which
Granovetter sees as “a combination of the amount of time, the
emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal services
which characterize the tie” (p.1361).Thus, friends would be
typified by strong ties, while acquaintances would be characterized by weak ties.“Absent ties” refer to a lack of any relationship or ties that do not have real significance. In
Granovetter’s scheme of things, regularly buying a morning
paper from the same vendor does not lend to a tie. Thus,
strong ties are basically close relationships.
While the strength of the weak ties argument is persuasive
and has received much attention in the literature, strong ties
are by no means moribund in their impact on our lives.
Indeed, Granovetter, in a subsequent (1982) revision of his
weak ties theory, concedes that strong ties also play a significant role. Other researchers have suggested that strong and
weak ties exert differing influences on human action (e.g.,
Brown and Reingen 1987).
Weak ties may be important bridges over which information is diffused, while strong ties are sources of social influence on our actions. How does this reflect the ethnicness of
a person?
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Ethnic Homogeneity of Interpersonal
Relationships
While closeness or strength appears to be the common way
of thinking about social relationships, it is but one approach
to the analysis of social connectivity. Researchers using the
“relational analysis” perspective of social structure are not
limited to studying only tie strength (Emirbayer and
Goodwin 1994). Indeed, it is the patterns of interaction that
lays the empirical foundation of network analysis, and the
mere existence of ties is itself meaningful and consequential
(Cook and Whitmeyer 1992).We propose that in the context
of ethnic groups, following the lead of scholars in the field of
ethnic enclave economies (Light et al. 1994; Portes 1984), the
ethnic homogeneity of one’s social relationships is also an
important consideration.

Ethnicity and Strength of Ties
Thus, a useful examination of interpersonal relationships
comprises both the ethnicity and strength of one’s social ties.
Coethnic relationships are those with people of the same
ethnic background, while nonethnic relationships refer to
those with people from ethnic backgrounds different from
one’s own. Ethnic homogeneity of strong ties, then, refers to
the preponderance of coethnics among a person’s close relationships. Likewise, ethnic homogeneity of weak ties refers to
the preponderance of coethnics among a person’s peripheral relationships.
If, as the literature seems to indicate, a person’s strong ties
exert important influence over the person’s behavior, we
would expect that the more ethnic one’s strong ties are, the
more “ethnic” one’s behavior would be.
On the other hand, weak ties, as conduits of information,
may well play an important role in a migrant consumer’s
knowledge of the products and services that the host society has to offer.
Since most migrants look to coethnic ties to help with their
adjustment to a new society (Kwong 1984; Pohjola 1991), this
could have important social policy implications as well, not
the least among which has to do with the questions of ethnic
economy and ethnic enclave economy (Light et al. 1994).

Ethnic Ties and Entrepreneurship
Social ties appear to have varying effects on people, depending on the strength of the ties. The ethnic homogeneity of
one’s social ties, as we have seen above, influences people’s
propensity to behave in a more or less “ethnic”manner. In the
context of entrepreneurial activities, this may well translate
into the kind of social capital one desires or relies on among
others of a similar ethnic heritage. It may also influence
whether the entrepreneur would target specific ethnic market segments given her or his own ethnic background. It may,
furthermore, affect the location of the firm, the makeup of its

workforce, the suppliers and facilitating institutions (Dunne
and Lusch 2005) one uses, and so on. Facilitating institutions
refers to members of the supply chain that facilitate the buying and selling in a supply chain, but who do not take title.
These include institutions such as purchasing agents, ad
agencies, transportation companies, financial enterprises, and
the like.
From the above discussion, we offer the following propositions:
Proposition 1: The more the ethnic homogeneity of
an entrepreneur’s strong ties, the more likely the
firm’s markets and products will be ethnic in scope.
Proposition 2: The less the ethnic homogeneity of an
entrepreneur’s strong ties, the more likely the firm’s
markets and products will extend beyond ethnic
boundaries.
Proposition 3: The more the ethnic homogeneity of
an entrepreneur’s weak ties, the more likely the
firm’s management processes and facilitating
institutions will be ethnic in scope.
Proposition 4: The less the ethnic homogeneity of an
entrepreneur’s weak ties, the more likely the firm’s
management processes and facilitating institutions
will extend beyond ethnic boundaries.
While there are certainly advantages to be had by engaging
in the kind of niche marketing typified by a minority-owned
SME operating within the confines of an ethnic environment,
opportunities for growth are more abundant if the firm were
to expand beyond being an ethnic operation. Moreover, to the
extent that access to a wider range of facilitating institutions
than what the ethnic enclave could offer is advantageous, one
would expect that firms with wider access would achieve better survivability or performance. With this in mind, we offer
the following additional propositions:
Proposition 5: Firms whose products and markets
extend beyond ethnic enclaves outperform those that
primarily serve ethnic communities with ethnic
products.
Proposition 6: Firms whose management processes
and facilitating institutions extend beyond ethnic
communities outperform those who rely on processes and institutions within the ethnic communities.

Measuring Strength of Ethnic Ties
To test the above propositions, we need to identify and
measure two important sets of variables. First, we need to
isolate an entrepreneur’s social network and distinguish
between the strong ties from the weak ties. Second, we need
to measure the ethnic homogeneity of the entrepreneur’s
strong ties, and likewise for her or his weak ties.
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Network analysis is a common method of identifying relationships and an individual’s social network. When performing network analysis, first we typically identify all of the connections a person has in a given social context (e.g., membership in an organization), and second we classify these ties by
measuring them on certain dimensions such as tie strength
(e.g., Sirsi et al. 1996; Ward and Reingen 1990). Another
approach that researchers have utilized in studying social relationships is to begin with categories of ties, rather than all the
relationships a person has (e.g., Argyle 1986).This approach is
generally useful when the ties in question are not constricted
by a specific membership or organization. There are at least
two related strategies for data collection in this respect.
First, a “rules for social relationships” stream examines
what people see as acceptable behaviors (thus “rules”) given
a particular kind of relationship. In this kind of research, relationships are classified based on their roles. Examples of such
roles include spouse, date, teacher, coworker, and so on. For
instance, previous research by Argyle and his colleagues (e.g.,
Argyle, Graham, and White 1979) establish a list of between
22 to 25 kinds of relationships that are found to apply across
a range of cultural settings.
A second line of inquiry categorizes relationships based
on the significance the individual places on the relationship.
Instead of roles, investigators are interested in how much the
relationships mean to people. Fischer (1982), in his attempt
to discover what people mean by “friend,” finds that it is a
very common label and to some extent a residual label.
McAdam and Paulsen (1993) analyze people’s decision to
take part in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project, to
determine the sources of support for actual participation.
Having identified social relationships as a key variable,
McAdam and Paulsen ask individuals to indicate all those
“who positively influenced your decision to apply to the
Freedom Summer Project” (p.652).The researchers find that
participants were greatly influenced by those with whom
they had closer interpersonal ties; the latter were self-identified by the subjects when asked to “list at least 10 persons
whom they (applicants) asked to be kept informed of their
summer activities” (p.652). Typified by McAdam and
Paulsen’s approach, these studies (e.g., Chung and Fischer
1999b) begin with certain descriptions of relationship categories and ask respondents to list those individuals who they
believe fit each description.
Chung and Fischer (1999b) describe the methodology
that they used to both identify strong and weak ties and to
measure the ethnic homogeneity of the strong and weak
ties. First, participants identify their own ethnic affiliation
with a four-item, five-point scale based on Donthu and
Cherian’s (1992) ethnic identification scale. Second, the participants’ social network is identified. Participants are asked
to indicate which individuals they would interact with given

several different scenarios.The strength of the identified ties
is measured via a five-item scale by Sirsi et al. (1996). Lastly,
the ethnicity of both the strong and weak ties is determined.
Participants are asked to indicate if the ethnicity of the individuals identified as part of their social network matches
their own ethnicity. Ethnic homogeneity is quantified as the
percentage of the ties that are with individuals with matching ethnicity. Thus, strong and weak ties are identified and
the ethnic homogeneity of these ties is measured.

Modeling Entrepreneurial Success
Recently, McKay and Chung (2005) proposed a model for
benchmarking entrepreneurial survival (in the context of
their paper, continued survival of an entrepreneur firm is considered a success given the high failure rates).They outlined
four “exemplary processes” that they felt should be “central in
an entrepreneur’s benchmarking.” These processes are: cooperation, sharing founder’s vision, time management, and developing organizational competency. Unfortunately, McKay and
Chung (2005) did not offer concrete suggestions as to how
their various models may be measured. While our current
study does not lend itself to an elaboration of McKay and
Chung’s model, and indeed we have simply added to it, we
believe it would be fruitful for future research to fully address
the measurement issues thus posed.
Particularly in light of Propositions 5 and 6, we propose
that for minority-owned SMEs, another important benchmark
would be the ethnic homogeneity of the entrepreneur’s
strong and weak ties. In this respect, we would add to the
McKay and Chung model a fifth benchmark, that of ethnic
homogeneity of ties (see Figure 1).

Discussion
Increasing numbers of minorities and immigrants see entrepreneurship as an alternative to traditional occupations in
the corporate sector. Not only do researchers need to continue their examination of factors leading to entrepreneurial
success, but also they must be cognizant of the additional
complications that an ethnic dimension throws into the
equation. Furthermore, our article is a departure from the
typical unit of analysis, where the individual entrepreneur is
the central focus. Indeed, we propose that the phenomenon
of entrepreneurship cannot be comprehensively studied
without due attention paid to sociological forces, through
interpersonal relationships, which play a part on the human
condition. In this respect, our study contributes to extant literature by introducing first an ethnic dimension to entrepreneurial research, and second, by highlighting the critical role
that social forces play. In their editorial comment in the
Academy of Management Journal, Ireland, Reutzel, and
Webb (2005) urged researchers not only to continue to foster the robust field of entrepreneurial research, but also to
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Cooperation
•
•
•
•
•

Sharing founder’s vision
•
•
•
•
•

Time management

Share goals
Reciprocity
Networking
Organizational
expansion
“Liberating structures”

•
•
•
•

Defining limits
Flexibility, reflection,
creativity
Speed of activities
Important, but not
urgent activities

ENTREPRENEURIAL
SUCCESS
Developing organizational
competencies

Innerdirected vision
Strategy: intended or
emergent
Internal marketing
Organizational learning
Organizational
commitment

•
•

Valuable, rare, cannot
be replicated
Behavioral and
cognitive
considerations: skills,
resources

Ethnic homogeneity of
entrepreneur’s strong and
weak ties
•
•
•

Personal ethnic
affiliation
Social network
Ethnic identification

Figure 1. Modeling Entrepreneurial Success
consider the question:Where does business (and in our context, entrepreneurs) come from? Our research is consistent
with this line of inquiry, and we hope that our introduction
of social ties into entrepreneurial research will further what
Ireland et al. predict to be a “robustness of talent and diversity of insights” in this area.
We borrowed from the framework proposed by McKay
and Chung (2005), in which they suggested that four processes need to be benchmarked to help facilitate entrepreneurial
success. To this we added our fifth benchmark, in the context
of minority-owned SMEs, that of ethnic homogeneity of
strong and weak ties. A series of propositions are offered in
our study to test our overall hypothesis that social relationships and ethnic ties matter. In addition, we discussed a solution to the potential data collection problem of researching
open-ended social networks.
SMEs are fueling much of the economy and job creation.
In particular, minority- and migrant-owned SMEs represent

not only an important part of our economic system, but also
one of vital significance to minority and migrant communities.
Our article highlights various areas that may fruitfully be
addressed by future research. In particular, research is needed in the areas of ethnic social ties among entrepreneurs, for
example to arrive at a more parsimonious measure of the
strength of ethnic ties. How such social ties may relate to an
entrepreneur’s sense of ethnic identification may well be a
rewarding area of research. In addition, we believe the literature would be enriched by future research into our modified
model of entrepreneurial success. While we offer, primarily
based on McKay and Chung’s (2005) discussion, the key constructs and some of their variables, currently the literature
does not contain sufficient guidance to help us develop a fullscale research study around the topics.We suggest that more
work needs to be done on developing the measures required
before the McKay and Chung (and our modified) model can
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be tested.Admittedly, while the above places a lot of burden
on future research, we recognize the importance of building

a strong foundation on which to premise any substantive
testing of our propositions.
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From the Practitioner’s Corner
The Often-Neglected Term in the
Entrepreneurial Equation—the Purchase Order
Deaver Brown
Joseph E. Levangie
any entrepreneurs are enthralled with their
company’s technologies, products and potential
markets. Invariably these emerging ventures
present bedazzling business plans with industry-wise vernacular, detailed market research, and sophisticated
financial spreadsheets. They often flaunt their “optimized
business models.” Investors, however, typically want to
know when and how the sales will start meeting the
Plan. “Where’s the purchase order?” is the refrain. In this
article, our “Practitioner’s Corner” associate editor Joe
Levangie collaborates with a long-time colleague, Deaver
Brown, to address how businesses should “make sales
happen.” Levangie warns that Brown’s elitist education
(Choate, Harvard College, Harvard Business School)
should not be interpreted as a lack of “street smarts”;
Brown’s more entrepreneurially friendly credentials
include winning Golden Gloves boxing medals and selling Fuller Brush products door-to-door! To ascertain how
the entrepreneur can wrest an order from a prospective
customer, read on.

l

What kind of “selling culture” needs to be established?
What is the nitty-gritty of actually getting a purchase
order?
l What lessons can be gleaned from real-world experiences?

M

The old adage is that “If you build a better mousetrap, the
world will beat a path to your door.”Don’t bet on it! The reality is that the New Venture trash heap is piled high with
cratered entrepreneurial initiatives that failed from sales
shortfalls. Most entrepreneurial research studies suggest,
however, that “lack of capital” is the overwhelming reason for
business failure.This is true. But a closer look at the financial
dynamics of the typical venture underscores the need for
sales success: sales revenues generate gross profits (sales net
of materials and direct labor) which help absorb company
expenses, thus extending the venture’s cash reserves.
Investors, banks, and BODs encourage the conservation of
cash! While it is ultimately the lack of cash that sinks a business, sales generation (early and often) can keep the doors
open during the critical early stages of the venture and create an operational platform for profitable growth.
Let us examine the root cause of the success (and failure)
in the entrepreneur’s quest to generate sales:
l Where does an entrepreneur go to learn about selling?
l What are the requirements for sales leadership?
l What are the elements of building a winning sales
team?

l

Desperately Seeking the “Sales Mystique”
What Do the Traditional Sources of Advice
to the Entrepreneur Provide in the Area of
Sales Techniques and the Generation of
Purchase Orders?
Disappointingly little has been published to assist entrepreneurs unlock the key to the sales mystique—that epiphany
that may come to the entrepreneur and lead to success in
closing sales contracts with customers. For aspiring entrepreneurs weaned from the safety net of a big company or
thinking that a purchase order is akin to a government R&D
grant award, the need for an injection of selling acumen is
clearly present. Over the past two decades, the two authors
have collectively interviewed hundreds of entrepreneurs
and assisted them launch dozens of successful companies.
More importantly, each author has been an active and serial
entrepreneur, setting up several new and successful enterprises. Most entrepreneurs whom they have observed have
displayed extraordinary capabilities in the areas of engineering design, strategic planning,“big-picture” strategic marketing, manufacturing, and finance. Often, however, selling
competence is not part of the skill set. One-on-one counseling on selling from seasoned veterans is most helpful. It is
not often available. Absent such hand-holding, these aspiring venturers have sought out written knowledge on the
ABCs of selling.
Where might one direct these entrepreneurial wannabes?
Practical “selling help” for the entrepreneur from conventional sources is, regrettably, difficult to obtain, as reflected by the
following sampling of references many entrepreneurs routinely use:
l American Management Association (AMA).The marketing management section of the AMA produced a
classic text, The Marketing Mystique (McKay 1972),
in which the author tried to defuse the “aura” of marketing. The objective was to persuade businesses to
adopt a marketing concept that compelled them to
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be more customer-friendly. The five marketing tasks
recommended were
1. development and maintenance of a marketingoriented attitude and philosophy;
2. structuring and staffing of an effective organization;
3. initiation and conduct of strategic planning;
4. managing of a dynamic operating system; and
5. appraisal of marketing performance.
This AMA classic—useful for marketing guidance to the
entrepreneur—never addresses, however, even the notion of
a purchase order!
l The Smaller Business Association of New England
(SBANE). SBANE produced a Start-up Guide (Hexner
1987) which included informational resource references for
n strategic planning assistance;
n legal and audit professional services;
n BOD and other advisers;
n marketing and product development guidance;
n funding sources; and
n government assistance.
This is a practical and most helpful entrepreneurial aid,
but again, nary a word about selling and getting purchase
orders!
l How-to Book 2005 (Banks 2005).The Boston Business
Journal produces an annual reference book for regional businesses and entrepreneurs that includes contact
information in the following areas:
n legal, audit, engineering, and construction;
n VCs, banks, and SBA loans;
n staffing and temp help;
n education, training, and motivational speakers; and
n sales training.
This is a great regional resource for small businesses, but
has only one obscure reference to selling (sales training).
Enrolling in a sales training course might get the entrepreneur closer to understanding how to secure a purchase
order, but most entrepreneurs do not have the time or inclination for training courses.

With the Exception of Actually Taking Sales
Training Courses, the Notion of Unlocking
the “Sales Mystique” Remains a Mystique;
Are There any Readily-available Hands-on
Resources to Help the Inquiring
Entrepreneur Better Understand Selling?
Obviously there are many books on sales management. Few
of these have the entrepreneur in mind.There are, however,
two entrepreneurial books well-known to the authors. Baty
(1990), in his Entrepreneurship for the Nineties, has a chapter (1 out of 30) devoted to “selling” that addresses market
research, pricing, PR/advertising/product literature, rep net-

works, and international marketing. While there is little discussion of selling techniques and buyer psychology, Baty
does convey a useful message. He opens the chapter with:
“Nothing happens until you get a purchase order.” He closes with, “Sell, sell, sell!”
Coauthor Brown is particularly fond of The Entrepreneur’s Guide (1980), a seminal reference he wrote a quarter
of a century ago and is in its 18th printing as a book and
50th as a CD.All aspects of Brown’s selling advice are still relevant today; key points are included in this article. Here’s a
sample:
As a young man, I thought it was obvious that you
had to know your deal. I learned that early as a Fuller
Brush salesman.You had 30 seconds to get their attention; if you did, fine. If not, move on. I got to refine my
pitch 50 times a day; I refined it so I made a lot of
money. Most salespeople do not have that training in
the beginning and do not realize they have just that 30
seconds in every sales situation.

Is It Ever Too Late for the CEO-Entrepreneur to Unlock the “Sales Mystique” and
Become More Customer-oriented?
Not if the entrepreneur is still alive and breathing! Not even
if the venture is an unqualified winner. Consider the case of
Nike’s Phil Knight. In an interview (Willigan 1992), this outstandingly successful CEO-entrepreneur admitted,“We used
to think everything started in the lab. Now we realize that
everything spins off the consumer. And while technology is
still important, the consumer has to lead innovation.We have
to innovate for a specific reason, and that reason comes from
the market. Otherwise, we’ll end up making museum
pieces.”

The Entrepreneur as a Sales Leader
Where Does the Entrepreneur Start in
Introducing a Selling Concept to the
Venture?
The best sales team usually wins in business. In new ventures, the sales task must start with the entrepreneur who
may also serve as the sales team’s quarterback.The toughest
position to hire for is the lead salesperson.Why not do it oneself? Anecdotally, it seems that more than 90 percent of successful new ventures have the CEO-entrepreneur as the lead
salesperson for key accounts.
When Brown wrote The Entrepreneur’s Guide, after selling his Umbroller Stroller company (Cross River) to
Rubbermaid in the late 1970s, he determined that the characteristic considered most crucial for new venture success was
the sales skills of the CEO-entrepreneur and his or her willingness to employ them on a daily basis.
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Selling is not a job that can typically be delegated successfully.The successful entrepreneur, therefore, must often start
the selling process by looking in the mirror.

Why Is Entrepreneurial Leadership in Sales
So Important?
The CEO-entrepreneur can provide executive-level attention
and weight to key customer relationships. In contrast, established “Big Company” competitors generally cannot. These
more “structured” companies have probably delegated the
sales function down the ladder in their organization so that
their leaders can concentrate on “more important things”—
such as endless internal corporate meetings!
T. Wilson, the legendary CEO of Boeing who transformed
the company into a worldwide leader in aircraft sales, when
asked, “What he was,” used to say, “I am a plane salesman.
Why you may ask? Because if I sell a lot of planes, people like
me; if I don’t, they don’t.”
Edwin Land of Polaroid, Bill Gates, and Ken Olsen of
Digital Equipment positioned themselves in their respective
markets as an “inventor,” a “nerd,” and an “engineer.” They
were, however, consummate salespeople. Neither Polaroid
nor Digital generated much excitement after the two
founders retired. Microsoft lost its mojo when the legendary
Gates took a backseat.
What did these renowned entrepreneurs do to provide
selling leadership?
First, these larger-than-life personalities were always
entertaining and quotable. Land regaled his annual sales and
shareholder meetings with his stories, inventions, and ideas;
everyone looked forward to them, much as they do for the
Warren Buffett extravaganzas of the present day (guess
where Warren got the idea?). Land’s prices for cameras and
film were always somewhere between excessive and totally
outrageous—but no matter.The purchase orders rolled in.
Olsen ragged salespeople up and down as he emphasized that “only” the engineering mattered. Of course, Olsen
was selling to the best of all possible customers—other
engineers. These kindred techno-spirits lapped it up and
idolized him! He got his price, and closed on huge orders in
the process!
Gates doggedly pursued day-to-day sales activities, with a
dash of aggressive pricing. He essentially “encapsulated” the
purchase order in the Microsoft operating system included
in most personal computers sold, and became the world’s
richest man.
Sam Walton had a similar charisma. When George Bush
Sr. went to Bentonville to present “Mr. Sam,” as Wal-Mart people called him, with the National Medal of Honor, he could
not believe the love and support of those Wal-Mart people
for their leader. “Selling leadership” extends to selling the
employees!

The authors have each (separately) had the opportunity to
talk to or to meet each of the aforementioned celebrity-entrepreneurs.They were appropriately wowed by these entrepreneurial legends. Everyone in their presence basically took a
ticket and got in line.And, as with so many other great leaders, to this day the authors still revel in telling people about
these encounters with these leaders “who could close the
deal.” Wonderful…something out of the ordinary in a very
ordinary world…and that is the key to why entrepreneurs
must sell—to make an ordinary day special and different
for the buyer. The ongoing flow of purchase orders is the natural consequence of executing the selling process correctly.

Why Do So Many Entrepreneurs Fall Short
in Getting a Purchase Order?
Shortcomings in generating purchase order flow stem from a
variety of entrepreneurial frailties, including
l lack of understanding the customer;
l confusing “hard work” with achievement;
l poor sales technique; and
l bad time management.
Salespeople who fall short of their quota in closing on purchase orders often provide a litany of excuses for unsuccessful customer interactions.Among their reasons are
l The customer was out of the office.
l We ran out of time in the meeting.
l They want us to tweak our design (or packaging or literature).
l They were my last call and I was running late.
l They want to take another look at their inventories.
l There simply was bad chemistry.
l Our pricing is too high.
l I think the buyer is in our competitor’s camp.
l It’s not clear who’s calling the shots.
l I never got around to asking for the order!
As George Boule has written (Goodman 1997),
“Salesmanship starts when the customer says no.”

How Should the Strategy and Tactics of
Selling Evolve to Avoid Such Shortcomings?
Most salespeople are burdened with a complex mission.
Overlay the workload of the entrepreneur, and focus can
indeed be difficult.Think of the mission as a battle plan.The
excessively ambitious CEO-entrepreneur often has too many
contradictory other missions in mind (IPO opportunities,
new products, siting a new plant, patent applications, etc.).
Any one or two might be doable, but the third and fourth
complicate the end game, dilute the resources, and create
the undoable task. For a simple image, consider Hitler as
CEO. His despicable particulars aside, he perhaps could have
beaten the British, the Russians, or conquered North Africa.
He might have been able to do two of three of these mis-
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sions. He tried, but could not do all three. His ultimate fate,
of course, was the equivalent of the entrepreneur filing for
Chapter 7!
When devising the sales mission, be sure it is a doable
task. The flaws of talented entrepreneurs are often to try for
too much. Remember, while entrepreneurs may know this
reality, they may never admit it. This is especially a problem
for the small business leader who must both devise the sales
plan and implement it.The entrepreneur is the player and the
referee, all in one mixed bag. So the entrepreneur must work
very carefully not to overburden the tactical plan with too
much strategic complexity. Pick goals consistent with existing (or contemplated) resources.
This practical approach to strategizing seems a simple
matter in retrospect.Yet as the great UCLA basketball coach
John Wooden said upon retirement:
I always thought it was simple when I was young. I
never understood why no one else did it. I looked at my
players; I figured out what they could do and not do;
and that is the way we played.When we had height, we
played to that advantage; when we had speed, we
played to that; when we had shooters, we played to
that. It was always a mystery to me why so many coaches forced their game plans (“tactics”) to fit their personal style (“strategy”) when the players just couldn’t do it.
(Brown 1980)
One of the great problems about learning how to sell is
that the great salespeople just do it and don’t think much
about how they do it. This is one reason the great hitters
such as Ted Williams and Ty Cobb could never coach.
Swinging a Louisville slugger was so natural to them that they
could not understand why everyone could not do it.
The challenge is to dissect the problem and concentrate
on what works. This is why so many coaches happened to
have been mediocre (or worse) players. They became students of the game.Their weaknesses permitted them to evaluate; it almost forced them to do so. Our discussions in this
article are efforts to get you to think about the process, the
opportunity to sell, and the wonderful results if you are successful.
Tip: Sales results come from concentration on what’s truly
important.

How Do Real-world Customer Types Impact
the Strategy and Tactics of Selling?
The CEO-entrepreneur who wants to be the leader of the
sales team must acknowledge an important reality about selling. It is not just a matter of “you and the buyer.” It is a matter
of your organization and their organization. There may be a
complex decision-making process involved within the cus-

tomer’s organization Consider some of the players who
might impact the issuance of a purchase order.
Economic Buyer. This is the budget setter.This person is
rarely available to the seller; he or she pulls the strings in
the background by setting the general terms of the purchase order in terms of budget and needs.
The Technical Buyers. These are the people who are
relied upon to keep the company or buyer out of trouble.
They are considered gatekeepers and usually fiercely protect this role. It is a very rare buyer or economic buyer
who will cross this person.
Buyer. This is the traditional person most salespeople
think makes all the decisions.This person meets with you,
but must check decisions with the economic buyer, carrying your message, and then checks it out—voluntarily or
involuntarily—with the technical buyer.
Coach(es). This is the person or people who can lead
you through all these organizational land mines. This can
be everyone from an assistant, receptionist, to the buyer,
technical buyer, or economic buyer themselves. Most
salespeople spend far too little time cultivating these relationships.

Building a Successful Sales Team
What Are the Issues in Hiring Good
Salespeople?
Much has been written on sales organizations. Throw an
entrepreneur into the mix, however, and you have a challenging dynamic. Some entrepreneurs always try to go top-shelf
in hiring staff. Others are biased in favor of technologists, but
with regard to salespeople are willing to accept mediocrity.
To avoid such potential mediocrity, consider hiring salespeople as follows:
1. Hire someone experienced in your industry without
too many biases about the market. Of course, this
statement has an inherent contradiction since all people in an industry have built-in attitudes and biases.
There are several ways of getting around it.When coauthor Brown’s company Simply Media was looking
for a key account salesperson, it was decided to go
after someone familiar with consumer products since
Simply Media’s products were sold as consumer entertainment, not software. Former computer salespeople,
who would probably had been previously trained to
overdemo, were avoided.
2. Be alert and interview recently fired salespeople
from your competitors. Salespeople tend to be terrible politicians; many of them talk too much, sell too
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much, and their bosses want them out of the way.
Occasionally the bosses succeed. Look for these people; the good ones are jewels. At the Umbroller Stroller
company the best salesperson had been fired by its
largest competitor; at American Power, the new CEO
had been terminated by his old company, had terrible
references from several disgruntled venture capital
groups, and was the perfect person to lead the company to more than $2 billion in sales. Successful entrepreneurs and salespeople typically learn from their
mistakes.
3. Watch out for “marketing people” who are trying to
sneak into your company. Marketing people know
that you actually need salespeople; often they have
the ability to do sales, but never will. They hope to
sneak in, then move to another “more appropriate”
position.Watch out for these people; they can outfox
you.
4. Look for “nice people” who are aggressive selfstarters. Niceness is sometimes overlooked in the set
of skills recommended for good salespeople. Look for
these traits in others. But be sure they are more than
superficially nice!
5. Look for people who don’t like to sit down for too
long. Good salespeople keep moving. Marketing people get too comfortable in their leather-cushioned
lounge chairs.You need people who want to go on to
the next call, the next customer, the next deal. As a
result, they have to close the sale to move on out.You
want these people.
6. Hire people who really, really like to sell. While most
competent entrepreneurs look at selling as a necessary evil, there are some selling “idiot savants” who get
endorphin highs from closing the deal and walking
away with the purchase order. As reported by Exley
(1993), sales guru John Fenton has exclaimed,“Selling
has to be the most exciting thing you can do with
your clothes on.”

What about the Folklore of Superstitious
Salespeople?
The folklore is often a reality. Gellerman (1990) reported on
an observational study he performed on 25 salespeople. He
found that almost all the salespeople were convinced that
there were good days for selling and that there were bad
days, and that the outcome was basically predetermined (at
the whim of the sales angels?)! “Furthermore, they maintained that they could usually tell what kind of day was in
store for them after their first few calls,” noted Gellerman. Of
course, such thinking is confusing cause with effect, can be
self-fulfilling, and sometimes is self-defeating. Early-in-the-day
success can be uplifting and may bring out the best in the

salesperson—confidence, attitude, adherence to the selling
fundamentals, etc. Conversely, early-in-the-day failure can be
depressing, bruising the ego and confidence of the less competent salespeople. Selling is a tough way to make a living,
and the salesperson’s ability to manage rejection will help
determine success.

What about the Sales Manager Who Must
Tend to These Salespeople?
The most productive sales manager for an entrepreneurial
organization tends to be a nuts-and-bolts individual, suspicious of the chaotic, zealous new enterprise environment.
The sales manager’s natural inclination will be to bring order
to the confused new enterprise. These individuals rarely
share the entrepreneurial goals of deferred compensation,
and well-paid retirement. They generally prefer immediate
income gratification and a substantial expense-account budget as rewards for their achievements.These traits conflict significantly with the entrepreneur’s hard-work ethic and longrange dreams. Despite the potential for personality clashes,
the entrepreneur needs a nuts-and-bolts individual to manage
the sales organization and bring in the purchase orders.
The really good sales managers try to understand their
people. As GE’s retired CEO legend Jack Welsh recommends
(Collingwood and Coutu 2002):
Get into the skin of every person so that they know
that their ideas count. Celebrate small successes.
Evaluate the people down to the lowest units, so they
know that they count. It’s critical that people know
their achievements are constantly being measured and
that they count. It’s critical that people know that their
contributions matter. It’s critical that they know that
they will be seen and rewarded.

What About Reps?
Early on, many new ventures cannot afford full-time salespeople. As a result, companies often turn to independent sales
agents known as manufacture’s representatives.They are paid
strictly on a variable commission basis and therefore do not
represent a fixed overhead burden to the venture. Reps also
benefit the new enterprise by providing experienced sales
coverage and bringing strong customer relationships to the
venture. Most reps carry several lines and really don’t have to
follow the entrepreneur’s directions. As the company’s line
becomes more important to the rep, this problem lessens,
and benefits to the company accrue.

What Are the Mechanics of Selling?
The mechanics of selling should be perfected to improve
your effectiveness. Most people generally underrate these
procedures because they are seemingly so routine. Do not
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make this mistake. Here are field-tested suggestions on selling
mechanics (with an emphasis on retail channels) from coauthor Brown.
1. Create a database. Every salesperson needs a welldeveloped prospect and customer list.The first step is
to learn to use a computer and use a sales contact program such as ACT!.You can store a variety of different
lists (customer type, industry category, product developments, etc.) should your industry or area of responsibility change.
Keep the old contact list, however. People have a
way of resurfacing elsewhere. Interestingly, when you
meet someone in a new situation, even a modest contact in the “old place” may make you seem much closer in the new one. This has happened to entrepreneurs many times.There is a wonderful New England
expression for this phenomenon, “It isn’t how well
you know someone, but how long.”Old contacts make
for great door openers.
There are essentially two kinds of buyers: (1) those
who are paid to see you (e.g., retail or industrial buyers who are paid to see vendors and potential vendors); and (2) those who are not (e.g., individuals such
as those to whom car or insurance salespeople sell).
Retail and industrial buyers can be identified by various trade books such as Chain Age, Thompson, and
other related periodicals.Another way to build a database is to enter names from trade periodicals in your
field. If you do this for just 12 months, you will build
up a surprisingly good file.
Keep particularly alert for the top 50 to 150
accounts in your territory. This territory can be as
small as a neighborhood of a city and as large as a
worldwide list. Given the 80/20 rule, which is really
95/5 (i.e., 95% of your results come from just 5% of
your customers), you should always be on the lookout
for new customers that can make your top 50 to 150
accounts.
In addition to the ACT! contact file, keep a customer
clippings file. Any news or important events that
includes quarterly results, if they are public company,
should be retained. Get their annual reports if they are
publicly traded.This attention to detail can pay off in
getting your selling proposition, or your deal, in harmony with the business plans of your customer. If the
customers are trying to increase margins, you can
craft your product offering accordingly; if they are trying to increase sales, you can suggest promotions.
2. Getting appointments. Getting appointments with
buyers paid to see vendors is relatively easy.You need
to have a 30- to 60-second speech prepared as to why
they should see you; in the contact stage, do not try to

sell them on your product or service, just on seeing
you. Keep at it; do not leave messages; just keep on
calling until you secure an appointment.
When first contacting customers, make it easy for
them. Meet them when and where they want. Do not
start by trying to get them adapt to your schedule—
unless you believe this is the only way to get them to
see you (i.e., “I will be in your area-town-city on a
given date, can you see me at 10AM?”).
Keep your top accounts on a limited mailing list that
keeps your products or services in front of them on
an ongoing and updated basis.
Tip: If you want to reach the key customer contact, try
before 9AM and after 5PM, which are often the best
times.They are not expecting cold calls then; if they
have gatekeeper secretaries these zealot impeders
are usually not there then.
3. Practice your two-minute presentation. You must
have your own deal down cold so you can respond to
the customers’ questions or interruptions. If you really understand your own deal, you can answer responsively, encourage their participation, let the conversation wander or evolve, and still close the sale.Very few
salespeople know their deal; if you keep practicing
the pitch on customers, you will find out what works
and keep it; what doesn’t and drop it; and what
intrigues them and build on it.
4. Carry a big sales bag. Brown learned long ago to
bring the big, bulky sales case to key customer meetings. That way it showed “I am serious,” and not just
another executive with a skinny elegant briefcase full
of nothing. The symbolic value is important; it says,
“You are serious; I have all the stuff with me.”
In your sales bag, make sure you indeed have all the
right stuff: price lists, catalogs, customer support documents, necessary forms to set up a listing, and documents required to be filled out for the sale.
If they say “yes,” you want to be able to close.While
most salespeople do not have the sales closing documentation, make yourself the exception. On a human
note, buyers appreciate salespeople with the information. The number one complaint of most buyers is
salespeople do not have the information. Astound
them; bring the stuff.
5. Respect the customers’ time. Do not take more than
30 minutes. As has been said to several buyers, “We
are not selling Boeing 747s here.” The implication is
this is a simple, straightforward doable deal. This
makes them relax; the longer the presentation takes,
the more worried most buyers get. After respecting
their time, tell them, “I am glad we could do this
quickly so we did not use too much of your time.”
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They will appreciate the thought and remember you
well for it.
Great Salesperson Story. When new long distance telephone services were coming out, many people
tried to sell entrepreneurial businesses. Brown
observes, “They never had the stuff, the details,
the facts. One salesperson called and said he
would take 10 minutes; when he arrived I took
out my watch and said,“Go.”At the end of 10 minutes he had sold me, completed the paperwork
thanked me, and left. I just had to call his office
and find out more.Yes indeed, this rather modest,
quiet person was their number one salesperson.
Naturally, I asked the office boss why. He gave me
a bunch of reasons that really had nothing to do
with it. The reality was that the man was quickfast, modest, easy, and made the whole process
seem natural. Speed, speed, speed. It is a great way
to close.”
6. Appearance and manners. Suits are the usual uniform. Sports jackets are okay in the more informal
parts of the country. Be neat; orderly; quiet. Sit where
they want you to; do not ask them a lot of questions.
No jokes. No one can tell a good joke; even Jay Leno
has a hard time connecting every time. Stay away
from the yucks. If you are selling to women, do not
move in on their personal space; this applies just as
much to both male and female salespeople.
Tell them why you are there; tell them when you will
leave by; and be straightforward. Do not say anything
to a new prospect that you would not say to your own
grandmother. Miller (1986) noted that the great salespeople tend to be quiet on the sales call even if they
are loud and talkative outside of that environment.
7. Telemarketing. If you are in the telemarketing sales
business, this is an entirely different kind of selling
and should be approached that way. A number of
books have been written on the subject; an inquisitive
entrepreneur might sign up for at least one seminar
with AT&T or the local phone company.
Tip: When telemarketing is part of the sales process,
remember that the prospect cannot see you. Use
this to have all your notes and information spread
out in front of you. The best telemarketing people
have notebooks with sections key coded for objections such as “College-Aged children.” So, if a
prospect says, “I have college-aged children so….”
the salesperson flips to the section that lists the
benefits for that group.
8. Be organized. The image of the bungling salesperson
is a stage prop in the movies and on TV. Great salespeople are absolutely the opposite. In fact, they are

usually quite graceful. This makes sense if you think
about it; no one wants a bumbling fool stumbling
around their office, home, or personal space when
you are out of the house. Your sales practice should
include how to enter a room gracefully, present your
materials, and withdraw when the meeting is over.
Tip: For every sales call, I prepare a short, tight presentation that I have out when I enter the office. My sales
bag has the rest.This way I do not have to open the
bag, pull out the papers and samples, and have the
buyer watch me fumble around. Always have an
order pad with the forms, and two pens with you
(one might not work, and you always want to give
the customer a pen with the paperwork).
9. Start your day early. The best salespeople get to work
early, do their preparation in the morning, and leave at
a reasonable time.They set up their key appointments
for the morning; are wary of late-afternoon appointments; and do not overschedule themselves.
Starting the day late is like trying to chase a train out
of the station.You have to run faster and faster just to
stay even with the train as it roars away.An early start
lets you get prepped for the day. First you plan the
work then you work the plan. If you start late, you
have to do this out of order; plan the work and then
work it the next day. Late salespeople who try to
struggle with their paperwork at the end of the day
when they are tired always have a feeling of “being
behind.” Get over it. Get to work early. Period. If you
are on the road, schedule your first meeting as early as
possible. Most productive selling work is done before
2PM.After that, most sales calls are just spinning your
wheels—unless this is the only time they will meet
you. Some nasty buyers schedule you for 4PM on
Friday, just to test you. Meet the challenge; see them.
But avoid setting future meetings for those times.

Creating a Winning Sales Culture
If Setting Up a Sales Organization Is
Relatively Straightforward, Why Don’t More
Entrepreneurs Implement a Company
Culture that Nurtures “Selling?”
Some CEO-entrepreneurs are going out front and leading the
sales effort. The problem is that not enough are seizing the
reins and doing it.That is why we need to continue to preach
the Gospel of Selling in the attempt to convert a few more
people! Instilling a winning sales culture requires, we would
suggest, an understanding of societal issues such as work,
relaxation, wealth, and respect.
We might reach back to the 19th century and Thorstein
Veblen’s (1899, 1970) The Theory of the Leisure Class. The
essence of elegance, as defined by society, was to do and own
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useless things to demonstrate that you were above the scramble of the everyday hardscrabble life. In other words, you
chose your hobbies, such as exercise, because you had too
much food, too rich a life, and too much in general.You could
get the same exercise by doing yard work, but that would be
a “useful” activity and identify you as “having to do it.”
Golf is a similarly respected activity. It takes a great deal of
leisure and money to play a round of golf. Only those blessed
with both time and money can do so; especially respected
are those lucky few who can do it during the workday. Few
people seem to comment on the fact that golfers generally
spend their time on the course cursing their swing, the lie of
the ball, their clubs, and their luck. Golf can be more work
than the job itself; it is certainly more frustrating for most
people than their jobs.Yet, few will admit that reality.
Some entrepreneurs—when they can spare the time—
enjoy the game of golf as long as it remains that—a game.Yet
one notices that most golfers take the game as seriously as
anything else in their life. Each bad shot can become their
particular crisis.They often don’t seem to be having “fun,” as
one normally defines it. So why, one wonders, do they do it?
This golf metaphor provides an interesting conundrum for
the prospective salesperson to consider: How to work on getting beneath the surface of things to understand people’s
true motivations.The ability to draw such insight reflects an
ability to make the sale.
The premise is that people play golf for many, many reasons because golf is: (1) worthwhile; (2) what true leisure is;
(3) part of being successful; (4) good for business; and (5) just
something to do. Finding out, for example, why the potential
customer likes, or dislikes, golf can provide important clues
as to what is important to that person.
According to Veblen, manual work is “disdained” because
it is so necessary.Think of where society would be without
garbage collectors, dishwashers, phone repair people, and
assorted other performers of critical tasks! The “most valued”
work, in contrast, is theoretical or removed from specific
necessity.
From this viewpoint comes the bias in favor of people
aspiring to become professionals, especially professionals
who do arcane and generally useless stuff. So, the divorce,
probate, and criminal lawyers get little respect because
these are mundane and necessary activities; Wall Street
lawyers get a lot of respect because they do complicated
work that generally has no practical impact whatsoever
other than winding up in musty files. Doctors who act as
GPs or pediatricians, who we all need, get little respect compared to the fancy surgeons. Marketing people are admired;
sales managers are tolerated; but road salespeople are
looked down upon even though the business would fold
without them. Who wants to be a Willie Loman? See the
point? An entrepreneurial culture that ignores those “lowly”

salespeople who actually bring in the purchase orders is
more than a little dysfunctional. As with most obvious
points, they tend to be disregarded.
In many businesses, the sales, production, and customer
service people who make stuff (customer service people
“make stuff” by communicating with customers) get little
respect. “Marketing gurus” and “strategic planners” get the
lion’s share of the respect.As Tom Peters has often suggested,
a sales or customer service person who talks to five people
will find out a lot more about customer opportunities than
most marketing gurus or strategic planners in their daily routines.The golf analogy would involve talking to the starter or
the caddies to get the scoop on the inside stories of the country club! The entrepreneur needs to talk to the real workers
and the real customers! The entrepreneurial culture needs to
be biased in favor of the sellers in the organization.

What Is Needed to Introduce Sales-oriented
Problem-solving to the Entrepreneurial
Culture?
What does all of this analysis have to do with sales? People,
people, people; motivation, motivation, motivation; otherness, otherness, otherness. Not me, me, me. That’s the sales
culture the entrepreneur needs.
To sell, the entrepreneur must absolutely think about why
people act as they do, not take things at face value. Few people admit that they pay attention to advertising. Yet most
routinely buy consumables like Crest toothpaste and think a
Rolls Royce is a pretty neat car—despite never having driven in one! The seller must interpret and understand such
behavior.
The entrepreneur’s challenge is to keep an open mind so
that opportunities can flow in.You need to look at things creatively to seize the opportunity and make the sale. How often
have you heard salespeople say about the customer:“He had
a lot of stupid comments”; “She didn’t understand”; “They
weren’t listening.” The real message, of course, is the salesperson was not listening.
“He had a lot of stupid comments.” Message: The salesperson discounted the customers’ points because they were
not deemed reasonable or warranted in his or her judgment.
Solution: Customer objections to sales presentations suggest
that something could be learned; something new is going on;
this is precisely the time to be listening.
“They weren’t listening.” Message: You turned them off
like a light switch. Solution: Listen and regroup if they are
not paying attention. Find out why. Something is going on; the
salesperson just missed it.
Tip: Just because you do not understand the customers’ feedback does not make them “wrong,”“crazy,” or “stupid.” In
fact, if you believe those things, you are the one who is
wrong, crazy, and stupid.
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What Is Needed to Turn the Tables and
Pursue Selling from the Customer’s
Viewpoint?
Think about your sales situation from the buyer’s perspective. A simple thing, usually overlooked, is that most buyers
(just think about yourself when you are about to buy something) are most concerned about not doing something stupid. They are not as concerned with the right answer as
avoiding the wrong one. They are not seeking the ideal
answer, but just a reasonable one.Addressing this concern is
always of top-most importance.
If you play chess, the perfect approach is to stand up and
observe the board from your opponent’s point of view. The
perspective is startling. The same goes for most sales situations. Consider the sales proposition from the customer’s
perspective.
Search out the differences between appearances and reality. To sell effectively, you must labor hard on this mission.
Think of the simple example of the agreeable prospect, nodding at your every point; then think of another who challenged you sincerely on various points. On the surface, the
agreeable prospect “appears” the more likely buyer, but experienced salespeople know that a challenging series of questions from a buyer is a much better prospect.
As a wise professional once observed about becoming an
executive or a lawyer,“First learn about people; the business
or lawyering part will then be a lot simpler.” Understanding
how people work, and responding to their needs, is how you
match the benefits of your product or service to their situation. In simple terms, God gave you two ears and one
mouth—good salespeople use them in proportion.
Brown notes,“Many salespeople who have worked for me
have commented that I talk at length about selling, the customer account, the prospective orders, and the dynamics of
the overall buyer-seller situation.Yet, they notice that I keep
it quick and simple with the buyer themselves.The reason is
it takes a lot of work to make the presentation simple, clean,
and effective. Or, as Franklin Roosevelt once apologized in a
letter,“I am sorry this letter is so long; I did not have time to
write a short one.”

The Nitty Gritty of Getting the Order
Does the Entrepreneur Know His Own “Deal?”
Consider co-author Brown’s personal experience.
My first real-life explanation of the importance of
the “deal” came at The Hardware Show in Chicago during the early 1970s. While covering the booth, I was
approached by an elegant looking gray-haired man,
with a country boy demeanor, who put a tape recorder
in my face and said, “Tell me your deal, kid. You have
two minutes.

I did. I got the order. I asked him what was the big
hullabaloo, why the tape recorder? He said, “No one
knows their deal. Let me show you.” So, he put me in
tow and we went to other booths and asked the same
question. After the sixth failure, he winked at me and
said,“See. You’ll do fine; just remember your deal. And
always pitch it the way you did, from my point of view,
not your own.”
That was the late, great Sam Walton—when he had
only 22 stores.

How Does the Entrepreneur Develop a Sales
Team with the Right Temperament that Is
Presentable, Is Disciplined, and Gives the
Customers What They Want?
As Oscar Wilde once said,“Experience is the name we give
our mistakes.” He also said that people rarely lament their
mistakes. In effect, if and when you made a mistake you were
in the game actually doing something. It might not have
worked; but you were there. It was real, something happened, and you felt real and human.
If you do not share that point of view, and have a glass jaw
where one hit knocks you out, sales and entrepreneurship
are certainly not for you.
Tip: Salespeople are like dogs, kick them and they come back
again. Cats are like buyers, one bad look, and they are
gone for good. Good salespeople have to be more like
dogs than cats.
The best writer on business is arguably Peter Drucker. His
book, Managing for Results (1964), remains a landmark
some 40 years after original publication. He gets most things
right.The one area where Drucker may be off-base is his conviction that good managers can be good entrepreneurs.The
reality check is that good managers may have skills to be
good entrepreneurs—but will they actually take the risk to
get into the game? Is their temperament suited for the job?
The exact same problem exists in getting people to perform
the sales job.
Many people can do sales; but will they? In this case, will
the entrepreneur? Does your temperament permit you to do
the nitty- gritty job of selling versus the more elegant, but less
useful task of managing or marketing? One must deal with
this temperament issue before starting to refine other talents.
A few key points are worth emphasizing and reemphasizing.
l You must genuinely like and care about people.
Today, people are experienced and worn out by all the
sales pitches and ads machine gunned at them. They
have become more skilled in filtering the real from the
phony. The first turnoff is if they feel the salesperson
or advertiser is not genuine or real.
Gerstener, former CEO of IBM, and Bill Gates of
Microsoft may be busy doing a lot of sophisticated
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things, but they obviously get a kick out of people.
They like to mix it up. Gates even played golf with
President Clinton! Gerstener simply loved to talk to
people.
In contrast, there are the examples of Palmer and
Olsen ex-CEOs of (the former) Digital Equipment,
both of whom were known as elite nonsocial types.
They did not enjoy mixing with people. Palmer was
known as a fashion plate; Olsen as a down-home, redshirted Maine type. People were not their thing. If they
would not sell, they had to let someone else try. The
same goes for every entrepreneur. Don’t force-fit misanthropes into the selling process!
You have to be able to listen and reevaluate based
on new information received. A salesperson is like a
waiter who starts out with a menu and comes back
with a tailored, individual order. If one diner likes steak
and the another chicken, neither one is right or
wrong.The same principles apply to dealing with customers; each has particular requirements.These needs
are neither right nor wrong. It is especially not the
function of the waiter, or salesperson, to pass judgment on customer requirements. Far too many salespeople spend time criticizing the issues raised by buyers instead of addressing them. Instead, they should be
linking product benefits with customer needs.
One reason French restaurants have really never
worked in the United States is that Americans do not
like to be told what is right and what is not, and to be
made to feel foolish because of their choices or suffer
the condescending attitudes of the French waitertype. All too many salespeople come off like French
waiters!
You should be quick, short, and respect the customers’ time. Nothing is respected by a buyer as much
as brief, concise, documented presentations.The number one complaint of buyers is that salespeople do not
have the facts.The number two complaint is that salespeople take too long and do not get to the point.
Nothing is remembered better than giving buyers the
gift of their time back. Just because you have flown
3,000 miles does not mean you should spend a long
time on the sales call.
Stick to the customers’ needs, not to your opinions;
knowledge is king. Keep “I” out of your presentation
and put “you”in.This is not trivial. Learn their business;
understand how your products or services could better their situation.Tailor your presentation accordingly. Some might view this as phony. Buyers acknowledge that, yes, this is an obvious tact; but they also
state that it is all too rare and the salespeople who do
bother to scout the territory always make better rec-

ommendations. In other words, it is a blunt, bolder
approach; but it works for both sides.
l Do not interrogate the customer. Do your research in
advance. If you have questions, call the library. The
buyer should not be subjected to cross-examination. It
is not the inalienable right of the salesperson to ask or
the requirement of the buyer to answer. Questions
usually frustrate and irritate the buyer; most want to
just say, “Tell me your deal and get on with it.” This
advice is contrary to most sales advice. Most of that
advice relates to trapping buyers with questions. Bad
idea; overused. Good salespeople do not need it.
Do not fall off the other side of the horse and never
ask any questions! Ask appropriate questions as a sign
of respect and interest, but not as a means of entrapment and false empathy. Comments indicating that
you know the essentials about their business are good;
for those prospective customers which are public
companies, get the annual reports. Read the chairperson’s letter. Good companies have a clear-written mission; bad ones do not. The best companies follow
through on the leader’s comments; most do not.
Indirectly test whether the customer decision-maker
has “hot buttons” aligned to the company’s promulgated mission statement.
l Do not demo unless required; then do so cleanly and
quickly. Modern technology has a lot to answer for
with regard to the assault on the senses. Don’t overwhelm the buyer.Tell the story. Have a written presentation and wait for interest before demoing. Demo to
close the order; do not launch into it. It tends to be a
“me, me, look how smart I am/we are” thing. Be cautious here.
The first step in improving any high-tech approach
is deteching the sales force. Stop the techno talk.
“People talk”counts the most.What will all of this techno virtuosity do other than cost a lot of money, possibly blow up, drive the salesperson nuts, require a lot of
feed and caring, and potentially make the salesperson
the laughing stock of the company? Keep it simple.
Nice, clean facts are appreciated and remembered.
As Tom Hopkins (1984) says brilliantly in How to
Master the Art of Selling, “People buy with emotion
and defend with logic.” They want to be satisfied emotionally that this buy-decision is not just another dumb
deal they should have passed on.They worry that the
proposition is too good to be true; that it will cost a lot
more than quoted. Use your facts to answer these key
emotional questions. If you doubt the validity of this
premise, just think about your purchase of most bigticket things such as a car or a house. Didn’t you
worry: (1) it was “too much,” (2) you would “change
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your mind” later, or (3) there is a better “deal somewhere?” Your customers are no different. Deal with
these questions directly, not by trying to outdemo or
outsmart them.The “techno-speak” approach just raises the anxiety level of the buyer—“Whoops, I am
being taken again.”
l Good manners. Good manners are universally appreciated by the customer. If they ask you to have coffee,
have it. Take your coffee black; the fuss-free option
will endear you to the buyer. Do not hassle the receptionist, secretary, or assistant. Brush up on your manners.Think of your visit as going to a foreign country.
Don’t be the ugly American. Fit in.
The pleasant, polite salesperson is all too rare a
phenomenon. Cut the jokes; most buyers cannot
remember the last funny one they heard. Watch out
about crossing the line into personal subjects. Most
buyers feel vulnerable enough without being questioned on private matters. Well-mannered people
have the best luck in getting the second or third
appointment.
l Minimize or eliminate your corporate rulebook.
God used just Ten Commandments to run the world.
Do not add more of your own rules for your customers. Be easy to do business with. Do not treat your
customers as potential bad debtors. Check out
whether you will sell them before you see them; no
credit applications should ever be inflicted upon
potential customers in this day and age. Enough information is available today to get a D&B (Dunn &
Bradstreet report) on most customers.At a minimum,
you should know a few vendors that they buy from
to check out credit, if required. Casual inquiry can get
you their bank and a trade reference or two.
The Credit Applications department often seems
to be a sorry institution intent upon harassment and
putting customers “in their place.” All of that customer credit information is available elsewhere.
Once you get the customer’s first check, you have
access to all of it anyway. Do not be self-deceived;
most credit managers do not do your firm any good.
Otherwise, why the large bad debt balances? Big bad
debts occur because credit managers do not check
back on the story with your customer base. You do
not lose money on new customers. You lose money
on good customers that go bad—and the folks in
credit rarely pay attention. So don’t try to bail out
your credit department by harassing prospective
customers with forms. Excellent examples of this
credit manager failure are Pharmor and Ames. Both
showed signs of huge problems 18 months before
going into Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.

Find out customer needs; get the order written; and
then fight with your beloved credit department to get
the order approved. Do not waste time on jamming a
rulebook down the customer’s throat. If you handle
the first part successfully, you can usually get the customer to conform to a few relatively minor rules later
on.
l Practice and refine your pitch. It is imperative you
keep working to refine your presentation. Find out
from buyers afterwards what worked and what did
not. Be careful about the analysis since a lot of success
comes from emotion and that is both hard to describe
and hard for people to admit they are susceptible to.
Again, as Tom Hopkins (1984) says, “People buy with
emotion and defend with logic.”
l Be organized. Let us reemphasize some details. Use a
contact manager software tool such as ACT! Have your
travel case packed. Use the big salesperson type of travel case—it looks serious and there is always room for
one more thing. Always have your data there so you can
fill out the forms on the spot, close the deal, and get the
order.
Again, with reference to Veblen and the desire to be
above “actual work”—most salespeople like to look
sleek with a small, thin briefcase.They never have the
information required to complete the deal. Buyers love
the information right there. Brown comments,“As one
buyer said to me as I pulled one thing after another out
of my salesperson case, ‘Got a corn muffin in there
too?’ He loved the joke; told it often; and loved all the
data I packed in the case. He especially liked it because
I was the president of the company and thought
enough of him to pack completely for the sales call. Do
not let Veblen get to you here. Have the nitty-gritty
with you.”

Real-World Lessons
Co-author Deaver Brown is the consummate salesman—a
closer who generally gets the purchase order. Someone
who’s been selling his whole life, Brown held part-time
sales jobs during his college years.After earning his MBA, he
worked at General Foods, marketing Cool Whip (differentiated brand) and then Birdseye Vegetables (commodity
"plus" brand). After a couple of years in the cocoon of
Mother GF, he was bitten with entrepreneurial fever. In the
1970s, he sold baby goods (Cross River); in the
1980s–1990s, he sold UPS units for PCs (American Power
Conversion); and in the 1990s–2000s, he sold low-cost, general interest information via CD-ROMs (Simply Media).
These experiences provide a context for understanding
how to “close” in the selling process and obtain the purchase order.
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What Was Learned from the Cross River
Umbroller Stroller Experience?
Addressing the juvenile furniture marketplace, Brown
cofounded Cross River, Inc. (CRI) in 1971 to manufacture,
market, and sell the then-revolutionary stick-folding baby
strollers to Macy’s department stores, the Bloomingdale’s of
their day, and K-Mart, the Wal-Mart of its day. What were the
lessons learned?
l Pick names with a good image. Brown picked
“Umbroller” as a contraction of umbrella and stroller,
and the name was extremely well-received. “Cross
River” derived from a sign on 84 Route North in New
York, a local town near the plant. It had the perfect
18th-century sound to help disguise the venture’s
newness.
l Analyze and understand the size and structure of
the market. CRI determined that 1,400,000 baby
strollers were sold annually according to the 1970
Census. Total wholesale sales were about $25 million. Despite the visibility of the category, with products rolling down the streets, the market was quite
small, fragmented between 20 manufacturers, and
the birth rate was in decline in the 1970s with only
3 million babies born per year (most purchases were
for the first born; the rest hand-me-downs; first-born
births were about 1,400,000 as well). CRI determined it was also a niche market with only 5 percent
of the population at any time having any need whatsoever for a baby stroller in their family or extended
family.
l Target accessible channels of distribution. Initially,
CRI was selling primarily through small stores, but had
secured a few small chains such as Bradlees in New
England with 100 stores and, eventually,Wal-Mart, then
having only 60 stores.The primary method of distribution was through the major chains, Sears, Wards, KMart, and JC Penney—very similar to Wal-Mart,Target,
and Sears/K-Mart of today. A secondary form of distribution was through the growing regional discount
chains, most of which have now been severely marginalized or gone out of business, such as Ames, Bradlees,
Caldor, Hills, and Zayre. In the 1970s, department
stores were a formidable force and had representation
by stand-alone retailers in most major towns and cities
in the United States.These outlets would later become
marginalized, rolled-up into May or Federated, and
stop selling anything but apparel. In the 1970s, outlets
like Macys were an important influence and sold a lot
of strollers.
l Know the product costs. The production costs worked
out to be $8.00 per stroller in small quantities and
declining to about $6.50 each for 10,000 units per

l

l

l

l

month.The assembly process was reasonably complex
with a frame consisting of 12 pieces of tubing, 8
wheels—2 per strut, 42 rivets, a specially sewn seat
that had to be free-hanging, plastic-dipped handles to
be cool in summer and warm in winter, various steel
brackets to hold the product together, and a flexible
footrest.
Set a price that assures a profit. CRI sold $13.50 per
stroller which retailed at $25.00 representing a 40 percent markup for the retailers. Some stores like Saks
sold the Umbroller Stroller for $30.00. CRI’s variable
cost came in at $9.35; $8.00 for the stroller; 5 percent
of the sales price ($13.50) for commissions, and 5 percent for other discounts, returns, and the like. So CRI
netted $4.15 per stroller.
Know the operation’s break-even. Within a year, CRI
was selling 2,000 strollers a month, enough to breakeven on the entrepreneurs’ low overhead costs.
Knowing the break-even volume allows the entrepreneur to have information to make better decisions.
Set up a rep network. Distribution did not seem unduly difficult with a very fragmented system.There were
free-standing stores in most states; no major competitor that could stop CRI; lots of independent reps to
help. The CRI entrepreneurs very early on attended
their first trade show and got purchase orders for
about 2,000 strollers, a one-month breakeven. Such
early success in “closing the deal” provided a certain
cachet that allowed them to attract and hire a group of
commissioned sales reps around the country, and even
landed an opening order from Bradlees, a small discount chain in New England.
Land a major account. CRI’s challenge was to land a
major account to reach the 4,000–6,000 unit per
month to get operations out of “the land of the living
dead.” CRI figured the old-line retailers would not
budge. CRI was new and so was by definition “bad.”
CRI felt that the Young Turks were the discounters, trying to get big and successful. CRI had sold to Bradlees
and that had gone all right; but the buyer left and the
new buyer didn’t give CRI much more business. CRI
also saw an opportunity with department stores that
flourished picking up new and interesting lines of
merchandise. CRI had done well with them in a lot of
small cities, though not in New York, Chicago, or Los
Angeles—the major cities of the time. CRI targeted two
possible major accounts: Macy’s in New York and KMart, the Wal-Mart of its day, in Troy, Michigan. (Brown
closed on both!)
–Macy’s was the Bloomingdale’s and Neiman Marcus
of its day (and before there were many specialty
store chains) and was a dominant player in selected
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markets across the country. The New York buyer
would help CRI get into its Midwestern and San
Francisco stores if CRI was successful in doing business with him. Closing this account would give CRI a
prestige boost in the large cities where the population was still centered in the 1970s. Macy’s also had
outlets in surrounding suburbs, of course, but the real
action tended to be in their downtown stores where
women pilgrimaged to have the fun of the shopping
experience.The buyer was willing to see CRI because
of past discussions and because he had seen the
Umbroller Stroller in some of the smaller department
stores in town. Further, he had an ongoing relationship with CRI’s salesman who had sold him carriages, a big business in cities in those days.The buyer
was a long-term employee and of a conservative
nature. He was quite knowledgeable about the industry and Macy’s methods and objectives.
–K-Mart was the lead dog in the industry. It was at
least five times larger than its next competitor, Zayre,
in New England, and the Woolco division of
Woolworth in New York. K-Mart had no pretension of
high-end merchandise and positioned its products
toward blue-collar workers. If others, lured by the
cachet of value pricing, wished to buy there so be it.
n Price points. K-Mart had three strollers: $9.99;
$19.99; $29.99. They took slightly more than 40
percent markup or paid their vendors about $5.90,
$11.80, or $17.40 or thereabouts for these products. CRI knew K-Mart worked a little tighter on
margin at the low end and higher at the high end.
So CRI’s first question was, "What price point to
pitch at?"
n Choosing the right slot. The idea of going “up” was
absurd.The high price points have all the bells and
whistles and generally sell darn little stuff in the
major discounters. They are there principally for
show.They also are subject to be changed-out continually as the next big thing hits—which always
does. So the second price point, $19.99, made
sense.This was especially appropriate since K-Mart
had pretty good sell-through even at $24.99. CRI’s
price at the $19.99 retail slot was $11.80. With a
$9.35 variable cost at low margins (with $1.35
built into that figure for rep commissions, returns,
promotions), a clean $11.80 would deliver
between $2.45 and $3.80, or 20 percent gross margin up to 32 percent—not bad. One might overlook the notion that $11.80 is an acceptable number. If volume were to soar, as CRI desired, the
$8.00 cost would drop further to $6.50 at a minimum.That meant the upside was a 45 percent mar-
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gin. So why not do it? The largest problem can be
ego.The entrepreneur might forget that the objective is to close the deal and create a favorable platform to grow from. Agreeing to the $11.80 CRT
price point (and the $19.99 K-Mart price point),
could create a platform for future trust and more
purchase orders.
l Picking up on hints from the decision-maker. The KMart buyer was seasoned, conservative, and liked the
status quo. He had become a millionaire through KMart stock options, a situation for which he was
famous. Although loyal to K-Mart, he was clear about
his objective to finish up his last couple of K-Mart years
smoothly and retire. He said,“Don’t make a special trip
to see me.” Brown had previously called him from the
New York airport saying he was in town and could he
see the buyer. Several times before the buyer had said,
“No.” The one time he said,“Yes,” Brown flew to Detroit
and saw him. Since this buyer didn’t like sales reps,
Brown went alone. He told Brown this was an informational meeting only. Brown determined he would
therefore inform him.The buyer said 10 minutes would
be enough.That was a “buy sign.” Brown indeed got the
order. Did he know why? Not really! It is about getting
the order, not explaining the rationale. It is about listening to the customer. And this brings the reasoning
full circle as to why the entrepreneur must lead the
sales charge. He or she must listen intensely, and often
painfully, to buyers’ responses to recalibrate the company’s products, services, and organizations, as well as its
presentations and selling habits.The sale to K-Mart was
the beginning of this lesson for Cross River. CRI gradually learned what K-Mart “really” wanted:An aggressive
packaging goods orientation to the staid baby furniture
business. It took years before the buyer admitted to
Deaver, “I bought from you in hopes you would drag
the industry by its ears out of the dark ages of all the
brown packaging and products of yesteryear.”
l Exploit the first key orders to establish long-term sustained relationships. CRI got the initial POs from both
Macy’s and K-Mart.The trick is to make the opportunity snowball.
–The Macy’s unit was also slotted at $11.80 for CRI,
$19.99 for Macy’s, providing Macy’s with a 42 percent
gross margin. From an initial test order of 100 units, the
ongoing relationship flourished for well over a decade,
until they discontinued hard goods.
–CRI closed the initial K-Mart deal for only 48 units in
a four-store test, of 12 pieces per store. Within a year,
however, K-Mart was buying 25,000 units per year.
Within three years, 50,000 units; and the bragging
rights helped catapult CRI to a 40 percent market
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share or 560,000 units per year.The lower price point
expanded the market substantially and the company
soon sold 1,000,000 units per year as the market
expanded.

How Was the American Power Conversion
Corp. (APCC) Experience Different?
American Power, founded by three MIT engineers, created
the small–sized Uninterruptible Power System (UPS) to capitalize on the growing importance of PCs in the early 1980s.
With Moore’s law doubling chip speed every 18 months, PCs
were about to replace minicomputers in the workplace
because they were simpler and easier to operate. Managers
and entrepreneurs were preparing spreadsheets (Lotus 123)
on their new processing tools.
The sales and marketing challenge was to locate the right
distribution channel through which APCC could gain early
dominance, and grow with the market to a substantial size.
Interestingly, that market had not been created yet.The VARs
(value-added resellers) were the ideal customers, but were
just coming into being, putting together entire systems for
companies.The first inkling of VARs emerging was with VARs
selling point-of-sale and inventory control software, hardware, and peripherals to retailers.
This was a perfect market for APCC since retailers had
important data to protect and lots of locations, which meant
both a substantial need and lots of potential orders. While
this was all transpiring, coauthor Brown led the effort to stabilize sales by selling to small computer retailers, distributors, and direct end-users. The effort was quite difficult and
produced modest results in the early years; however,APCC’s
early entry to the VAR market meant the company ultimately
kept its market leadership role as PC sales grew.The purchase
orders eventually started rolling in. Profitable growth soon
resulted. To help fund this growth, coauthor Levangie brokered through Wall Street APCC’s IPO.The happy end to this
selling story is that APCC is now at the $2 billion revenue
level and has a $4.5 billion market capitalization.

What Market Traits Make the Current
Simply Media Selling Experience Different?
Simply Media (SM) experienced brand consumer software
sales channel challenges similar to that of APCC.The primary
area in which consumer products were sold was the mass
market grocery, drug, and mass merchant retailers segments.
Most software was too high-priced to sell well in these locations.As a rule, nothing much more than $5 sells well in groceries or drug chains (other than drugs themselves), and not
more than $10 in mass market retailers.
This was best reflected in the fact grocery and drug chains
sold 40 percent of the books and magazines sold at retail
while they sold less than 1 percent of the software. This 39

percent differential was very appealing as a sales opportunity.The first step was to engineer costs out of the product system to reduce a $7.99 low-priced line aimed at computer
stores such as Best Buy, Circuit City, and CompUSA and drive
the price down to the $2.99 to $3.99 level.
As CEO, co-author Brown set up a series of rep groups to
assist in this effort, but, as with Umbroller and APCC, they were
of limited value since reps are best at servicing existing
accounts,not opening them.Once he got the price point down
to $3.99, Brown started to get modest distribution in these
channels that includes grocery,drug,and mass market chains—
opening up some sales with Kroger, Ahold, and RiteAid. Even
though SM’s sales were small, it became the leader in this distribution channel—the key to long-term survival—market
share dominance—and being #1 or #2, as Jack Welch
preached to the American business community (Peter Drucker
agreed; so this wasn’t bad company in which to be aligned).
As SM’s made cost-saving improvements and gained outright ownership of its own titles (which its primary $9.99
price-slot competitors did not), its cost structure was
reduced further so it could then sell the fastest-growing sector in retail—the dollar stores and dollar zones within multiple price point chains.
No software company had yet entered the dollar zone. SM
therefore figured that if it reached this price point, the company would gain early dominance and establish brand image.
In most consumer markets, this leads to long-term dominance (whoever really replaces M&Ms, Crest, Cool Whip,
Cheerios, Rubbermaid, and the rest, despite the repeated
blunders of their management teams?).
Simply Media accomplished dominance by reconfiguring
its products into thin colorful sleeves for its CDs; selling only
in preassorted displays; and emphasizing large order customers, but supplying smaller ones if they made the supply
issues simple.The SM brand became the market leader in the
$1 software business.

Parting Thoughts
Does the Entrepreneur Remember How
Professional Investors View Sales?
Wall Street is constantly on the prowl for growth companies.
Wall Street is notoriously unforgiving about failures. Wall
Street forgives a lot with regard to fast-growing sales companies because increased sales cover a lot of sins in other areas.
Wall Street is always trying to hitch its star to the “next”
‘49er’s Gold Rush, whether it be multimedia a few years ago
or the Internet today. Why? Because emerging markets produce all kinds of large, financially successful companies.
Many companies have grown quickly without any genuine
profits at all. This is because their financial backers have
allowed them the luxury of growing by subsidizing their lack
of profit and usually their even greater lack of cash. Why do
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hard-boiled financial types permit this? Simply because sales
are the top line that create the bottom line.Without substantial, growing sales, a company is apt to decline into mediocrity, to be followed by slow attrition and eventual extinction.
The long-time credo of the Boston Consulting Group (and its
many offshoots) is that profitability is a function of market
share. Sales growth is key!
Tip: Don’t ever forget that good sales performance keeps
companies fresh, profitable, and happy! Too many entrepreneurs and executives forget this. Just get the purchase
orders! Happy investors make for happier entrepreneurs!

Does the Entrepreneur Remember to Keep
an Open Mind to Allow Opportunities to
Flow in?
Every business started with its first sale.Virtually every entrepreneur remembers his or her first sale as people remember
their first love. Coauthor Brown, for example, recalls:
My first sale in my own company was a 600-piece
Umbroller stroller order to Bradlees, a major Massachusetts discounter at the time. I remember the buyer,
Barry Cohen, the place, a corner of a One Park Avenue
Showroom in New York City, and the circumstances—
the quick demo, the sales negotiation, and getting the
paperwork (before computers, one could actually get
orders on the spot). This order was my initial training
ground at my first trade show. After each order, or
nonorder, I reviewed my success or failure, revised my
approach, and pushed on. By the end of this first five-day
trade show, I was much more effective by being more
responsive to buyer needs, quicker off the mark, and
faster to close.
The objective is to adjust continually your selling approach
to be more responsive to customers and more effective in closing.This comes from listening to your customers with an open
mind about everything surrounding the sale, and responding
with better information, processes, and products or services.
Each selling experience has the potential to give you more
knowledge to move forward and be a better salesperson.You
can either “dig in” and get ornery, or be one of those rare salespeople that stay fresh by being open to the new experiences
and knowledge that is newly available to them.
Tip: You have two ears and one mouth—use them in proportion. Bad salespeople seem to have two mouths and one
ear.

Does the Entrepreneur Fully Realize that
the Customer Is a Gold Mine Whose Ideas
Can Lead to Additional Purchase Orders?
All customers have a potentially mutual stake in the out-

come of the sales call. They can become the salesperson’s
partner. Remember, your customers have horizontal knowledge; you only have vertical knowledge. Retail and large
industrial buyers see virtually all the important industry
players every 90 days.They hear and are told virtually every
industry story.This gives them a breadth of knowledge even
they do not always appreciate. You, on the other hand, are
caught in your vertical world of knowing your company
very well, but not knowing as much about your competitors
and their plans.
Buyers will rarely tell you directly about your competitor’s plans. But they will respond to what they think will
work best; much of this knowledge comes from their horizontal knowledge.Access this knowledge. Use it.
Timing is key. The above advice regarding intelligence
gathering is to be used only after you have made your presentation, have their commitment to the concept, and then are
filling in the details. Potential customers hate to be crossexamined or buried in questions.
The customer feedback and advice that the entrepreneur
does receive can be quite constructive since it means that
there is a seriously committed buyer who shares an interest
in refining the deal so it is the best it can possibly be.

Does the Entrepreneur Know “the Deal?” If
Not, Why Not, and What’s the Damage of
Being "Off-deal" (Wal-Mart Example)?
Just consider Wal-Mart’s profitable growth generated under
Sam Walton’s leadership. Mr. Sam spent a seemingly inordinate amount of time telling the Wal-Mart story (“the Deal”) to
his customers, suppliers, salespeople, bankers, Wall Street,
and communities at large. His deal for consumers was the
lowest price; his deal for everyone else was to share in the
glow of the resulting prosperity coming from satisfied consumers.The proof about the power of Walton’s simple, clear
message was the fervor of the commitment he created. Just
as clearly, once Walton was slowed down with cancer and
gradually became less associated with Wal-Mart prior to his
death, the company slowly became just another big firm
mired in controversy with no special feeling around it. The
Deal had been forgotten!
Now many communities sue Wal-Mart about siting new
stores. People fear Wal-Mart, wary that their newly earned
killer reputation will harm the local economy. Vendors fear
Wal-Mart because Wal-Mart is exercising its muscle with
tough terms, markdown money, chargebacks for small mistakes, and aggressive price negotiations. In other words,WalMart now has the tough guy image that Sears had in the
1960s and 1970s which brought them low.
The final problem is all of this has slowed down Wal-Mart’s
sales growth. This, in turn, has slowed down its stock performance making employee stock options represent less
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value. So employees may become less committed in the field
and at headquarters. A Wal-Mart job is no big deal now. As a
result, the dry rot continues—just like it did at Sears in the
1960s and 1970s. It can be argued that the company no
longer “knows the deal!” It has made the company vulnerable. Consider the four rules put forward by Maier (2005) on
how to beat Wal-Mart:
1. Hit ‘em where they ain’t. Costco targets a higher economic demographic segment—people with cash
who want cachet on the cheap. Result (2004): Costco
sales per store was $115 million; Sam’s Club was $67
million.
2. Outdiscount the discounter. Dollar Tree tries for
straightforward pricing and a less painful shopping
experience. Result (2004): Dollar Tree enjoyed a 9.7
percent operating margin;Wal-Mart’s was 5.9 percent.
3. Recreate what “the Deal” used to be. In the grocery
segment, Save-A-Lot stores bring back the old-time
sense of Main Street and focus on underserved neighborhoods. Result (2004): Save-A-Lot’s profit margin
was 3.5 percent;Wal-Mart’s was 2.6 percent (groceries
only).
4. Win the service game. Dick’s Sporting Goods has
developed in-store sales teams that have both in-depth
product knowledge and treat customers with TLC.
Result (2004): Dick’s Sporting Goods experienced revenue growth of 34 percent;Wal-Mart’s was 16 percent
(sporting goods only).
The player with the best “deal” generally wins.

Does the Entrepreneur Know How to Define
a Selling Proposition by What His or Her
Company Does Not Do?
In reviewing successful companies, one is struck by the clarity of their deal proposition. Hertz rents cars, McDonalds sells
hamburgers, H&R Block does your taxes, Southwest Airlines
offers low cost travel, PricewaterhouseCoopers does corporate taxes and accounting, TRW makes parts, H-P develops
computer-related products and instruments. GE stands out as
the exception that proves the rule—that rare company that
does many things well.
Successful companies generally offer excellent quality at a
reasonable price. Many may have slightly higher prices than
their competitors, but not by much. Each one has a solid value
proposition. Occasionally they wander from their mission.This
“wandering-off-deal” syndrome erodes the selling proposition.
An amusing case-in-point relates to the fast food business.
McDonalds and Burger King joust with each other on premiums, new products, and the like. Yet, when desperate for
increased sales and profits, every six months or so, they
return to their low cost/high value roots and just put out
lower prices on their basic menu. And, about a month later

the CEO appears in the Wall Street Journal stating, with
some surprise,“It worked. It really did.” There is better food
than McDonalds and Burger King; but quick, courteous service, and low costs got them to the party. Forget your deal at
your peril, folks.
Just consider the failure of Sears (before Arthur Martinez)
and later K-Mart to retain the ranking as the number one
American retailer. Good quality at a great price got them to the
party and to the highest industry ranking.They then started to
nibble at the edges of their “Deal.” They took a spoke out of a
bicycle here, a double stitching out of a garment there, and
replaced a brand name with a no-name over there. Then the
price of the goods moved up a percentage point over here,
then over there, then overall. Result: They forgot their deal.
The consumer does not catch on all at once.The first thing
that goes is excitement about shopping there. People waited
for their Sears catalog; they checked it out before buying
almost anything, anywhere. That excitement disappeared
decades ago. The catalog only expired a few years ago.
Leadership was lost when the excitement disappeared.
The same “wandering-off-deal” happened at K-Mart. The
company stopped looking for great value for their customers.
They discontinued their blowout pricing. And they became
just another store.
As detailed previously, the same thing is happening at WalMart these days.As one consumer who went into a new store
said,“I was expecting something special; it was not there.” The
success or failure of Wal-Mart’s 2006 image campaign (“Look
beyond the basics!”) remains untested.
The entrepreneur-salesperson must acknowledge this reality of knowing what you aren’t.You must know what you don’t
know!
The best example of this approach is Southwest Airlines.
They focus on value and revel in what they are not. This permits them to be the best at what they are.The founder realized
that his number one customer was his employees. He realized
that if he let his customers destroy the morale of his employees, they would not be able to do their job well.
As a result, every Southwest employee is permitted to, in
effect,“Fire a Customer.” The method is not to say to the customer,“You are wrong.” The approach is to say,“We don’t do
that here. You should try our competitor, American. They do
what you want.”
The Southwest “deal” is to provide low-cost transportation
competitive with cars. It is meant to take salespeople, families,
and others off the road and load them onto planes because
Southwest is cheaper and faster. Period. That is the deal.
Southwest does not compete with other airlines.Those carriers simply happen to be there, too.
To execute this “deal,”along with their enviable excellence
in safety and on-time arrival performance, Southwest decided
what they would not do:
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1. No food. That requires clean up and expense. Food
slows down the turnaround time at airports so planes
cannot be used as often and elimination of food service decreases expense.
2. No assigned seats. This eliminates the complexity, the
hassle, the error rate, and the upset. It speeds up loading and requires fewer staff people, hence less
expense.
3. No third-party ticket distribution. This eliminates the
fees and errors with travel agents.
This definition of deal also makes the whole enterprise a
more efficient one because employees can concentrate on
fewer things. Just as importantly, employees have the ability
to say honestly, “We do not do that here. If you want food,
assigned seats, and tickets through other people, go to
American. If you want fast, dependable, cheap service—we
do that.”
As Tom Peters says in one of his books,“The Wow factor is
important.” Southwest? …..Wow!

Does the Entrepreneur Know How to
Present, Close, and Leave?
In a sales presentation, you need to focus on the other guy—
not your notes.You need to master the details so you can listen
patiently to the buyer’s questions and respond accordingly.
Brown observes:
In my sales presentations, I find myself always trying
to head for the exit once the order is committed to. I do
not want to give the slightest sliver of opportunity for
a rethinking, a new discussion, or a thoughtful moment.
My best reps know that my skill in getting out of an
office quickly after the order is committed to is my
most memorable talent. Get the order—leave. Let the

customers consider this settled ground; move on. Give
them their time and space.
And this brings the discussion full circle as to why the
entrepreneur must lead the sales charge. He or she must listen intensely, and often painfully, to buyers’ responses to
recalibrate their products, services, and organizations, not to
speak of their presentations and selling habits. Message: Close
and leave.

Does the Entrepreneur Remember the
Dream and the Payoff?
The good entrepreneur truly believes in his or her dream and
is a missionary to convert all the nonbelievers. If the selling
process is well-executed, the purchase orders will roll in.
What’s the payoff for all the nitty-gritty tasks of customer
prospecting? Consider these sales of entrepreneurial companies, as reported by Howard (2006) and Reidy (2006):
l Tom’s of Maine (natural products, such as toothpaste)
sold itself to Colgate for $100 million in 2006.
l The Body Shop (2,085 stores—environmentally friendly products) was bought by L’Oreal for $1.1 billion in
2006.
l Cape Cod Potato Chips was sold first to Eagle Snacks
(1985) and then (after repurchase) to Lance, Inc.
(1999).
l Nantucket Nectars was sold first to Ocean Spray (1997)
and then to Cadbury Schweppes (2002).
l Ben & Jerry’s was sold to Unilever in 2000.
l Stonyfield Farm was sold to French Dannon yogurt
maker Groupe Danone in 2003.
So why all the fuss over purchase orders? As they say at
MIT, it should be intuitively obvious to even the most casual
observer!
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